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Abstract 
 
The thesis tries to answer a central question about Dickens’ works: how can writing that is, in 
Grahame Smith’s words, ‘essentially…distorting’ also be ‘more real than reality itself’? If ‘the 
language of realism’ is, as Donald Fanger says in his seminal book on, among others, Dickens, ‘a 
language that does not do violence to its objects’, a language that ‘present[s] the object with…a 
minimum of emotional or stylistic deformation’, how is Dickens’ language ‘real’? To answer 
these questions, this thesis takes up and expands on Brigid Lowe’s notion of a ‘realistic 
hypotyposis’, realism as ‘fantasmatic’ (the purpose of the classical trope hypotyposis being, 
Aristotle affirmed, to ‘mak[e] our hearers see things’).  
 
The thesis explores, through Dickens’ writing, the descriptive procedures required to 
make the reader ‘see things’, to stimulate ‘fancy’. To do so, it ranges across three chapters in 
relation to Dickens’ writing. The first of these chapters examines knowledge in Bleak House, 
meditating on what is known, and when, and how, to argue that knowledge is dubious in Dickens 
and, further, is subordinate to fancy. The second chapter examines constructions of science in 
relation to Hard Times to show how fancy can actually yield knowledge, showing how 
defamiliarising language such as hypotyposis facilitates discovery better than the starveling 
abnegations of positivism. The final chapter examines The Haunted Man and The Mystery of 
Edwin Drood to show ‘reality’ itself defamiliarised in tranced visions. Its main interest is how 
these visions correlate with Dickens’ descriptive prose. That is the essence of the thesis: an effort 
to explain how distortion, even falsity, is essential to the transacting of representation in 
Dickens’ writing. 
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Abbreviations and Textual Note 
 
I have used the following abbreviations where necessary. If I have not mentioned a name 
recently or am using it for the first time in a chapter section, I revert back to the 
unabbreviated name (one hesitates to write ‘full name’, since these full names are themselves 
abbreviations). 
 
American Notes – AN 
Barnaby Rudge – BR 
Bleak House – BH 
Hard Times – HT 
The Haunted Man – THM 
Little Dorrit – LD 
The Mystery of Edwin Drood – Drood 
Martin Chuzzlewit – MC 
Oliver Twist – OT 
Our Mutual Friend – OMF 
Pictures from Italy – Pictures 
Sketches by Boz – Sketches 
 
Where they are valid I have retained alternative spellings in quotations. For example, I do not 
amend Carlo Ginzburg’s rendering of ‘defamiliarise’ as ‘defamiliarize’. On the topic of s’s 
and z’s, I use an s after possessive apostrophes for multisyllabic names ending in s sounds but 
not for multisyllabic names ending in z sounds. This means I write ‘Lewes’s’ but not 
‘Dickens’s’ or ‘Todgers’s’, which I realise is at odds with standard Dickens usage. 
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Introduction 
 
Well into the contents pages of The Pickwick Papers the reader is presented with, impeccably 
timed, this anti-précis of a chapter: ‘16. Too full of Adventure to be briefly described’. Its 
delightful silliness – not to mention its intimation of sprawling picaresque – strikes the 
keynote of the novel. More is the pity, I have felt at times, that the same dodge is not 
available to me here in the introduction to my thesis. It would be no less apt. The contents of 
this thesis represent a few years’ enthusiasms underwritten by a lifetime of interest. They are 
less an argument than an aftermath, purporting, with fingers crossed, to be a 
methodologically coherent ratiocinative enterprise. I have not composed the thesis so much 
as convened it. Amid the slow embezzlement of useful words from the copious verbal 
turnover of the past four years, much has changed. I imagine this is true of most theses. Any 
introduction to a thesis is the concierge of a hotel that started life as a Ritz in New York 
gleaming in its creator’s eye and ended up as an affordable, modestly spacious inn/conference 
facility in Cincinnati. It makes the thesis hard to describe. To show a reader around the thing 
itself without remembering the dream is to separate the dancer from the dance. This is so not 
least because the dream informs outposts of that thing in a big way. A thesis aspires to be 
prescriptive like a bill of rights when it is really accretive like common law. From false start 
to loose end, everything is relevant even when it exists only as absence; everything is a 
precedent. Yet here one must pool and condense the many parts of the thesis, not merely 
these in the canon of submission but those in the sundry apocrypha of miscellaneous word 
documents. The carry-on portability of an abstract, its wieldy parcel of summation, is tricky 
to pull off. 
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I dwell on these points because the subject of the thesis is description, the 
transmission of people, scenes, objects, behaviours and so forth in fictional and non-fictional 
discursive prose. If the foregoing qualifications obtain for a measly research project, how 
infinitely more must they do for reality? I shall expatiate on what reality – that is, Reality or 
‘reality’ – means in the context of this thesis presently, lest its methodology come awry. For 
the time being, however, let me set aside this troublesome term and its fractious semantic 
brood. Reality is, if nothing else, too full of adventure to be briefly described. Artless 
questions of this type and the curiosity they piqued were the dream of the thesis, its Ritz in 
New York, excitingly but impractically extravagant. It seemed natural to alight on Dickens, 
not least because my artless questions seemed always to be returning to his work like bailiffs 
to a debtor, Coavinses to Harold Skimpole. Unfortunately, a question like ‘How does Dickens 
describe things?’ occupies, if not a rickety scaffold between connoisseurship and scholarship, 
a mezzanine area for which the proper planning permission has not been obtained. It will not 
do as a question. A better question might be: how can writing that is, in Grahame Smith’s 
words, ‘essentially…distorting’ also be ‘more real than reality itself’ (63)? If ‘the language of 
realism’ is, as Donald Fanger says in his seminal book on, among others, Dickens, ‘a 
language that does not do violence to its objects’, a language that ‘present[s] the object 
with…a minimum of emotional or stylistic deformation’, how is Dickens’ language ‘real’ 
(6)? Dickens criticism, in particular that of these two eminent practitioners, has served the 
writing very well but I find these questions have not received the attention due to them. It 
might be worth rectifying that, and the following begins trying to. 
 
This, then, is the thing itself, as opposed to the dream; and, as it must be, the thing is 
much smaller in scope, cropped to a serviceable exactitude. Despite my reservations about 
describing it, what it proposes to do is actually very simple. It attempts to explore the 
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connection between verisimilitude and the visionary – the thing itself and the dream, if you 
like – in Dickens. The phrase ‘seeing things’, with its suggestive ambiguity, nicely 
encapsulates the connection between versimilitude and the visionary. In its blandest sense, 
‘seeing things’ is what any writer does and affirms in his writing, usually implicitly, to have 
done. I have been there, I have seen it. Dickens calls his memoir of Italy Pictures from Italy 
even though what it comprises are pictures of Italy, which is to say, writings on or of Italy. 
The preposition matters. As he says in his preface, ‘The Reader’s Passport’: 
 
The greater part of the descriptions were written on the spot, and sent home, from time to 
time, in private letters. I do not mention the circumstance as an excuse for any defects they 
may present, for it would be none; but as a guarantee to the Reader that they were at least 
penned in the fulness of the subject, and with the liveliest impressions of novelty and 
freshness. (260) 
 
Dickens’ purpose, to adapt and tweak an earlier line in the preface, is to reproduce the 
inaccessible contents of Italy ‘before the eyes of my readers’ (259). It is important that we 
accept Dickens was physically present in Italy rather than just spiritually present, as he later 
would be when mesmerically treating Madame de la Rue. It was all extemporaneous, a mere 
account, rapid and partial – in both senses – rather than a memoir, deliberate and crafted, its 
versions pored over. What we already see in microcosm here, though, is a division I shall 
explore as the thesis proceeds. Dickens wants to be close to his descriptive subject (‘on the 
spot’) because he wants his descriptions ‘penned in the fulness of the subject’. But that 
phrase, ‘the fulness of the subject’, does not betoken knowledge of the subject. For Dickens, 
knowledge means less than an immersion that acts as an afflatus for his fancy (the ‘liveliest 
impressions of novelty and freshness’). This is why he says the ‘circumstance’ of the penning 
and impressing is no ‘excuse’: the ‘circumstance’ is in fact his normal procedure. The author 
who wants his readers to ‘visit [Italy] in fancy’, a phrase I shall return to in chapter two, 
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visted it in fancy even when he visited it in person. This point gets lost amid the quite just 
appreciations of Dickens’ extraordinarily capacious knowledge. As Robert Alter writes in 
Imagined Cities, ‘He has the mapped co-ordinates of the city firmly in mind…but he is up to 
something very different from cartography’ (46-47). I shall return to this point below, and 
then again later, particularly at the end of chapter two. 
 
‘Seeing things’ also has its colloquial sense, and this type of ‘seeing’ is one that 
writers, none more so than Dickens, also do. Dickens is, of course, a very easy mark in this 
regard. John Forster, in his biography of Dickens, quotes his friend as saying that ‘some 
beneficient power shows it all to me, and tempts me to be interested, and I don’t invent it – 
really do not – but see it, and write it down’ (Life v.2 272). He saw his characters as a sick 
man sees hallucinations, it had been suggested by his contemporary G.H. Lewes, whom 
Forster was citing that quote to rebut, in an essay I shall return to below. Innumerable others 
have come to the same conclusion since. Much like Forster, I do not think that making a 
pathology of genius – that is, in slightly less loaded terms, the capacity for producing verbal 
prodigies – is very helpful or accurate. To imply that Dickens wrote so well because he 
suffered a benign madness is not just wrong but impertinent, both misunderstanding and 
deprecating the writing. Yet literary practice, certainly fictional practice, demands ‘seeing 
things’ at an illusory, if not hallucinatory, level. As Brigid Lowe writes, ‘When we “see” a 
house in a novel, there is nothing “there”, and worse, there is really no “there” for a “there” to 
be’ (76). We take a demonstrable illusion and believe in it as if it were real, though we never 
believe that it is real: that would be madness, as balmy as the fanatical literalists G.K. 
Chesterton invents ‘who could prove that Micawber never lived, and…who could prove in 
what particular street he lodged’ (533). As Lowe sees it, it is a mistake to impute to fiction a 
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propositional content that can be believed or not believed, since that is not the transaction that 
occurs between fictional texts and their readers: 
 
Not to understand the distinction between an untrue sentence and one that, like most fiction, 
elicits not an inference about a state of affairs but an imagining of the things it tells of, is to 
miss an important distinction. If we fail to note this distinction we will find 
ourselves…amazed at our frequent engagement in ‘the rather startling (upon examination) 
action of believing that inside the novel is not only a three-dimensional space but a person 
with some kind of physical and psychological depth and contour as well’. We don’t believe 
anything of the kind – even temporarily – but rather imagine it. (82) 
 
In the light of these words, Dickens prefatory remarks seem like backpedalling, indemnifying 
himself, as he often did in his prefaces, against charges of misrepresentation. If the text lies, 
he suggests, it will lie like truth. This sense of ‘seeing things’, the imaginative sense that is 
the stereoscopic mean of the other two senses I shall adumbrate, is the one I am most 
interested in and shall pursue in this thesis. One sees things and one ‘sees things’, often the 
same things. Seeing things in the first way leads to seeing things in the second way, much as 
‘A Rapid Diorama’, the title of one of Pictures’ chapters, produces an after-image. That 
assertion is one of the foundations of my second chapter, on Bleak House. In my third, on 
Hard Times, I look at the opposite of this: the way that ‘seeing things’ influences seeing 
things. But more on that soon. 
 
The thesis proceeds through three different areas, each area having one or two novels 
for the exploration of its respective themes. Before that, however, I extend some of the 
preoccupations of this introduction. The first chapter sketches the different understandings of 
realism. The discussion is brief and not meant to be exhaustive. It is there to give the context 
and flavour of what follows, to preface certain assumptions the rest of the chapter and thesis 
make and build on. As I suggest below, realism is a vexed matter and, though it is an 
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important matter to this thesis, a sustained theoretical discussion of it would distract from my 
other concerns. I want to suggest that ‘realism’ is best served by ‘world-creating’ 
defamiliarisation, and that the reason Dickens succeeds in persuading readers that his work is 
‘more real than reality itself’ is in part because of the defamiliarising trope hypotyposis, a 
rhetorical device ‘to make’, in Aristotle’s evocative phrasing, ‘your hearers see things’. 
 
The second chapter is on what I might rather pompously call the epistomology of 
seeing and knowing, with Bleak House adduced for textual support. This chapter is interested 
in is the ability of the characters and their anonymous satellite to see things and not to be 
seen. I track the novel’s vanishings, from the sudden physical absences and arrivals of 
characters to queer textual lacunae, particularly those quiet rifts in knowledge evinced by the 
narrators and, to a lesser extent, the vast fictional laity they superintend. Audrey Jaffe asserts 
in her book Vanishing Points that ‘omniscience in Bleak House is paradoxically proscribed, 
limited to one half of the novel’ (128). She is making the point that by being sundered from 
Esther Summerson’s narrative, the purport to omniscience of the anonymous narrative is 
‘undermined’ because the unsuitability of third-person narration to handling ‘the personal’ is 
exposed at book length: it ‘reveals a lack in what is supposed to be complete’ (128-29). Her 
point is well made and I do not disagree with it, but I think there is a second way in which the 
one narrative undermines the other’s omniscience. There are several instances in BH of the 
anonymous narrator misleading us about information he possesses, sexing up his 
intelligences. In Esther’s narrative the reverse happens: at times she occludes vital 
information and at others she seems, if you like, pointedly obtuse. 
 
The third chapter has similar concerns but is not interested in fictional seeing and 
fictional knowledge at this rudimentary level so much as in the language used to capture the 
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things seen and known. Indeed, the metaphoric import of a word like ‘capture’ is exactly the 
point of the chapter. It argues that the thinking behind such a usage is completely misguided. 
What is seen and known cannot be transmuted into verbal units of reality wherein some truth 
content is thereafter sequestered for infinite readings. To argue this it looks at those 
nineteenth-century constructions of science that exemplified this way of thinking and 
informed fictional practice, as well as at Hard Times, with its failures of positivist 
representation and its satire of hermetic ‘Facts’. Prompted by Dickens’ review of Robert 
Hunt’s The Poetry of Science, the chapter also meditates on constructions of scientific 
observation. Darwin famously listed the ‘inimitable contrivances’ the human eye uses for 
comprehending light and space and for adjusting to sudden changes in them; he observed that 
the idea it ‘could have been formed by natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the 
highest possible degree’ (On the Origin of Species 140). 
 
The slightly cavalier frivolity in these words suggests the aesthetic quality I have 
laboured at earlier. Both the evolution itself, with its endless relay of favoured mutations, and 
the imaginative vault needed to infer and accept it: both of these things are absurd. They 
remain absurd notwithstanding their likelihood. Indeed, their likelihood becomes more 
compelling as if because of their absurdity. It is surely a rhetorical sleight on Darwin’s part, 
this confession of absurdity, yet it is surely also an expression of his rapture at apprehending 
such implausible truth. Natural selection is one enormous vagary. This chapter is tasked with 
exploring that absurdity. Lastly, I am interested in Wordsworth’s ‘authentic tiding of invisible 
things’ in science, much written about by the likes of Gillian Beer (fn). The purview of 
science becomes observing, recording, examining and describing, if not often in that crisply 
linear order, things that may as well be fiction: atoms, bacteria, much of the cosmos and 
evolution, and so on. 
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The final chapter looks at the domination of falsity, places where falsity does not 
yield ‘the true’ but merely further falsity, as in the example from ‘Monmouth-Street’ I refer 
to below. The chapter’s subject is trances and addled vision in two novels, Dickens’ final 
Christmas novel The Haunted Man and his final novel The Mystery of Edwin Drood. I 
examine the former text in detail, partly because it rewards such attentions and partly because 
criticism on it has been meagre by Dickensian standards. My main interest in the text, aside 
from its peculiar waywardness, is mesmerism and doubling. I find in mesmerism a cogent 
analogue of the aesthetic transaction I shall discuss as hypotyposis. Fred Kaplan makes this 
unexceptional remark in his classic study Dickens and Mesmerism: ‘For the central mesmeric 
experience is that of sleepwalking, in which we awaken from the dreams of illusion and see 
the truth of reality’ (217). But I want to quarrel with this, because I think it gets things the 
wrong way around. Sleepwalking and its fellow tranced states, mostly but not always 
resulting from the labours of the mesmerist, cultivate the truth of illusion. This chapter is 
more concerned with exploring hypotyposis than the two chapters before it. I try to explicate 
what I had earlier intimated, such as here in this introduction’s criticism of Pictures from 
Italy and American Notes, about the importance of speed and disorientation to hypotyposis in 
Dickens. 
 
* 
 
The two kinds of seeing I distinguished above, seeing things and ‘seeing things’, are indeed 
present in Pictures. As I indicated, Dickens often eschews the approach his title suggests he 
will take. In place of dogged veracity, holiday snaps from Boz’s grand tour, we get something 
like the Venice chapter, the heady and headlong ‘An Italian Dream’, wherein Dickens adopts 
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the pretense that we cannot trust what he sees at all. As a rhetorical stance, this is, though 
very effective, not especially notable on its own. To treat this fantastic floating city 
(‘anchored…in the deep ocean’ [331]), a peculiar compound of dilapidated port and grand 
capital, as if it could not possibly be real is a standard device for conveying its ‘luxurious 
wonder’; another, I suppose, would be to carry on as if it were hardly wondrous, not that 
Dickens partakes of this. Soon after, for example, Ruskin would have it both ways in The 
Stones of Venice: ‘it was no marvel that the mind should be so deeply entranced by the 
visionary charm of a scene so beautiful and so strange as to forget the darker truths of its 
history and its being’ (26). This paraphrases Dickens’ own response, which attempts, not 
always with conviction, to allay his intense beguilement by marking that dark history. One 
finds some clue of how Dickens came to his rhetorical stance from his correspondence with 
John Forster, where he reels in heady awe at the sight of Venice and professes to falter in his 
descriptive response: 
 
[M]y dear fellow, nothing in the world that ever you have heard of Venice, is equal to the 
magnificent and stupendous reality. The wildest visions of the Arabian Nights are nothing to 
the piazza of Saint Mark, and the first impression of the inside of the church. The gorgeous 
and wonderful reality of Venice is beyond the fancy of the wildest dreamer. Opium couldn't 
build such a place, and enchantment couldn't shadow it forth in a vision. All that I have heard 
of it, read of it in truth or fiction, fancied of it, is left thousands of miles behind. You know 
that I am liable to disappointment in such things from over-expectation, but Venice is above, 
beyond, out of all reach of coming near, the imagination of a man. It has never been rated high 
enough. It is a thing you would shed tears to see. When I came on board here last night (after 
a five miles' row in a gondola; which, somehow or other, I wasn't at all prepared for); when, 
from seeing the city lying, one night, upon the distant water, like a ship, I came plashing 
through the silent and deserted streets; I felt as if the houses were reality – the water, fever-
madness. But when, in the bright, cold bracing day, I stood upon the piazza this morning, by 
Heaven the glory of the place was insupportable! And diving down from that into its 
wickedness and gloom – its awful prisons deep below the water; its judgment chambers, secret 
doors, deadly nooks, where the torches you carry with you blink as if they couldn't bear the air 
in which the frightful scenes were acted; and coming out again into the radiant, unsubstantial 
Magic of the town; and diving in again, into vast churches, and old tombs -- a new sensation, a 
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new memory, a new mind came upon me. Venice is a bit of my brain from this time…. But 
the reality itself, beyond all pen or pencil. I never saw the thing before that I should be afraid 
to describe. But to tell what Venice is, I feel to be an impossibility. And here I sit alone, 
writing it: with nothing to urge me on, or goad me to that estimate, which, speaking of it to 
anyone I loved, and being spoken to in return, would lead me to form. (Letters v.4 217) 
 
I quote at such length because there is so much to remark upon. Dickens’ discomposure is 
apparent from the clumsiness and infelicities, especially his repetition of ‘reality’, which 
ironically comes to be as effective as any trope. ‘Reality’ changes meaning, going from 
‘magnificent and stupendous…gorgeous and wonderful’ but unquestionable, to an 
accomplice in unlikeness (the houses are ‘reality’ to make the water seem a ‘fever-madness’), 
to ‘beyond all pen or pencil’. It is almost an unconscious tic, betraying with its several 
utterances his refusal to believe that what he saw was ‘reality’. This is reinforced by his 
invocation of the ‘Arabian Nights’, drugs and bewitchment (‘enchantment’, ‘Magic’). On the 
one hand, he is saying that all of one’s speculative industry is bootless when it comes to 
describing Venice, yet Venice is comparable only with imaginative speculation, willed or 
induced, ‘the fancy of the wildest dreamer’. It is ‘insupportable!’ – and here Dickens sounds 
as if he were engaging in a thought experiment, the chief engineer on the Venice Building 
Project advising on structural plans, rather than a tourist – yet it stands anyway. To go back to 
Smith’s formulation, it is so real it is more real than imaginative visions, and this reality is 
distorted and unreal (hence the idiom: ‘insupportable’, ‘unsubstantial’). Venice must be seen 
to be imagined, yet can only seem imagined once seen; is only possible to describe once 
verified, whereupon it becomes impossible to describe. And so on. Dickens is in a tangle, yet 
that tangle is itself potent. Pictures retains much of this energy. It is a queer book, oppressed 
at times such as its stint in Venice; a book touched with a sense of its own ‘impossibility’, a 
book that describes what its author ‘should be afraid to describe’. Thus while the Venice 
chapter’s trope is standard, the rupture it creates, or at any rate bespeaks, is fascinating none 
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the less. It is important to note this rupture, the rupture being knowing and fancying, seeing 
and ‘seeing’. I would submit that the potency both here and elsewhere in Dickens arises from 
the division between seeing and knowing, the ‘impossibility’ that must be acknowledged and 
transcended. The worth of seeing Venice to Dickens is finally in ‘seeing’ it, in the transports 
of wonder that prompt this visitor to hold it in mind, to fancy and describe it to 
correspondents and eventually readers. 
 
It is also worth noting about Dickens’ words in this letter that they are always on the 
move, traversing an entire continent (‘thousands of miles behind’) and never reposing. I 
believe that this is because ‘the liveliest impressions of novelty and freshness’ require 
constant movement – and, indeed, in ‘An Italian Dream’ Dickens spends only about two 
consecutive paragraphs not in motion (‘My only comfort is, in Motion,’ he wrote home to his 
wife Catherine from Italy [Letters v.4 215]) – that both affirms and denies the reality one 
apprehends, both discredits and vivifies one’s perceptions. Ruskin seems to be alluding to 
Dickens’ account when he goes on to say that 
 
though many of her palaces are for ever defaced, and many in desecrated ruins, there is still so 
much of magic in her aspect, that the hurried traveller, who must leave her before the wonder 
of that first aspect has been worn away, may still be led to forget the humility of her origin, 
and to shut his eyes to the depth of her desolation. They, at least, are little to be envied, in 
whose hearts the great charities of the imagination lie dead, and for whom the fancy has no 
power to repress the importunity of painful impressions. (27) 
 
To wrest those novel and fresh perceptions from the place and preserve them, to experience 
‘the wonder of that first aspect’, means getting out of the places as soon as possible. As 
Garrett Stewart puts it in Dickens and the Trials of Imagination, ‘fancy,’ about which I shall 
say more below, ‘wants a certain drive, a push and rapidity. Whether in words or in wishful 
fictions, it must quicken, enliven’ (184). Yet the ‘wonder’ here has corroded enough for 
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awkward reefs of desolation to have emerged. Dickens has stayed just long enough to see the 
ghoulish inquities lurking behind the splendid face. We see it as he descends into the ‘darker 
truths’, or darker half-truths, of Venetian dungeons. In these dungeons he observes a ‘loop-
hole’ in the wall of a dungeon where condemned men were detained before execution, 
writing that here 
 
in the old time, every day, a torch was placed – I dreamed – to light the prisoner within, for 
half an hour. The captives, by the glimmering of these brief rays, had scratched and cut 
inscriptions in the blackened vaults. I saw them. For their labour with a rusty nail’s point, had 
outlived their agony and them, through many generations. (333) 
 
This is interesting for several reasons. We find the two modes of the book mingling. Instead 
of reality providing grist to the dream-mill of the unconscious, the dream engenders reality. 
What does ‘dreamed’ even mean here? Hitherto it has been an anaphoric instrument of the 
rhetorical stance I mentioned: ‘I dreamed that I was led on…’ and so on (332). But here it 
seems to resume its meaning, to be meant. It is hard to know how much of the passage 
Dickens personally authenticated, his presence in the dungeon notwithstanding. That is what 
gives ‘I saw them’ – both emphatic and, because of its location, slightly weak – its piquancy. 
Here again is the reader’s intrepid correspondent, descending to these hideous cells, these 
‘darker truths’; here he is, bearing witness. But perhaps instead he ‘saw them’ in his mind’s 
eye, fancied them; perhaps he still ‘dreamed’ (Garrett Stewart, another reader to alight on this 
small passage and that odd, irruptive gasp in particular, finds ‘I saw them’ to be an 
‘hallucinatory suggestion’ [‘Written in the Painting’ 222]). That said, ‘I saw them’ also seems 
to cover ‘by the glimmering of these brief rays’, which Dickens has already incorporated in 
his picture of the scene. 
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Kate Flint writes that in Pictures ‘Dickens is especially fascinated with the act of 
seeing, and with the consideration of how his memory operates in relation to what he has 
observed’, and here we see a good example of this (Visual Imagination 145-46). Whether the 
rays that Dickens himself presumably sees and add to his conjecture were actually seen by 
any of the captives is entirely moot. Moreover, one infers that he would not see anything 
there without artificial illumination, which must have been dim. He has not really seen 
anything here except those inscriptions, one surmises. And why a ‘rusty nail’s point’? This 
comes across as a sly embellishment, the sort of over-egging that journalists privy to 
background briefings might try to put over the reader. Even if he had seen nails around, and 
they were rusty, and he had been told they were used by the prisoner, he had no way of 
knowing what state the nails were in when wielded to style the walls. But, knowing Dickens, 
we know this embellishment emanates from the gambolling of fancy – what Lewes called 
‘his fanciful flight’, but more on that below – here checked by the grim historical truth of the 
prisoners’ fate (Critical Assessments v.I 460). There is fancy and its sombre ballast: the 
suggestive contrast between those authors and their truncated yet timeless testimonies, for 
which they suffered greatly, and this author and his luxurious, potboiling testimony. But it is 
checked too by its sudden, almost unconscious recollection that its documentary purport is 
dubious – indeed, to the extent that Dickens would see fit to disclaim any such purport later. 
The problem is that the lapidarists’ inscriptions are dauntingly true. 
 
* 
 
Where does this impulse toward the illusory, toward, ‘distortion’, emanate from? Why is it 
successful? For G.H. Lewes, writing about Dickens calls for not faint praise so much as faint 
damning. The essay comes across as a rather peremptory sensibility allowing with great 
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difficulty that Dickens, for all his manifold offences against taste, is somehow not a terrible 
writer but a great one. Lewes is a commander of a defeated army suing for peace whose 
concession nevertheless trails conditions. Dickens’ state of mind, insofar as he had a mind 
well-developed enough to be discussed in Lewes’s reckoning, was of dubious soundness. He 
was certifiably a genius, as it were, his literary faculty tantamount to madness yet also clearly 
distinct from it (Lewes misquotes Dryden’s tag ‘Great wits are sure to madness near allied / 
And thin partitions do their bounds divide’, though he denies ‘wishing to imply any 
agreement’ with it [Critical Assessments v.I 458]). 
 
It is worth commending Lewes’s intellectual honesty, since the Dickens he defends in 
this essay trangresses all his principles of literary success. Indeed, Lewes had tacitly patted 
himself on the back when he noted, in his introduction to the argument, that ‘few minds have 
flexibility enough to adopt at once a novelty which is destined in its turn to become a 
precedent’ (Critical Assessments v.I 454). Lewes had previously enjoined that ‘Realism [the 
representation of Reality, i.e. of Truth] is thus the basis of all Art, and its antithesis 
is…Falsism’ (‘Realism in Art’ 37). Among his desiderata were words and phrases such as 
‘congruous’, ‘strict reality’, ‘internal life’ and ‘rigidly bound down to accuracy in 
presentation’, an idiom for which Dickens’ writing indubitably wanted (38-39). Lillian R. 
Furst neatly flicks away Lewes’s ‘simplistic and dogmatic declaration’, which is not only 
reductive but irrelevant (4-5). What if reality itself is not ‘strict’ or ‘congruous’ or 
‘accura[te]’: how then can representation be ‘rigidly bound’ to anything? Furst queries 
George Eliot’s ‘real unexaggerated lion’ in Adam Bede , asking what the ‘proper proportions’ 
for such a figure could be (4). Furst’s point is that nineteenth-century realism, inchoate and 
superficially abjuring convention, had no template for a ‘real unexaggerated lion’. But the 
less subtle point from which Furst implicitly advances is that this figure is intrinsically 
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chimerical. Michael Hollington notes a letter in which Dickens tells Jane Carlyle offhandedly 
that ‘it’s impossible to caricature Americans, they are already walking caricatures’ (Dickens 
and the Grotesque 125). What is a ‘strict’ representation of a caricature meant to look like? 
 
Lewes writes that ‘we…were startled at the revelation of familiar facts hitherto 
unnoted, and felt our pulses quicken as we were hurried along with him in his fanciful flight’ 
(Critical Assessments v.I 460). ‘Familiar facts hitherto unnoted’ and ‘fanciful flight’: such 
assertions inform the idea that Dickens’ work is what Taylor Stoehr and Donald Fanger 
respectively called it half a century ago: an exemplar of ‘super-naturalism’ and ‘fantastic 
fidelity’ (Stoehr vii; Fanger 91). Stoehr, further echoing or anticipating Fanger (they wrote at 
exactly the same time), goes on to say that ‘Dickens is neither realist nor fantast, but 
something in between’ (viii). Versions of this idea and this idiom, particularly the 
reality/fantasy division, have existed since Dickens wrote and persist now. Robert Douglas-
Fairhurst declares in his lively recent biography that Dickens had ‘an imagination so rich it 
made the real world seem like a pale and flimsy imitation of its fictional rival’ (5). Rather 
wonderfully, ‘the real world’ has been usurped by its shadow much as Peter Schlemihl, 
whom I adduce in my third chapter, was by his. It is wanting: dull, insubstantial, etiolated. 
Terence Hawkes in his old primer Metaphor cites Wallace Stevens’ offhand remark that 
‘Reality is a cliché from which we escape by metaphor’, and that is precisely how ‘the real 
world’ appears in comparison to Dickens (57). Reading Dickens one can, as The Man With 
the Blue Guitar can, ‘believe, in face of the object // a dream no longer a dream, a thing, / Of 
things as they are’ (Collected Poems 152) With Dickens, unlike a thesis, the dream usurps the 
thing itself. Grahame Smith in Dickens and the Dream of Cinema implicitly takes up where 
Lewes left off: 
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His writing has seemed to many critics to have precisely this dreamlike quality, a heightening 
and exaggeration of reality which has the effect of making books appear to be more real than 
reality itself. In other words, the vividness and detail of Dickens’s writing can create a 
response akin to that of leaving the cinema only to find the world outside flat and colourless. 
This quality is compatible with the notion of his novels as giant mirrors capturing the 
panoramic variety and intensity of urban life in a process of reflection cum creation, providing 
that we accept its essentially distorting nature and function. (63) 
 
There is much to unpack here. For Smith, there is a Lewes-inflected hint of contradictoriness 
in the aesthetic success of Dickens’ writing. Smith suggests that what Dickens does has an 
‘essentially distorting nature and function’, a suggestion earlier alluded to in ‘a heightening 
and exaggeration of reality’, which seems to hold that reality’s altitude is medial and 
constant. But what is ‘reality’? What is ‘the real’? I take for granted, as Smith seems to, that 
aesthetic success depends on ‘appear[ing]...real’, but what we mean by such locutions as 
‘real’ and ‘reality’ is moot and changeable. What is more, querying what we mean by them 
can sound like idly callow metaphysics. But this thesis tries to do that, in its modest way, if 
only by the way. It must ask what we see when we see the real because it seeks to explain 
how a ‘distortion’ can be ‘more real than reality itself’. There will be more on these rather 
recondite points of representation later in the introduction and in the first chapter.  
 
I would also take issue with that analogy, ‘the vividness and detail of Dickens’s 
writing can create a response akin to that of leaving the cinema only to find the world outside 
flat and colourless’, which the Douglas-Fairhurst quote above is so similar to. It is, surely, the 
opposite response. The reader – and the auditor of Dickens himself during his readings, to 
whom the analogy is apter still – leaves the cinema to find the world is not as she has 
imagined it. It is not blanched and stifled but gaudy and teeming. The Dickensian reader is 
like A.D. Nuttall’s viewer of Rembrandt self-portraits: 
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When we leave the gallery we look with greater insight into the first face we encounter. He thereby 
directly deepens our experiential knowledge of the real human face… [I]njecting fresh life into 
Gestalten which are in turn used in ordinary perception, he deepens our knowledge of the world we live 
in. (Mimesis 76)  
 
As it happens, Smith’s employment of ‘flat’ in that passage strikes an enduring paradox in 
appreciations of Dickens right down through history. Stoehr neatly sets out the divergence of 
views between those who, like EM Forster, thought Dickens wrote ‘“flat” characters’ and 
those – with, as we have seen, Smith and Douglas-Fairhurst later enlistments – to whom he 
was a Columbus of deliverance from the ‘flat...world’ (39). The term ‘flat’ begs the question 
of what ‘flat’ means. What is actually meant by ‘flat’ is not flat at all: someone quite worthy 
and boring like Ada Clare, whom we learn a good deal about, is less ‘flat’ in this sense than 
someone like Inspector Bucket. Yet nobody would dispute that Bucket is the more interesting 
and vivid, a word I use advisedly, of the two. Besides, there are characters whose flatness, in 
this reckoning, does not preclude richness and even complexity. The character in Dickens I 
treasure most, Mr Guppy, is ‘flat’ yet imparts to us all of what Lewes would call ‘internal 
life’ as I shall discuss in my first chapter. What matters more to a Potemkin village, its 
dimensions in space or the insipidness of its facades? Could an Invisible City, conjured up in 
words, be less ‘flat’ than, say, poor old Cincinnati? 
 
I would adduce Garrett Stewart’s description of ‘characters like Tom Pinch’ who 
‘deter monotony, war against…the degrading flatness of things’ (Trials 180). With Fanger’s 
coinage ‘fantastic fidelity, he is following on from Gissing, who perceived a ‘marvellous 
fidelity’ in Dickens (Fanger 98; Gissing 121). Gissing is in fact following and seconding 
Lewes, though he sharply demurs from the Lewesian diagnosis elsewhere, in saying that 
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This is what makes the difference between an impossible person in Dickens and the same kind 
of vision in the work of smaller writers… [I]n our literary slang, he ‘visualized’ every 
character… Seeing them, he saw the house in which they lived, the table at which they ate, 
and all the little habits of their day-to-day life. Here is an invaluable method of illusion, if an 
author can adopt it (122). 
 
This is a fairly representative statement of appreciation, and it seems to me mostly correct. 
Note the use of ‘impossible’, a recurring term in the lexicon of Dickens criticism. 
‘Impossibility’ is crucial to the effectiveness of hypotyposis. But while they do second 
Lewes, Gissing’s remarks also seems to me in certain respects misleading. For one thing, it 
turns Dickens into a mere auditor of the imagination, which is quite a different thing from the 
‘literalist of the imagination’ Lewes found. In this appraisal, Dickens is a humble quality 
controller manning a conveyor belt of lifelike images. He ‘see[s] the object as in itself it 
really is’, to quote Matthew Arnold’s formulation (Homer 64). Indeed, this appraisal renders 
Dickens a Realist, albeit one with the biggest aerial and thereby the clearest, most receptive 
transmission of verisimilar data. Gissing himself saw Dickens as the opposite of a Realist, an 
idealist, but I am talking about the implication of his assertion here. It renders him a kind of 
oracle, a prophet facing sideways, to adapt Krauss’s famous epigram, sideways toward a 
fictional alternative reality. Lewes, too, explicitly invokes the vatic (‘seer of visions’). The 
Realist novelist, as I shall discuss presently, was in certain constructions visited by reality in 
this uncanny way, wherein he was not a rigorous observer but himself a kind of seer. As we 
saw with Pictures, he is not a passive recipient in this way; nor, unlike the Realists, did he 
seek to be. At this point it is important to repeat my assertion that to talk of madness is to go 
astray. When I invoke Lewes or likeminded critics I am doing so because I think it furnishes 
insights into Dickensian description, which will become clear as the thesis develops, 
especially the first chapter. ‘Deformation’ or ‘distortion’, those slavish verbal helpmeets of 
the Dickensian critics I admire most, are what Dickens engaged in. As John R. Reed writes in 
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Dickens’s Hyperrealism, Dickens ‘rendering of real places did not have the realistic novel’s 
ambition of transparency; rather, he wished his artfulness to be obvious in a manner 
essentially unwelcome to realism’ (15). 
 
Another issue is actually the reverse of a question I just asked: what is the ‘distortion’ 
Smith writes of? What does this usage of ‘distorting’ speak to? What is ‘distortion’ in the 
context of literary practice? Smith refers to the ‘effect’ Dickens’ writing would ‘appear’ to 
have, that of being ‘more real than reality itself’. But this observation begs yet another 
question: what does it mean to be ‘real’? Smith is taking a certain degree of rhetorical licence 
here. Nevertheless, it is interesting and notable. The implication is that the super-realness is 
connected with the ‘distortion’; that, actually, it supervenes upon it. This picks up on the old 
notion that Dickens’ writing effects its startling animation through what John Forster calls the 
‘splendid excess of his genius’ (Life v.2 273). The notion that ‘reality’, the thing that by 
definition it and only it is, the semantic area it has a perpetual monopoly over, can be 
insufficient as reality is not meant to be taken seriously. ‘Reality’ is its own perfection and to 
say that something, the Dickensian ‘real’, is more perfect, as it were, is merely to emphasise 
that the two things are not the same. And, of course, they are not: one is concrete, the other 
imaginative. In Smith’s formulation it also goes without saying in a different sense. If 
something can be ‘more real’ then plainly, to recast what I wrote above, realness is not 
essential to what reality does. I do not want to pick more holes in such innocuous 
commonplaces lest they become rabbit holes. I merely want to suggest the central tenet of my 
argument, the thesis of the thesis: that to be ‘real’ is to be artificial; and not just artificial but 
also illusory; and, further still, false. 
 
* 
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George Levine, paraphrasing Richard Rorty’s influential treatise Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature, writes that ‘all “descriptions” of reality, all governing assumptions about it, are 
arbitrary. They must be recognised not as fixed and stable formulations of the prelinguistic 
real…’ (Realism and Representation 4). It is quite astonishing, this idea, namely its 
proposition that any serious reader had ever thought this way about ‘“descriptions” of 
reality’. Those surprised by the assertion that ‘language is not, as he puts it, “transparent to 
the real”’ are, or ought to be, as much figments as the notion of exact correspondence itself. It 
is wrong and, worse, frivolous. Of course they are ‘arbitrary’! What could ‘a fixed and stable 
formulation’ possibly be? Words do not minister exclusively to a client, like an old family 
retainer. They accrue semantic ambiguities, conflicts and outright contradictions, so that 
‘sanction’, for example, is its own antonym. Reed notes that in Oliver Twist the ‘Jacob’s 
Island’ where Bill Sikes reaches his end has an existence comparable to Dick Cheney’s 
conception of the US Vice-Presdency, oscillating between at least three different states. It 
was a real place but also a real fiction, and in Dickens it became a fictional real1. Brigid 
Lowe, among others, forcefully rebuts the cant about ‘fixed and stable formulations’. ‘Fixed 
and stable formulations’ would be inimical to fiction. Fiction is animated by the sense of 
possibility inherent in any given configuration of words and its notional objective referents, a 
sense that such formulations, if they existed, would annul. The idea that you can make up 
something or someone, conjure up an entirely abstract and conceptual version of that thing or 
person (or animal or whatever one likes), and make that version interesting is, quite apart 
from the means of conjuring itself, the ur-impulse of fiction. I repudiate the idea of ‘Fixed 
and stable formulations’ not because it is false and even question-begging (‘fixed and stable’ 
in what sense?) but because failing to understand the representative procedures of Realist 
                                                 
1 For more on this, refer to Reed (11-24). Reed teases out a fascinating explication of the ‘real’ in OT, and 
Dickens generally, which this thesis should complement.  
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writing makes it harder to understand their deviant, Dickens’, whose writing is nevertheless 
realistic. 
 
We see this problem in Reed’s Dickens’ Hyperrealism. A further problem, not 
unrelated, is that the reader is never enlightened as to the meaning of its titular concept. It 
takes a loan word, ‘hyperrealism’, from Umberto Eco, but why and what this term actually 
adds to Reed’s analysis are unclear. The best Reed can do to define ‘hyperrealism’ is to note 
that Dickens’ works contain ‘always a touch of exaggeration of the real (and sometimes more 
than a touch)’ and that ‘while he sought to render the material world in a factual manner, he 
also sought to enhance it for the improvement of his readers’ (1; 9). This is essentially 
meaningless – ‘enhance’ is somewhat, shall we say, protean here – and seems to imply that 
Realists, who if nothing else aspired ‘to render the world in a factual matter’, were not 
engaged in edification, a view Reed surely does not hold. If the finding is that Dickens 
exaggerates, then the term ‘hyperrealism’ adds little to Stoehr’s more suggestive ‘super-
naturalism’; indeed, it adds little to Lewes’s seminal essay quoted above. So extraneous does 
the concept seem that Reed in his conclusion declines to mention it. Instead he quietly 
retreats to ‘nonrealist’, in the rather questionable ‘exploring his use of such nonrealist devices 
as personification, first-person narration, and typical or symbolic naming’ (why is 
‘personification’, let alone first-person narration, incompatible with Realism or realism? 
[106]). Perversely, Reed is less successful at explaining the question ‘hyperrealism’ begs, 
namely ‘What is realism?’, than he is at explaining why Dickens was not a realist. But 
defining ‘realism’ is a broad problem, which I shall come to in the following chapter. 
 
True, ‘hyperrealism’ is ‘an honorific’, but even if it is, the argument it flags is never 
elucidated (Reed 4). Instead, ‘hyperrealism’ comes across as a binding agent for a handful of 
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very good though different articles. One is left frustrated, all the more so because the critical 
instincts that ‘hyperrealism’ the concept seems to arise from strike one as correct, and Reed is 
elsewhere trenchant and interesting, as I have tried to indicate. This thesis shares Reed’s 
conviction that Dickens’ enduring strength is his ‘ability to convey a sense of the everyday 
world while at the same time almost magically transforming it’ and that this magical 
transformation occurs because, to indulge in a crude summary of the motivations behind his 
style, Dickens ‘wanted to emphasize the human capacity to imagine’ (4; 106). I stress the 
importance of this capacity to Dickens in my third chapter especially. But immediately after 
the latter assertion, Reed adds that Dickens ‘wanted to heighten human experience through 
fancy’. ‘Heighten’ again! The laureate of flatness is the master of heights. The triteness of 
this metaphorical expedient, conveniently nebulous and therefore irrefutable, disguises the 
issue at hand, one Reed ought to have addressed. What, exactly, is ‘fancy’ and how might it – 
let us say ‘expand and enrich’ rather than ‘heighten’ – ‘human experience’? 
 
‘Fancy’ suffers from neglect in Dickens studies. The neglect is evident even in those 
studies to which its explication is most pertinent. I think that Reed’s inability to define 
‘hyperrealism’ is actually symptomatic of an older failure to define ‘fancy’, one which the 
other scholars I have discussed are also guilty of. Like Reed, Grahame Smith is quite correct 
and also wanting on this point. Mentioning in passing ‘the energy of Dickens’s inexhaustible 
linguistic virtuosity’ in a few of his great mature novels, Smith writes that these novels ‘do 
fulfil one of Dickens’s crucial purposes in writing, the stimulation of the imaginative faculties 
(what he called fancy) in a utilitarian age’ (82). Smith is very penetrating on the ‘stimulation’ 
but not on why it must occur ‘in a utilitarian age’ or on ‘fancy’. Why was this ‘crucial’? As to 
‘fancy’, the lack of further discussion in Smith’s work aligns with the rest of Dickens 
criticism. There is a peculiar remissness over ‘fancy’ that could do with correction. If 
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anything, the stray examples of engagement with the concept are more illustrative. Mildred 
Newcomb’s dilation on her phrase ‘inventive fancy’ in her notes indicates the poverty of 
definition (7). Standing athwart the ‘customary’ conflation of ‘imagination and fancy’, she 
sides with Coleridge (192-92n). 
 
In fairness, ‘fancy’ is an amorphous term and Dickens could summon it in various 
usages. Coleridge avers that ‘fancy and imagination were two distinct and widely different 
faculties’, not ‘according to the general belief, either two names with one meaning, or at 
furthest the lower and higher degree of one and the same power’ (50). Evidently from 
Dickens’ usages of these words, he subscribed to that ‘general belief’. As Harry Stone, who 
one infers is working from Coleridgean principles, concedes this when he writes that 
‘Without imagination (or “fancy,” as Dickens often called it) human beings could not truly be 
human’ (Invisible 3). In what follows I use these terms interchangeably as Dickens did. But 
‘fancy’ is nevertheless important to understanding what Dickens was up to when ‘distorting’ 
For this is what his ‘fancy’ did; this is the faculty that ‘fancy’ denominates. What is most 
surprising about the neglect of ‘fancy’ is that nobody has sought to examine its affinities, to 
delineate its aesthetic context. That is to say, ‘Fancy’ has seldom been considered in the light 
of its patent heir, Shklovsky’s ostranenie (‘estrangement’ or ‘defamiliarisation’2). Tore Rem, 
the only critic to do this in a sustained way, notes that ‘it is indeed rare to come across 
references to Shklovsky (or, for that matter, [fellow Russian Formalists] Tynyanov, 
Thomashevsky, Eikhenbaum, and even Jakobson) in Dickens studies’ (230). 
 
This is odd given that Dickensian critics are not averse to borrowing Shklovsky’s 
language. Reed uses it rather unhelpfully: ‘Turning the inanimate propeller into a moral guide 
                                                 
2 I use ‘defamiliarisation’ throughout this thesis in spite of the translator Benjamin Sher’s presumably sound 
disdain for it. He calls it ‘dead wrong!’ and instead prefers his own coinage, ‘enstrangement’ (Theory xix). I felt, 
however, that an abundance of ‘enstrangement’ might only confuse the reader.  
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is precisely the kind of trick to defamiliarize his material for his readers and make them take 
notice’ (83). But why Dickens does this is or what that loaded verb ‘defamiliarize’ connotes 
is never dealt with, in part because Reed is never expounding a wholly coherent thesis. 
Elsewhere in the chapter on personfication from which the quote comes, Reed finds that 
Dickens’ inveterate deployment of this trope exists less to ‘make [readers] take notice’, to 
refresh perception and ‘heighten human experience through fancy’, than to imbue the world 
with one’s feelings or personality, to project a contiguous subjectivity on one’s surroundings 
in a kind of Pathetic Fallacy. Ostensibly one of the closest Dickens monographs to 
Shklovsky’s ideas, Robert Newsom’s Dickens on the Romantic Side of Familiar Things, 
mentions him only in a single note: the earlier nineteenth-century discussion of ‘the romantic 
and familiar,’ he writes, ‘in turn anticipates the interests of various Russian 
formalists…whose notion of defamiliarization is in many ways analogous to the definition of 
the novel I am working with here’ (163n). It is curious that neither Newsom nor anybody 
else, Rem aside, has taken up this analogue. I shall say more about Shklovsky in the first 
chapter. 
 
Fancy, like ‘defamiliarisation’, is a form of literary magic. The success of a magic 
trick arises from doing something manifestly ‘preposterous’, to use Lewes’s words, in a way 
that is convincing. The more preposterous the thing, the greater the delight the audience feels 
upon its being done well. To see it done is to believe that what cannot be already was. The 
success does nothing to dispel the falseness of the act. Nobody sensible accepts that spectral 
doubles truly emerge from people and wander about near them. What the magic act is really 
saying is that if you do such-and-such in this way, with this imperceptible but crucial 
particular elided, you can make the preposterous convincing, at once impossible and 
believed. Patrons of the ‘Pepper’s “Ghost”’ illusion, an adaptation of Dickens’ Christmas 
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book The Haunted Man3, could be swayed into doubting what they knew to be so. Helen 
Groth quotes a contemporary critic who wrote this of the illusion: 
 
The spectres and illusions are thrown upon the stage in such a perfect embodiment of real substance, 
that it is not till the Haunted Man walks through their apparently solid forms that the audience can 
believe in their being optical illusions at all. Even then it is almost difficult to imagine that the whole is 
not a wonderful trick, for people cling to the old saying, that seeing is believing. (‘Reading Victorian 
Illusions’ 61) 
 
What interests me is that ‘even then’, that after-image of belief in spite of a simultaneous 
‘belie[f] in their being optical illusions’. The critic is like the earlier spectator of panorama  
who notes that you ‘are obliged almost to reason with yourself…that it is not nature…’ (G. 
Smith 30).4 Presumably someone once called a breeze ‘stiff’ for the first time and an 
interlocuter found this unlikely description, with its accurate travesty of strong wind, 
winning. It would take a dull reader not to find Joyce’s description of a night sky, ‘the 
heaventree of stars is hung with humid nightblue fruit’, witty and memorable; and for many 
of those who find it memorable, it must begin to change the way they think of stars and see 
them (573). Yes, ‘nightblue’ and ‘fruit’ are felicitous, but they exist to complete the treble of 
assonance. It is their sonic cognate, ‘humid’, that affects one’s perceptions thereafter. One 
                                                 
3 Helen Groth summarises the illusion thus: 
It was produced by a specially designed magic lantern concealed beneath the stage that projected a 
strong light onto an actor positioned before a sheet of glass that extended from pit to ceiling between 
the audience and the stage. A moving image of the concealed actor would then appear superimposed on 
a second actor onstage above, so that when the latter enacted Redlaw's feverish desire for amnesia, his 
spectral double came to life (‘Reading Victorian Illusions 55). 
The illusion relied on the audience assuming there was no ‘sheet of glass’. Word of this sheet of glass eventually 
leaked; the results were as one would expect (see below).  
4 Well, up to a point. The analogy is imperfect. Simon During, writing about ‘Pepper’s “Ghost”’, notes that 
when the audience tumbled to the main instrument of the illusion, the transparent plate of glass between the 
audience and the stage, it did not continue to be enchanted. Common japes included peppering what you might 
call the fourth window ‘with paper balls…and watching them bounce off’ (149-50). ‘Despite their enormous 
initial success,’ During goes on, many such startling magical acts ‘were relatively short-lived’ (150). At this 
point the illusion had entered what, to pursue the analogy just a little further, we might call the clichéd phase of 
its existence. In Lewesian terms, the novelty had in its turn become a precedent. 
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feels both that stars cannot be humid and that they will always be ‘humid’ thereafter. The 
rightness of the metaphoric fancy fords its unlikeliness, that gap between the new idea and 
the received one. Nobody has thought that way before, one feels, and nobody reading it can 
forget that thought again. This gap is important to Dickens, impelling his fancy, as I discuss 
with regard to Newgate’s walls in my second chapter. 
 
There are forms of defamiliarisation that I am not really considering here. It is 
certainly defamiliarising in David Copperfield when Mr Mell is assailed in class by 
Steerforth over his penury and his mother’s lowly quarters. David, who has betrayed this 
intelligence to Steerforth, stands aside Mell. There are many ways in which Mell could 
respond, notably with mortification or anger toward David, whom he surely knows is to 
blame. Instead, he stands up to Steerforth, rebutting his jeers with quavering but righteous 
opprobrium, boldly courting the political consequences he and Steerforth know will follow. 
What is truly astonishing, though, is that as he does this he merely pats David on the back. 
Pat, pat: this follows each sally (94). It is almost as if he is defending David against 
Steerforth – which in a way, he is. David has sullied his name and allied himself with the 
person who will steer him awry. It is one of the most poignant moments in all Dickens. But 
this does not comport with what I mean, which is ‘Fancy’ as Dickens’ contemporary 
Alexander Bain defined it most germanely in the tenth ‘Figure of Speech’ from his primer on 
rhetoric: 
 
Original comparisons, besides having the effects just stated, cause an agreeable surprise, and 
are introduced into composition with that view. 
 
A comparison that is new and not obvious, strikes us with a pleasurable flash, even 
although contributing little, either to elucidate a subject, or to excite livelier feelings in 
connection with it. In the following instance, the agreeable effect arises, partly from the 
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elevation of the subject (See QUALITIES OF STYLE, Strength), and partly from the 
detection of a certain resemblance between two things lying remote in nature :— “The actions 
of princes are like those great rivers, whose course every one beholds, but their springs have 
been seen by but few.” 
 
When comparisons have no other effect than the pleasure of surprise, they are often 
termed fanciful. This indicates one of the meanings of Fancy. Luxuriant composition, as the 
poetry of Shelley or Keats, is apt to abound in this species of effect. (25) 
 
Fanger expatiates on this ‘pleasure of surprise’ by lodging a rather useful working definition 
of Dickensian fancy: ‘the ability to see the world in adult terms but with a child’s vision’ 
(89). Commenting on the preamble to the first number of Household Words, with its 
forthright repudiation of ‘mere utilitarian spirit…iron binding of the mind to grim realities’ 
and extolling of ‘that light of Fancy’, Fanger writes that the impulse of the latter phrase, it 
‘would seem, is to discover, or be fed by, the romance that is sufficient in all familiar things’ 
(72). Fancy and ‘imagination – which may or may not be a different thing…’ are ‘a softener 
of “brutal fact”’ (72). Fanger’s paraphrase has utility as a schematic overview of Hard Times, 
a novel where Fancy and Fact are famously coerced into a duel. But Fancy is more than a 
palliative ‘softener’. This thesis is not really interested in political motives – ‘What is 
reality?’ is surely easier to account for than Dickens’ shifting, nebulous and often 
blockheaded politics – but Fancy is not some paltry nostrum for the working classes, 
imaginative alms as a substitute for meaningful reform. Nor, I think, is it an index of spiritual 
health, or not just an index of spiritual health anyway. Wittman is conflicted on this point, 
disagreeing with Garrett Stewart in writing that ‘it is the wondering itself…that matters’ but 
then seeming to agree later when she implies that the Sketches are interested in provoking 
wonder because Dickens ‘is interested in knowledge and social action’ (197, 206n). She goes 
on to say that: 
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The fundamental exigency of the Sketches is the need to take what has been ‘obscured’ by 
habit and overfamiliarity and enervating closeness and refigure it as a cause for wonder, (and 
do so, we take it, to prevent or alter the course of suffering—wonder is, considered 
optimistically, a precursor to care) (207). 
 
My own view is that it is the means itself that matters: what I discuss in the first chapter as 
the salutary ‘process of creativity’ of defamiliarisation – which Wittman, too, never 
discusses, despite employing its idiom. This is what I argue in the second chapter, though in 
the third I see ‘fancy’ and ‘wonder’ as facilitating knowledge. But more on that below. 
Suffice it to say, I agree with Harry Stone, who suggests that ‘Dickens…champions the 
power of imaginative sympathy. He sees the story…as a way of evoking the power of 
sympathetic response that slumbers within each person’, which, Stone says, ‘humanises and 
saves’ (Invisible 29). 
 
To see how Dickens does this, we need to look at the key word in Fanger’s 
paraphrase, ‘discover’. Fancy is the procurer of discovery. He begins to get at what I think is 
at the heart of Dickens’ aesthetic success. He cites Newcomb, whose name he apparently 
does not know how to spell, on the ‘“allegorical”’ nature of Dickens’ narratives and their 
constituents (82). But it is more useful in these discussions, Reed’s and my own, to think not 
of the text as allegory but of reality itself as allegory. This differs slightly from Tambling’s 
similar argument for the allegorical nature of Dickens, which leans heavily on Benjamin. 
Tambling finds Dickens sharing with Baudelaire what Benjamin called ‘the gaze of the 
allegorist…of the alienated man’ (Going Astray 55). To this gaze, commodities, the 
commerical tokens of the metropolis, are inherently allegorical; and Tambling takes many of 
his examples from Sketches by Boz, with its proliferation of commodities. I can assent to the 
argument this far. But I think Tambling goes astray when he suggests that certain objects 
‘allegorise the neighbourhood, their unsorted, ruinous state images what the area is, and 
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enables a partial reading of it’ (56). This seems to get things the wrong way around, in that 
Dickens wants to project allegorical significance on them that they do not have. Firstly, I 
should note that the meanings of ‘allegory’ Benjamin, Tambling and I are working with are 
loose and elide the scrupulous quiddities of, for example, C.S. Lewis and Erich Auerbach as 
unpacked by A.D. Nuttall. ‘Allegory’ implies fixity, and Benjamin and Tambling seem to 
take this for granted. But Boz and behind him Dickens are not retrieving stable, intrinsic 
meanings. The point is the meanings’ contingency. Indeed, in Lewis’s terms Dickens would 
be practising a kind of ‘symbolism or sacramentalism’ rather than allegory, wherein the 
‘world which we mistake for reality is the flat outline’ of what he earlier calls ‘the invisible 
world’ (in Two Concepts 16). A great source of impetus for Dickensian representation is the 
ardour for allegorical meanings that cannot be, that shall always remain subjective. For 
Dickens, reality is fancy’s allegory. It is a series of concrete referents yielding brilliant 
flashes of ersatz conjecture, all the more astonishing for the opacity of their quondam selves. 
 
This is not to discount the point I made above: the process itself is foremost, means 
above end. To borrow Shklovsky’s phrase about defamliarisation, which I shall come to in 
the next chapter, it is ‘the process of creativity’, both for Dickens himself and for his readers, 
that is of the greatest importance (6). But allegory matters too. As Reed himself writes: 
 
Dickens wants his readers to think of the natural and the man-made world as having a 
meaning that is discoverable by the imagination, not merely by reason and the interpretation 
of facts. (82) 
 
Just so, and this thesis expands on that insight. Look at ‘Meditations in Monmouth-Street’ 
from Boz in this connection. Boz fancies the entirely invented man mournfully wishing he 
could ‘have been restored to life’, restored to the entirely invented childhood which has now 
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surreptitiously consolidated itself as reality, as ‘life’. The entirely invented man has now gone 
from mere fictional predicate, a car in the train of fantasy, to a respectable citizen of the 
factual. Much like Elizabeth Bishop’s ‘The Man-Moth’, a lavish absurdity spun from a single 
diverting corruption of ‘mammoth’, Dickens ‘Monmouth’ turns baseless illusion into sturdy 
memory simply by proceeding as if it were. ‘The ‘working of fancy’, to quote a line from 
Martin Chuzzlewit I dilate on below, actually becomes ‘a real gesture’. A jaunt of question-
begging takes place wherein subsequent falsity retroactively confirms some false antecedent 
as true. It is, as Barbara Hardy writes about Pip’s fantasies of Satis House in Great 
Expectations, ‘arbitrary and zany, a free-floating fancy wrung out of the imaginative’, and, 
like Pip, Boz ‘pushes fantasy beyond belief and forces his interlocuters to believe him’ (73). 
That contradiction is noteworthy. Pip transcends and yet also compels belief, much as, in 
Smith’s formulation, Dickens distorts reality and yet also persuades us that his writing is 
more real than reality. I shall say more about this in the next section. J. Hillis Miller puts it 
best when he identifies the way the prose ‘moves not only to free Boz’s speculations from 
their voluntary basis and to make them into a self-generating reverie. As speculation becomes 
vision, quaint fancy becomes grotesque hyperbole’ (‘The Fiction of Realism’ 13). This ‘self-
generating reverie’ seems to me the essence of Dickensian description. It is what I believe 
Lewes is referring to when he gropes for his pathological similes: ‘speculation becomes 
vision’, falsity reality. As Lewes writes of Dickens: 
 
believing in its reality however fantastic, he communicated something of his belief to us. He 
presented it in such relief that we ceased to think of it as a picture. So definite and insistent 
was the image, that even while knowing it was false we could not help, for a moment, being 
affected, as it were, by his hallucination. (Critical Assessments v.I 458) 
 
He is not really saying Dickens was suffering a ‘hallucination’ any more than Dickens 
himself was saying that in his letter to Forster I referred to earlier. That last sentence is 
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tantamount to the ‘self-generating reverie’, the ‘definite and insistent image’; ‘even while 
knowing it was false we could not help, for a moment, being affected’ (my italics, needless to 
say). I shall discuss this rhetorical technique further and at some length in my final chapter, 
taking in examples such as the opening page of The Mystery of Edwin Drood, the passage 
from Little Dorrit that Dorothy van Ghent cites in her great essay ‘The Dickens World: A 
View from Todgers’, and lastly Pip’s first look at Barnard’s Inn in Great Expectations. The 
potential of inanimate, or at any rate insentient, things to be truants from themselves needs to 
be emphasised in a discussion of Dickens. It is never emphasised enough. 
 
* 
 
I am not the first person to suggest that the realness or vivacity or what have you in Dickens 
exists not in spite but because of the ‘distortion’, such as it is, Lewes’s ‘false’. Karen 
Petroski, writing about Dickens and phantasmagoria, postulates a stylistic development in 
Dickens in the period of his American works, American Notes and MC, and A Christmas 
Carol. She argues that Dickens abjured a stable point of view and began to essay a style of 
description marked by flickering contingency, a repertory of semblances waylaid in 
vicissitudes, whose cleaving to the makeshift and the shape-shifting serves better to indulge 
what Forster called Dickens’ ‘wealth of fancy’ (Life v.2 273). In AN, Petroski contends, 
‘Dickens draws on forms of description’ that make the reader similar to a viewer of 
phantasmagoria: ‘knowing that what they witness is illusion but nevertheless temporarily 
allowing themselves to believe in its reality and to be affected by it’ (73). Dickens himself 
likens the novel to a phantasmagoria, and in doing so, Petroski writes, he ‘is implying that it 
reveals a truth indirectly, in flashes: partially, ironically, metaphorically, and by example’ 
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(82). She amplifies these points by citing Dickens on ‘the varying illusions’ American tree 
stumps present in twilight (AN 194-95). 
 
Dickens is certain that they are not what they seem yet at the same time allows himself to see 
them as if they are something other than what they are and identifies them with an entirely 
different kind of illusion. Contrary to what would seem reasonable, the stumps become more 
meaningful to Dickens when he perceives them to be something that they are not. (75-76) 
 
It seems to me very perceptive, that line about Dickens both seeing things as more 
meaningful – more, in a sense, fully themselves – when ‘he perceives them to be something 
they are not’. Dickens’ contemporary Thoreau, also writing in Massachusetts and at the very 
same time, declares at the end of his Natural History of Massachusetts that ‘We must look a 
long time before we can see’ (28). But what are we seeing? What is Dickens seeing? The 
thrust of Thoreau’s conclusion is a swipe at the dominant construction of science. You cannot 
see without looking, he suggests. But while ‘the true man of science’ looks, the false man, as 
I suppose we have to call him, does not. ‘We do not learn by inference and deduction, and the 
application of mathematics to philosophy, but by direct intercourse and sympathy’ (28). I 
shall return to the subject of scientific looking in chapter three, but for now let me note 
that‘sympathy’ is an important word to Petroski too. Petroski writes that ‘Dickens presents 
such [phantasmagoric] moments as, literally, moments of vision – moments of perceptual 
confusion that produce not disorientation but a recovery of the ability to sympathize’ (88). 
Brigid Lowe, writing about sympathy and, among other authors, George Eliot, notes that in 
Eliot’s Scenes of Clerical Life she approvingly declares that ‘“imagination” questions the 
‘new-varnished efficiency, which will yield endless diagrams, plans, elevations, and sections, 
but alas! No picture”’ (118). ‘[F]eeling, thinking, experiencing beings, with social and 
creative capacities’ are, Eliot and Lowe both believe, beyond ‘the cold, rationalistic and 
deterministic equations of political economy’ (118). I return to sympathy toward the end of 
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chapter two, but for now I want to implant this notion of sympathy being in oppostion to 
‘cold, rationalistic and deterministic equations of political economy’. While it anticipates my 
reading of Hard Times, it also, and more importantly, foreshadows my division between 
sympathy and knowledge in Sketches and The Uncommercial Traveller. But again, more on 
that soon. 
 
One of Petroski’s examples of these temporarily convincing illusions is from MC. 
Montague, already severely agitated, has a fantastic vision of his companion Jonas rearing up 
to slay him as they travel in a coach through a storm. That vision is in fact a premonition 
borne out by subsequent events. The ‘curious optical illusion’, a ‘piece of pantomime which 
had so impressed his mind to be a real gesture, and not the working of his fancy’, anticipates 
the ‘presentiment and vague foreknowledge of impending doom’ that Montague feels after 
seeing off Pecksniff and just before his sudden rendezvous with Jonas on the path back to 
town (MC 606; 608). Mark that contrast between ‘real gesture’ and ‘the working of his 
fancy’; a distinction between these two things is not so much made as assumed: one thing is, 
one is not. The concession here, to hark back to Smith, is that the thing that is not may 
nevertheless be as potent as the thing that is. 
 
The distinction, though, is in some ways facile. Fancy does not exist in abstraction; it 
has a context. Later on, Jonas, remorseless but fearful of capture, suffers presentiments of his 
own. In a passage reminscient of Poe’s recently published ‘The Tell-Tale Heart’, ‘his own 
heart beat[s] Murder, Murder, Murder…’ and, looking in the mirror, he sees ‘a tell-tale face’ 
(682; 683)5. The murder is legible, he fancies, ‘broadly written on his face’ (682). The 
illusory displaces reality, his alibi becoming a parallel existence which his return, in a 
                                                 
5 Barbara Hardy, among others, has also identified this resemblance in Dickens and Creativity (7).  
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remarkable inversion, threatens to destroy rather than complete. Whereas at first ‘He pictured 
in his mind…the tumbled bed, and he not in it, though believed to be’, soon, upon his return, 
‘The passage was empty when his murderer’s face looked into it. He stole on to the door on 
tiptoe, as if he dreaded to disturb his own imaginary rest’ (682; 683). This, more than Jonas 
imagining that Montague will await him in his room, a Gothic staple, is the true horror: he is 
a double for whom there is no avatar to supplant. ‘He became in a manner his own ghost and 
phantom, and was at once the haunting spirit and the haunted man’ (681). By taking another’s 
life, he has forfeited access to easy domesticity, now alien – even the morning’s pottering 
about the house is foreboding – and must bear this testimony, almost a Mark of Cain, 
henceforth. He has, like Janus, whose name his so plainly connotes, a second face, ‘his 
murderer’s face’, that suggestive usage, which implies that he has, in murdering Montague, 
also murdered himself (682). 
 
There is, to my mind, an even better example of Petroski’s contention in Dombey and 
Son. More than an omen of death, it brandishes its falsity, contains its falsity within it, and 
even, perhaps, is annealed by it. Before Carker carks it, struck on the railway line, he is struck 
by an uncanny portentous fear, ‘some visionary horror, unintelligible and inexplicable, 
associated with a trembling of the ground – a rush and sweep of something through the air’ 
(810). He recovers, just, but as the narrative tells us in a queer paratactic paradox: ‘It was not 
gone, it never had been there’ (810). What that means depends on how you parse the words – 
that is to say, on which side of the ambiguity you come down. Either the clauses have a 
logical relationship or the comma stands athwart two separate, contradictiory assertions. 
Ostensibly his dread sensation cannot go because it never came, yet there follows a 
concession that it ‘left behind’ a ‘startling horror’. It had not come, it had never been there, 
yet it had left something behind. It is, as the second of the dual readings suggests, both there 
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and not there rather like the man upon the stair in ‘Antigonish’, or like Jonas’s invented, yet 
to everyone else true, sleeping self. Indeed, this hints at the very opposite of the first reading: 
not that it could not have gone because it had never come but that it could never go – could 
linger, a psychic toxin – precisely because it never was. Being chimerical makes it vital and 
irrefutable, not susceptible of being expunged. During rationality’s hasty inquest into the 
irrational, reason is unwittingly surrendered. 
 
There is a precursor of Carker’s dread in, to complete the circle, AN. Dickens has 
arrived at Niagara Falls, or in the vicinity of Niagara Falls, having ‘strain[ed] my eyes in the 
direction where I knew the Falls must be’. Upon disembarking from, as it also happens, a 
train, he writes that ‘I heard the mighty rush of water, and felt the ground tremble underneath 
my feet’ (199). Recall that Carker, a few years on, feels something ‘associated with a 
trembling of the ground – rush and sweep of something through the air’. Tambling posits that 
Carker is going through ‘what Derrida calls “a trace”, which precedes experience of [an 
event]’ – appropriate concerning one afraid of being ‘traced’ (810) – and in the visit to 
Niagara Falls it is as if there is a trace of that trace (Going Astray 116). Dickens presses on 
toward the source of the tumult in a passage that is the literary equivalent of J.M.W. Turner 
lashing himself to the mast like Odysseus and weathering the tempest. It is kinetic and 
intense, disoriented and clamouring for orientation, which it claims only to lose it again in the 
current, ‘the hurried water gathering strength’ (200). The passage, which it is in more ways 
than one, begins with this paragraph: 
 
The bank is very steep, and was slippery with rain, and half-melted ice. I hardly know how I 
got down, but I was soon at the bottom, and climbing, with two English officers who were 
crossing and had joined me, over some broken rocks, deafened by the noise, half-blinded by 
the spray, and wet to the skin. We were at the foot of the American Fall. I could see an 
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immense torrent of water tearing headlong down from some great height, but had no idea of 
shape, or situation, or anything but vague immensity. (199) 
 
It is not easy to tell whether the passage is bravura or merely wilful, but it is intense and 
verily overwhelming. In this part of it, Dickens is stumbling onto the stage of the Sublime. 
The cadences are as broken as the rocks; the tenses slip as Dickens and the officers must 
have, between present tense (I cannot forget a misreading of ‘The bank is very steep’ as 
having a cinema verité shakiness, not unlike ‘I saw them’ in the Venetian dungeon) and past. 
The ‘immense’/‘immensity’ repetition, almost clumsily pleonastic, is Dickens getting his 
literary bearings, scrabbling for a handle or foothold on the experience. Dickens is trying to 
rise to the literary occasion, with, as I have insinuated, mixed results. He writes of ‘Niagara 
before me, lighted by the sun and by the moon, red in the day’s decline, and grey as evening 
slowly fell upon it’ but he might as well add that it is empurpled by his prose (200). It is 
worth noting the faintly antagonsitic rift of duality between these points (sun/moon, red 
afternoon/grey twilight). We see many other dualities in the passage, notably between the 
‘Light’ that ‘came rushing on Creation at the word of God’ – whose proxy Dickens 
presumably is, electing himself to God’s retinue (‘I felt how near to my Creator I was 
standing’) – and a kind of infernal darkness. Between these dualities, in fact, is the tension 
that makes the passage really interesting; they roil it, leave it ‘troubled yet, far down beneath 
the surface’ (200). 
 
Indeed, it is this sort of tension that, perhaps more than anything else, makes all of 
Dickens’ writing really interesting to me. It is about this that I write when discussing The 
Haunted Man, that strangest of Dickens productions, in chapter three. Here in the Niagara 
passage, however, the Christmas books look a long way off. Upon finally surveying the 
Niagara Falls complete, Dickens writes that ‘the first effect, and the enduring one – instant 
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and lasting – of the tremendous spectacle, was Peace’ (200). He goes on to count the ways in 
which he feels ‘Peace’. But as with the contradictory conclusion to Carker’s daymare, there is 
something unstable here, not least Table Rock, the landform on which Dickens is standing 
and which frequently subsided.6 A capitalised ‘Peace’ is no bulwark against the tremendous 
force of the Falls; and that reinforcing capital, elevating a passing feeling to an abstract 
concept or poetic humour, seems intended to shore it up, so to speak. It seems a concession 
that the rest of the passage rebuts its assertion, for there is no peace. 
 
Dickens is apprehending the Falls almost in spite of his sensory organs’ impairment. 
Dickens owns up to being ‘in a manner stunned, and unable to comprehend the vastness of 
the scene’. Over the next few hundred words he gallantly tries to redress this by looking at 
and describing ‘the cataracts from all points of view’, summoning them into manifold, 
torrential periods. I am particularly taken by ‘some great height’. ‘Some great height’ makes 
it seem as if he is ignorant of the waterfall’s height and provenance; turns it, for a moment, 
into something nebulous, unknown, even imponderable. Yet it is the very height Dickens 
descended from and would soon ascend again. The context of the waterfall has been elided by 
its ‘stunn[ing]’ effect. Dickens seems to have become estranged from his earlier perceptions, 
both aware of his situation (‘the foot of the American Fall’) and yet perpetuating a falsity, a 
distortion (he knows the ‘situation’!): ‘We were at the foot of the American Fall. I…had no 
idea of…situation’ reads like ‘it was not gone, it never had been there’. As I noted earlier, I 
shall return to the connotations that ‘estranged’ throws out like spray from a waterfall in the 
next chapter. Dickens does not himself overtly return to his estrangement but it abides in 
those irreconciled dualities. ‘But always,’ he writes near the end of the passage, ‘does the 
                                                 
6 Melville alludes to these subsidences in Moby-Dick: ‘Almost in the same instant, with a thunder-boom, the 
enormous mass dropped into the sea, like Niagara’s Table-Rock into the whirlpool’ (324). James Barbour 
records that the the biggest collapse, which Melville was probably thinking of, took place on June 25th, 1850 
(‘The Composition of Moby-Dick’ 207). 
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mighty stream appear to die as it comes down, and always from its unfathomable grave arises 
that tremendous ghost of spray and mist which is never laid (201). In that subtle 
‘unfathomable’ is the crux of the passage. Here we find the ghost of the estrangement itself 
arising, never laid. The malcontents of thought linger, disturbing the ‘Peace’ earlier professed 
much as the waterfall disturbs its antecedents below. 
 
It occurs to me that reading Dickens’ descriptions is not entirely dissimilar to this 
experience of the waterfall. At times one is ‘deafened’, ‘half-blinded’ and disoriented. The 
frequency of these assaults only increases when one tries to write a dissertation on Dickens, 
as I have found, and have not stopped finding. In one’s relative critical nonage, contending 
with this voluminous bequest of mostly excellent criticism is deflating as well as inspiring. 
But it is only so voluminous because Dickens’ merits are so numerous, never more so than in 
the descriptions, reading which has been a tonic for any despair . At their best these 
descriptions are just as magnificent as Niagara, and I have tried, in my modest way, to do 
justice to them here. That has meant trying to write in their spirit: if nothing else, this thesis 
should be lively, or at any rate, I hope, not too dull. It should also transmit the pleasure that 
moved me to write it, which is now beginning to seem a tremendous, foolhardy presumption. 
But only beginning, as this thesis is only beginning.  
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This chapter explores the matter of realism itself, sketching its two dominant constructions of 
and then mounting an argument for the relevance of a salient mode within one of those 
constructions, ostranenie (‘defamiliarisation’), to Dickens’ work. Carrying on from the 
suggestion in the introduction that ‘distortion’ or Lewes’s ‘Falsism’ was essential to 
Dickensian representation, I explore the ways in which defamiliarisation, itself portended by 
Dickens’ numerous remarks about ‘the romantic side of familiar things’, could make a 
represented thing seem ‘more real than reality itself’, as Smith put it. As I shall point out, 
distortion, or Fanger’s ‘deformation’, was the aim of defamiliarisation. My central argument 
is that Dickensian representation is so successful not in spite of its distortions, its falsity, but 
because of them.7 Here I shall try to show that not only was this so but that the ‘Falsism’ is in 
fact a better instrument of realism than ‘world-reflecting’ Realism. It seems to me that 
Dickens’ work is ‘world-creating’, which is to say defamiliarising; its emphasis on what 
Grahame Smith identifies as the ‘continued process of Dickens’s language’ foments what I 
note Shklovsky discussing: ‘experienc[ing] the process of creativity’ (G. Smith 159). If the 
reader is to ‘experience the process of creativity’ then it helps for the writer to possess a style 
that, like Dickens’ at his best, is fabulously extemporising. I have already looked at the 
germane aspects of Dickens’ style and shall return to them, especially in the last chapter. 
Finally, this chapter introduces the notion of hypotyposis, a mimetic trope that employs 
incongruous, fanciful illusions to convey reality. 
 
Put reductively, which division into conceptual binaries never fails to do, there are 
two paradigms of mimesis: what Stephen Halliwell calls the ‘world-reflecting’ and ‘world-
                                                 
7 To repeat an earlier comment, I equate ‘success’ with being ‘real’, as I believe Smith and other Dickensians I 
cite do too. I acknowledge – I could hardly not acknowledge – the intractably problematic nature of words like 
‘real’ and ‘reality’. Part of this chapter is unpacking what ‘realism’ means and how it is relevant to Dickens. 
Another part is demurring from those who, I humbly submit, bowdlerise the term so they can make rather 
specious arguments against it. 
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creating’ (or ‘heterocosmic’) paradigms (23). The former is ‘a response to a reality… that is 
believed to exist outside and independently of art’; the latter, ‘an imaginary world-in-itself… 
[defined by] fictional coherence or congruity’ (23). Mack Smith,8 referring to similar 
paradigms, writes of ‘correspondence’, a ‘word-to-world’ relationship, and ‘coherence’, a 
word-to-word one (2). These are, as Halliwell and Smith are eager to qualify, merely 
provisional heuristics. So, in its much larger way, is that section of the chapter. It tries to 
outline the difference between the ‘world-reflecting’ and ‘world-creating’ paradigms, the 
latter of which I favour in this thesis. I must give summary of the ‘world-creating’ paradigm 
so that I can discuss Shklovsky’s ‘defamiliarisation’, which in turn is there to precede the 
classical trope of hypotyposis. Hypotyposis is, I shall argue, a ‘world-creating’, 
defamiliarising trope that is realistic despite courting artificiality, the illusionistic and the 
fantastic – in short, the opposite of what is conventially understood to be ‘realism’. 
 
* 
 
‘Realism’ has the ambiguous honour of being something all writers want their works to 
achieve, but few want them to be examples of. Damian Grant has noted that the various 
branches of ‘realism’ have their etymological root in the Greek word ‘res, “thing”’, 
supplementing this with Harry Levin’s term ‘“choisme”, “thing-ism”’ (43). ‘Thing-ism’, 
which Brooks also cites, is a nicely evocative – or, perhaps, nicely unevocative – term, 
connoting as it does both exactitude and a shrugging vagueness. The rub, the reason for the 
vagueness, is: what does one do with a ‘thing’? How does one represent it? And that is why I 
shall try to distinguish between realism and Realism, which has its own indigenous 
assumptions of what ‘thing-ism’ ought to be. The tenor of many writers’ attitudes toward 
                                                 
8 All subsequent mentions of ‘Smith’ in this chapter are references to Mack Smith. All mentions elsewhere are 
references to Grahame Smith, excepting brief references to the prisoner John Smith and Dickens’ friend Albert 
Smith in chapters two and three respectively. It is, I hope, always clear to which ‘Smith’ I am referring.  
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Realism and its ‘thing-ism’ is epitomised by Flaubert’s peremptory snort that ‘I hate what is 
conventionally called realism, though people regard me as one of its high priests’ (Stromberg 
38). The clerical metaphor is, I think, apposite in this case. Doubted even by adherents, 
among whom various intramural quarrels have occurred, and strenuously repudiated by 
modern opponents, it is like the God of the Anglican Church (indeed, the American Katherine 
Kearns, discussing the ‘confusion’ of philosophical realists, characterises their position as ‘a 
sort of Episcopalian largesse, the sense that one can believe in God and not believe’ [49]). 
The reasons for this are plain. As Peter Brooks writes: 
 
The lesson of much criticism and theory in the last decades of the twentieth century seemed to 
suggest that notions of representation, and especially representation that thinks of itself as an 
accurate designation of the world, are naive and deluded. (6) 
 
An abiding trait of subsequent literary theory is a growing loss of faith in the ability of 
language to represent at all. Poststructuralism – which informs much of the ‘much criticism 
and theory’ – has done the most to tend this growth. As Pam Morris writes, poststructuralists 
like Lyotard believed that ‘realistic representation’ is inherently unsatisfying because too 
satisfying: it is intended ‘to produce a reassuring interpretation of reality in terms of 
predictability, unity, simplicity, and communicability’ (31). So, for example, when Luc 
Herman opens a chapter by pronouncing that ‘Deconstruction did not cause the death of 
realism criticism’, it is tacit that the high priests of poststructuralism were about to perform 
the last rites (208). To take another example, George Levine, discussing Middlemarch and 
Sketches by Boz, remarks almost as an aside that ‘neither of the[se]… insistently realistic 
texts turns out to be really realistic. Nor can any text be’ (Secularism 186). The breeziness of 
this confirms Brooks’s point. The notion that language has realistic potential is absurd, the 
anti-realists seem to say. But why should this be so? On what is this startling complacency 
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founded? It was not ever thus, as Levine implies: such texts were once taken to be ‘really 
realistic’. At the beginning of this chapter I want to alight on a few, dare one say it, 
representative quotes and ideas of Realism and the kindred ‘world-reflecting’ literary 
paradigm. 
 
Champfleury, self-appointed mouthpiece of Realistic painting’s high priest Gustave 
Courbet, explained his theory of realist writing thus: ‘what I see enters my head, descends 
into my pen, and becomes what I have seen’ (Herman 10). That curious, unwitting inversion 
at the end of the sentence is telling. ‘Becomes what I have seen’ naturally – and, one would 
add, necessarily – has it backwards for a ‘sincériste’, as Champfleury called artists who cared 
nothing for form, only for content (those who cared about form were ‘formistes’ [Grant 26]). 
It only becomes what one sees when it is on the page and not before that, he would seem to 
be saying, implying writerly mediation. But Champfleury is not saying that. Indeed, his 
conception is curious enough on its own. It portrays the Realist as less a neutral observer than 
a mystical amanuensis, a Saint Matthew being visited by the angel. This conception of 
realism is interesting because redolent of older mimetic dispensations. George Herbert wrote 
his ‘Jordan’ poems to chastise the presumption of himself and other poets to embellish 
reality: ‘I sought out quaint words, and trim invention /…Curling with metaphors a plain 
intention, / Decking the sense…’ he writes in ‘Jordan (II)’, adding ‘Nothing could seem too 
rich to clothe the sunne’ (Gardner 133). This, one is given to understand, renders the poet a 
blasphemous upstart. Auerbach finds a similar awareness of the writer’s ontological place in 
‘the Biblical stories’: 
 
Their aim is not to bewitch the senses, and if nevertheless they produce lively sensory effects, it is only 
because [of] the moral, religious and psychological phenomena which are their sole concern. (14) 
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Writers ‘decking the sense’ (doing their ‘dutie / Not to a true, but a painted chair’, as Herbert 
writes in ‘Jordan [I]’) commit an infidelity not merely to reality but to the glory of God, 
because reality is God’s – or, rather, is God (Gardner 125). Likewise, Levine writes, George 
Eliot hewed to the belief that the ‘submission of the self to the voices of external reality was a 
condition of real knowledge (just as, for contemporary Victorian science, objectivity was a 
condition of acquiring the truth)’ (Secularism 25). He cites her ‘doctrine that all truth and 
beauty are to be attained by the humble and faithful study of nature’, as opposed to 
‘substituting vague forms, bred by imagination on the mists of feeling, in place of definite, 
substantial reality’ (28). This is doubly interesting because it connotes both one old 
dispensation (‘submission of the self’) from which Realism emanates and, through ‘vague 
forms’ another, a fundamentally Platonic dispensation. Another theorist of Realism, Georg 
Lukacs, articulates this in his ‘Art and Objective Truth’: 
 
The more ‘artless’ a work of art, the more it gives the effect of life and nature […], the more 
clearly it exemplifies an actual concentrated reflection of its times and the more clearly it 
demonstrates that the only function of its form is to express this objectivity, this reflection of 
life. (Frow 15) 
 
Lukacs’s criticism, like any that invokes ‘objectivity’ and ‘reflection’ as criteria for art, is 
predicated on what Morris calls ‘eternal, transcendent realities’ (50). One concedes that for 
Plato, the intractable problem of mimesis was that it could not ‘express this objectivity, this 
reflection of life’. In The Republic, for example, Socrates asks if, when one looks at a bed 
‘from the side or straight on, or any other way, does it at all differ from itself, or does it not 
differ at all, though it appears differently?’ (330). To which his interlocutor answers, with 
Socrates’ implicit agreement, that it does not. There are, in short, big differences between 
Plato’s conception of mimesis and the Realist one – namely, Plato’s assertion that writers 
were ‘poor imitators’, at ‘two removes’ from the universal ‘ideal Forms’ (rather than ‘vague 
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forms’) by the mediation of our perceptions and their own mediation of that mediation; 
Realists, however, held that artists could be absolute imitators (Morris 50). But there is a 
fraternity of thought among the differences. Courbet sounds very Platonic when he 
promulgates that ‘it’s dishonest to write poetry’ (in Grant 26). ‘Poetry’, for the Realists and 
Plato alike, was the syrup of style poured over content. 
 
These older dispensations were also compounded with a much newer one. Levine’s 
analogy with ‘contemporary Victorian science’ is not incidental. An enduring interpretation 
of what Brooks terms ‘the realist vision’ yolks it with the dominant nineteenth-century 
paradigms of science. Literature, craving respectability, sought the legitimating rigour of 
scientific method – it sought to marry up. Indeed, writing in 1886 about the realists’ and 
naturalists’ ‘art of observation rather than imagination’, Emile de Vogue comments that 
‘jealous of the rigour of scientific procedure, the [realist or naturalist] writer proposes to 
instruct us by a perpetual analysis of feelings and of acts’ (Grant 31-32). One finds abundant 
examples of de Vogue’s sentiments in the literature of the period. ‘Because the true world 
which science reveals to us,’ French polymath Ernest Renan wrote in 1848-49, ‘is much 
superior to the fantastic world created by the imagination’ (Realism, Naturalism, and 
Symbolism 26). Once again there is a partitioning of ‘science’ and ‘imagination’, ‘the true’ 
and ‘the fantastic’, just as there was in the quotes from Eliot. Grant, citing Roland Stromberg, 
asserts that ‘Coleridge’s “shaping spirit of the Imagination” had been replaced by the 
“shaping strength” of science’ (39). The brothers Goncourt announced in 1864 that ‘the novel 
has taken upon itself the researches and duties of science’, a statement epitomised by Zola, 
with his belief that the scientific novelist was engaged in the ‘conquest of nature’, the 
tabulation and taxonomising of reality (Grant 38, 40). ‘Imagination,’ Zola wrote, ‘is no 
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longer the novelist’s most important faculty’ (Grant 30). It hardly needs saying what he 
thought had replaced it. 
 
* 
 
Lukacs’s contentions on realism were put in the service of a broader historicism, a socio-
political teleology. ‘History moves toward a predetermined goal,’ Frow paraphrases, ‘and this 
goal is the realization of an “objective rationality”: the process is rational, and the writer must 
reflect this rationality…’ (13). This distinguishes it from the historicism of someone like 
Auerbach, which identifies no ‘predetermined goal’ for this development. Auerbach’s 
historicism identifies the development of literature from the essentially macrocosmic biblical 
and Homeric narratives to the microcosmic ‘serious treatment of everyday reality’ apparent in 
nineteenth-century fiction (491). But it is instructive that both critics, both cleaving toward a 
‘world-reflecting’ (or ‘correspondence’) paradigm of mimesis, expound historicist arguments. 
Lehan writes that ‘literary naturalism’ had an ‘analogue’ in the ‘old historicism’, since both 
‘depended on a belief in the linearity of history, the necessity of cause and effect, and the idea 
of a verifiable narrative’ (15-16). Conversely, the Russian Formalists, cleaving toward a 
‘world-creating’ (or ‘coherence’) paradigm, disclaim historicism. They expound, rather, a 
constructionist dialectics of Smith’s ‘word-to-word’ relationship: ‘a kind of accretion of 
broken prohibitions’, as Frow calls it (86). That is, as Smith writes: 
 
Dynamic, innovative expression, rising in response to an automatized mode, also becomes 
automatic in readers’ responses and is soon replaced by a newer expression that is dynamic in 
relation to the now traditional one’. (8) 
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‘Dynamic, innovative expression’: I want to emphasise this. For the Russian Formalists, a 
work should not be ‘more “artless”’ but more artful: style matters, in other words. Smith 
reiterates this point in the conclusion to his treatise: ‘Harry Levin writes that “yesterday’s 
realism is today’s convention”… for realism is not a static form: it is a mode of literary 
change’ (241). Brooks seconds Smith, noting that ‘the founder of modern linguistics, 
Ferdinand de Saussure’ analogised language with our system of money (14). That much is 
obvious, of course: we speak of ‘coining’ new words, ‘minting’ new images. For ‘the great 
realist novelists,’ Brooks goes on to assert, ‘words… are part of a circulatory system subject 
to inflation and deflation, that meanings may be governed by the linguistic economies and 
marketplaces of which they are part’ (14). Language, particularly clichés, is subject to 
inflationary pressures (except that, unlike in economics, interest rates go down rather than up 
in response). One finds an incipient awareness of this in Flaubert. Brooks writes that 
Monsieur Homais in Madame Bovary ‘is constructed of nothing but clichés’ and that the 
Dictionary of Received Ideas, that inventory of ossified expression, ‘confirms a fully 
disabused, or deconstructed, understanding of language’ (63). So, for example, Flaubert, 
countering Christopher Ricks’s argument that clichés have a short shelf life (a cliché with a 
decidedly long shelf life), remarks of ‘candour’ that it is ‘always “disarming”’ and of 
congratulations that they are ‘always “hearty”, “sincere”, etc.’ (Ricks 358; Flaubert 297, 
299). 
 
Quite how different this is from the ‘objective’, ‘world-reflecting’ paradigm is evident 
in a letter Flaubert wrote to Louise Colet in 1852. He declared that he wanted to write a book 
‘about nothing, a book dependent on nothing external, which would be held together by the 
internal strength of its style, just as the earth, suspended in a void, depends on nothing 
external for its support,’ a book with ‘almost no subject’, or, at any rate, an ‘invisible’ one (in 
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Walder 9). Flaubert’s dream was quixotic – just as the earth, after all, does depend on 
external things for its support, words must always be ballasted with referentiality – but it was 
not wholly unserious. A strain of Flaubert’s thinking, the idea for a book ‘held together by the 
internal strength of its style’, infects many Romantic and post-Romantic writers. Whereas 
Herbert lamented of his poetry that ‘nothing could seem too rich to clothe the sunne’, 
Shelley, in Hazlitt’s waspish caricature, ‘determined to “elevate and surprise”’ and 
‘distort[ing] everything from what it was’, ‘would swear that it was black’ (211). The writer 
ceases to be a ‘poor imitator’ and becomes an ‘artificer’, in Philip Sidney words, who 
‘bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in nature’ (100). The writer makes 
the ‘ideal Forms’. The extreme version of this tendency construes the artist as a kind of God. 
Brooks notes Stephen Dedalus’s ideal in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: ‘the artist, 
like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond his handiwork, invisible, 
refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails’ (Brooks 198). The artist ceases to 
be only a ‘humble and faithful’ minister to God’s ‘handiwork’, to nature – what Herbert 
called ‘a sweetnesse readie penn’d’ – and becomes ‘world-creating’. Halliwell notes that the 
originator of the term ‘aesthetics’, the eighteenth-century German philosopher Alexander 
Baumgarten, conceived of the poet as, among other things, ‘a human maker on analogy with 
the divine creator himself’ (9). Baumgarten’s contemporary Shaftesbury conceived of the 
artist as a ‘second maker’ (God being the first); Bellori before him conceived of the artist as 
one who ‘“imitates” God himself (Halliwell 360; 356). 
 
Scientific procedure and attempts at exclusively denotative prose – Zola’s ‘screen [of] 
plain glass, very thin, very clear, which aspires to be so perfectly transparent’ – were no basis 
for literary representation (Grant 28). Perhaps this is merely symptomatic of ‘the crisis in 
confidence in the scientific account of reality which occurred late in the nineteenth century’ 
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(Grant 43). But I submit that it predates this; indeed, Keats’s sentiments about ‘cold 
philosophy’ I discuss in chapter three tell us as much. Emily Dickinson, to take only a minor 
example, writes in a poem on spring that: ‘A color stands abroad / On solitary hills / That 
science cannot overtake, / But human nature feels’ (her italics, surprisingly [259]). No, art 
would ‘make its appeal through the senses’, Conrad writes, ‘to our capacity for delight and 
wonder’ (232; 231). Sensory impressions, not ‘facts’ or ‘ideas’, would be literary art’s 
bulwark against irrelevance: ‘to show [a ‘rescued fragment’ of the world’s] vibration, its 
colour, its form; and… reveal the substance of its truth—disclose its inspiring secret…’ 
(232). One would approach this undertaking with ‘tenderness and faith’ (my italics [232]). 
 
It is ‘the shaping spirit of the Imagination’, not the ‘shaping strength’ of science, that 
predominates; the writer does indeed imitate God, ‘imitating’ the way Coleridge also 
postulated, ‘by artistic remaking’ (Halliwell 366). Morris makes the now fairly banal point 
that Realism emerged concurrently with photography, saying that ‘this coincidence may well 
have encouraged a pictorial or photographic model of correspondence’ (5). But there is an 
alternative mechanical comparison to be made, one pertinent to the distinction I am trying to 
draw. Robert Alter, discussing the concept of ‘phantasmagoria’ in the nineteenth century, 
nominates the magic lantern, ‘an exhibition of optical illusions’, as its seminal influence (30). 
‘Phantasmagoria,’ he continues, ‘is the exact antithesis of the guidebook representation… in 
which everything is mapped out, ordered… as a system’ (30). In the same way, one infers, 
the magic lantern is the exact antithesis of the linear verisimilitude of photography, affiliated 
as it is with the ‘mapped out, ordered’, systematic representations of Realism. Moreover, it 
bewitched nineteenth-century writers like Dickens; indeed, Morris herself, like apparently all 
critics of Dickens, quotes his figure of London as ‘that magic lantern’ (22). The 
suggestiveness of the magic lantern comes from the ‘optical illusions’ Alter speaks of. Both 
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concepts feature in the following paragraphs. My conjecture is that much post-Romantic 
fiction, and some of that especially, increasingly engages in a project of ‘mak[ing] you see’, 
of cultivating illusion to show reality – of, before all, ‘world-creating’. As Brooks notes, 
‘realism’ (of any kind) is a term ‘resolutely attached to the visual, to those works that seek to 
inventory the immediate perceptible world’; it is, he goes on later in the book, ‘highly visual, 
invested in the faculty of sight, in a viewing of the things and the milleux people move amid, 
rub up against’ (16; 223). Levine goes even further, asserting that ‘Realism is an illusion, just 
as representational art is illusory’ in the deployment of perspective and the rendering of light 
(189). The latter, Levine perceptively remarks, achieves its purpose ‘just by not making the 
brush strokes look like the thing being represented’ (Secularism 189). 
 
What Levine means here is encapsulated by James Wood in How Fiction Works: 
‘Aristotle’s original formulation of mimesis, in the Poetics’, with its valuing of convincing 
impossibility over unconvincing possibility, emphasises not ‘simple verisimilitude or 
reference’ but ‘mimetic persuasion’ (179). Writers, like painters, ‘convince’ their audience 
that what is palpably not the object, just words on a page or paint on a canvas, represents it. 
Therefore I think Barthes errs in his essay ‘The Reality Effect’ when, identifying what he 
sees as the origins of modern literary description, he adduces the ‘functional genre… the 
epideictic’, ‘intended to excite the admiration of the audience (and no longer to persuade it)’ 
(143). Surely no such division between ‘exciting’ and ‘persuading’ exists, for how is one 
possible without the other? Nobody, when watching a magic trick, is excited yet not 
persuaded (Socrates condemns art and ‘conjuring’ both for just this reason [336]). This is 
what Henry James meant by his phrase ‘the intensity of illusion’, which Wayne Booth 
expatiates on in The Rhetoric of Fiction: 
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‘The intensity of illusion’, [James] tells us again and again, is the ultimate test. The mere 
illusion of reality of itself is not enough…. Whatever intensity is achieved must be an 
intensity of the illusion that genuine life has been presented. (43-44) 
 
Barthes further contends that ‘by posing the referential as real, by pretending to follow it in a 
submissive fashion, realistic description avoids being reduced to fantasmatic activity’, such 
as that practised, he says, before the nineteenth century (145). But Brigid Lowe emphatically 
rebuts Barthes’s assumption that modern literary representation, even pseudo-‘transparent’ 
prose, is not engaged in a similarly ‘fantasmatic activity’. ‘It is not at all clear,’ she writes, 
‘why the description of familiar, common and representative scenes – quite as much as 
fantastic scenarios… cannot put things before the reader’s eyes’ (86). In short, as Levine 
suggested, Realism is not actually real, and criticism like Barthes’s tends to perpetuate those 
‘naïve and deluded’ notions even while repudiating them. Kearns, integrating the tendency of 
fictional texts to bear false witness to any style or program their authors might espouse, 
writes: ‘the literary process itself destabilizes the positivist program of fact-gathering, for 
things that appear to be facts can elide and metamorphose with the intricacy of the language 
game’ (11). In one sense this is manifest. If ‘the literary process’ did not do this, the whole 
anti-realism critical edifice would be invalidated: realism would be real. Too much criticism 
of realism ignores this corollary, as Barthes’s does, or carries on, as Kearns’ does – and 
Levine’s and Rorty’s too in the introduction to this thesis – as if it were some trenchant 
discovery. 
 
A problem with the Barthes-Kearns antipathy to realism, I think, is that they are 
complicit in the Realistic preference for ‘science’ over ‘imagination’, the ‘true’ over the 
‘fantastic’: they perceive avowedly mimetic fiction to be attempting the ‘communication of 
information’, not of ‘imaginative experience’ (Lowe 83). Lowe argues that, insofar as these 
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binaries are not crudely simplistic, the latter surely not very far at all, ‘imagination’ is the 
shaping spirit and the shaping strength of fiction. She concedes that ‘Barthes seems to be 
partly aware of language’s potential for… conjurings of imaginative experience’ (83). But, 
she writes, ‘[f]or Barthes the paradigm classic realist text leaves little for the reader to do but 
understand the words’ (92). Lowe counters that, for the reader, fiction is a ‘real of sensual 
and experiential pleasure, a “phantom” as Bronte calls it, of real experience’ (94). (Plato, too, 
uses ‘phantoms’, along with ‘phantasies’ and ‘phantasma’ [Melberg 11].) The idea here is of 
a piece with Wood’s ‘mimetic persuasion’. It is an engagement of the reader, and goes back 
to the time of Plato and Aristotle: 
 
The traditions of mimeticism are firmly aligned with a recurrent Greek tendency to judge the 
impressiveness of artistic representations partly in terms of their success in drawing the 
hearer or viewer into a strong engagement with the possibilities of experience they depict. 
(My italics [Halliwell 21]) 
 
I want to return to this ‘strong engagement’ in the final section of this chapter, where I 
discuss hypotyposis. Before that, however, I must extend the discussion of formalism’s 
‘world-creation’ to ‘defamiliarisation’, Viktor Shklovsky’s concept of aesthetic success. 
‘Defamiliarisation’ seems to me the underwriter of hypotyposis’s efficacy as a trope, and the 
latter cannot be viewed outside of that context. 
 
* 
 
When I was a child I can remember having a brief fascination with questions that required, to 
use what then seemed a glamorous, occult phrase, lateral thinking. These questions, which in 
retrospect look like disappointed riddles, occasioned a pleasurable windfall of surprise when 
one came upon their answers. The secret of their effectiveness was that unlike riddles, to take 
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the comparison slightly further, their answers were, at least to the simple questions fit for 
duller children, obvious from the beginning. To a question such as ‘what weighs more, a 
tonne of iron or a tonne of feathers?’, the answer was obvious in more ways than one. The 
iron, naturally. My juvenile brain, not much more agile than the objects under consideration, 
had cracked the case. Iron beat feathers in this rogue rock-iron-feathers game. Feathers 
cannot be heavy. Indeed, that young version of me would not have been alone in finding a 
tonne of feathers truly unimaginable. Not in the world’s biggest roosting site nor in its biggest 
natural history museum nor in the entirety of the The Birds could there possibly be a tonne of 
feathers. Perhaps a quilt that wrapped the Opera House, say, as if in one of Christo’s stunts, 
would be in the tonne-of-feathers ballpark. The rapid extirpation of moas in New Zealand 
might have yielded a tonne of feathers. 
 
At that age, however, I was unfamiliar with colonial slaughter and Christo. ‘Feathers’ 
and ‘weight’ were tantamount to an oxymoron. Whereas a tonne of iron – well, one had only 
to look around. Iron was the population-bearing stuff of the vast conurbation around me. It 
was the difference between skyscrapers and thatched cottages, adobes and yurts. That I could 
apprehend the existence of thatched cottages, adobes and yurts about as well I could 
apprehend the existence of the word ‘conurbation’ hardly mattered. Iron was heavy, and I 
knew it. Yet by alighting on that cannily irrelevant bit of misdirection, the comparison 
between iron and feathers, I had overlooked the mutual annullment taking place between 
‘tonne’ and ‘tonne’. My error was to assume that I knew what a tonne of anything was like. 
This was how these questions – ‘conundrums’ might do more justice to the modishness of 
their origins – worked, and worked me over. They thrived on covert prejudices. In this way 
they were salutary. Once one recognised or was told the answer, that local prejudice – and 
others, if one grasped the principle of the question – would have been identified and 
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temporarily neutralised. Nobody experiencing this would then sleep under an iron quilt or try 
to make cars out of feathers. But for everybody who did experience it, their understanding of 
what iron and feathers can be – which is to say, what they are – was enhanced. 
 
What I have just outlined is the process of art as Viktor Shklovsky saw it. Explaining 
it is not as straightforward. A problem with Shklovsky’s work is that one feels its rightness 
without being able to employ anything more cogent than obtuse platitudes to account for it. 
One is reduced to the dialectical position of Saint Augustine on time, knowing what it is and 
why it is true until one is asked to explain it. Evidently, Shklovsky was too. As Fredric 
Jameson remarks, ‘characteristically, Shklovsky does not conclude; he is temperamentally 
allergic to metaphysical assertions’ (79). Shklovsky, with his various explications and 
applications of one simple idea, appears to be a hedgehog but is actually much more the fox. 
His prose is discursive and belletristic; he thinks as a writer does, feeling first for aesthetic 
contours rather than thematic architectonics. Unlike his contemporaries Vladimir Propp or 
Roman Jakobson, for example, he never erects a theoretical trellis for his ideas and readings 
to grow on. It is in his encounters with writing that he is a brilliant critic: his ‘theory of prose’ 
is just the sum of these encounters. Even at its most abstract, it is buoyed on the thermals of 
textual appreciation. 
 
It is, therefore, hard to extrapolate anything systematic from his criticism. Moreover, 
the charge of frivolousness has often rumbled around him. Jakobson held that ostranenie, a 
term he alleged Shklovsky had purloined from the Formalist patriarch Osip Brik, was, in 
Douglas Robinson’s words, a term that ‘should not be taken too seriously’ (80, 268n). It was 
as loose and mercurial as Shklovsky himself. In fairness, signs of slipshod methodology and 
unseriousness were marked in Formalists other than Shklovsky. Victor Erlich called Boris 
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Eikhenbaum ‘not a methodologist par excellence. He was capable of acute insights, as long as 
he dealt with purely literary matters....’ (133). This could apply to Shklovsky as well. But 
Erlich goes even further about Shklovsky, alluding to him as a capricious iconoclast, ‘a 
rebel...a reckless Bohemian’ (67). Shklovsky – whose ‘reading was wide but spotty. 
Erudition was never his forte’ – ‘always’, in the words of his sometime acolyte G. Gukovskij, 
whom Erlich quotes with approval, 
 
worked by intuition[;] he was apt to misstate some details, to construct his theories above and 
beyond historical data... Both defects were outweighed by the consistency and freshness of his 
views on art. In his hasty and brilliant formulas he embodied the yearnings of Russian 
scholarly and literary thought in the Futurist era with a clarity and pungency hardly paralleled 
by any of his contemporaries. (Erlich 133) 
 
Robinson is more disobliging still, though his reproof too is leavened with admiration for 
Shklovsky’s puckish impudence, his talismanic centrality to Russian Formalism. He calls 
Shklovsky ‘a devious writer’ whose ‘rhetorical deviousness’ in his later work on ostranenie 
‘is sheer devious fun’ (92-93). This actually comports, or does not entirely discomport, with 
Shklovsky’s estimate. Shklovsky saw himself, and ostranenie itself, as the knight in chess, 
which ‘moves in a L-shaped manner because it is forbidden to take the straight road’ 
(Knight’s Move 3). The genius of the knight is that its occasionally cumbersome, laggard 
progress, which also includes the ability to vault other pieces, is unique. The knight is not 
bound by the linearities of the rook and the bishop and their composite, the queen. 
 
Only the knight, then, can attack the pivotal queen without being threatened by her: 
only it can grasp the nettle. To attack with another piece requires the mobilisation of further 
pieces in support; three or four pieces usually are required to make sure she does not escape, 
and at least one of those usually must be sacrificed. In other words, queens dominate the 
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structure of the board and its pieces much as conventions dominate thinking about any 
aesthetic matter (‘There are many reasons for the strangeness of the knight’s move, the main 
one being the conventionality of art, about which I am writing’ [KM 3]). The thinking is done 
on the conventions’ terms and the game played on the queens’. But the knight alone can 
change the latter, and Shklovsky likewise sought to attack one of the former: namely, that 
‘the purpose of the image’ is to make the unfamiliar familiar. This is not so, Shklovsky holds, 
and turns the proposition on its head: it is not to make the unfamiliar familiar, ‘to draw our 
understanding closer to that which this image stands for, but rather to allow us to perceive the 
object in a special way...’ (10). The image must be an antidote to automatisation, that baleful 
symptom of familiarity. 
 
Automatisation is pervasive, as Shkovsky could attest. In his scarifying memoir-cum-
parable of revolutionary Saint Petersburg in the midst of a torrid winter (‘the Arctic Circle 
became a reality’ [13]), he wrote that ‘when the pressure is enormous, it obliterates the 
differences between a hardness of straw and a hardness of iron. It all takes a single shape’ 
(14). While such an obliteration would presumably have made it easier to answer any lateral 
thinking question about iron and straw (or feathers), it connives at the same end as the one the 
question would try to counter: obscuring perception. For Shklovsky, this imaginative poverty 
is more obscene than many of the kinds of material poverty he depicts. Moreover, while it 
was a symptom of the circumstances, it was also, he implies, a cause, an enabler of them. 
This aesthetic matter was also a moral one, as I suggested in the introduction that it was for 
Dickens. It is an implication of Shklovsky’s arguments that is seldom noted: ostranenie is 
edifying. I alluded to this in my anecdote. The more we ‘saw’, the more we should try to 
‘see’. By noting this, I do not wish to engage in a debate over whether aesthetics can be 
edifying, merely to highlight that Shklovsky appeared to believe they could be, after a 
58 
fashion. There is another point about automatisation, this perceptual entropy, that Shklovsky 
does not mention: it is also linguistic entropy. As Erlich, summarising ostranenie, writes, ‘by 
bringing together disparate notions, the poet gives a coup de grace to the verbal cliche and to 
the stock responses attendant upon it’ (177). It could just as easily be the other way round: 
perceptual cliche and the stock words and phrases attendant upon it. Either way, to make a 
point that should not need making, the verbal is hand in glove with the perceptual. The 
metaphor ‘hand in glove’ itself illustrates this. It does nothing special to impress on the reader 
my meaning. Like the note in place of a missing file in an archive, it represents without 
yielding apprehension, with making its referent live on the page. To change figures, it is a 
tyre whose innumerable torsions have reduced its purchase. 
 
As Sheldon notes, Shklovsky, countering Trotsky’s assertion that ‘the word is the 
“phonetic shadow of the deed”’, declared that ‘the word is not a shadow but a thing’ (KM 
viii). The word, the ‘image’, is not a mere helpmeet, an intermediary between reader and 
object; it is more akin to a private detective who uncovers some scandalous piece of 
intelligence about an object, who sees it in a way others do not. Yet it is not a corollary of 
ostranenie that the strangeness itself must be cultivated and fetishised, as if the essence of 
literary wit were one of those creative writing exercises in which the student has to write a 
paragraph comparing, say, sophisticated financial instruments to a hippotamus. Literature is 
not an estrangement arms race. Indeed, it is better to adduce examples that are as far as can be 
from wilful strangeness. That wonderful little grace of Shklovsky’s about the frigid weather – 
‘the Arctic Circle became a reality’ – is an example of an image that ‘deforms’, to use 
Fanger’s parlance, without being wilful, without resorting to an input of extraneous 
phenomena. If an historian or a memoirist, such as a later version of Shklovky himself, were 
to say anachronistically that ‘all of St Petersburg had climbed into a freezer’, he would be 
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invoking an extraneous object, the freezer, in what is really an implicit simile (‘Living in that 
winter was like living in a freezer’), with only the slight peculiarity of ‘climbed’ estranging 
the central metaphor’s triteness. But the Arctic Circle is, one hazards without any expertise 
on such matters, a big influence on the weather in its metropolitan satellite St Petersburg. As 
a gloss of the weather patterns in St Petersburg, Shklovsky’s line has a terse utility. Yet it is 
so strange, strange in a way the freezer simile could not be. How does a geographical location 
‘become a reality’? It is, surely, always a reality, and a reality to the city of St Petersburg 
most of all. In fact, what Shklovsky does here is simulate the very perceptual automatisation 
the average St Petersburg resident suffers from as this unprecedented coldwave comes on. 
For him or her, cold is by the by, winter a routine hardship much as feudalism and tsarist 
absolutism were. Although the cold was a reality, it was a reality that had been assimilated. It 
took this extraordinary weather event to make the cold palpable again. That is what the image 
registers. A big part of its effectiveness comes from the ostensible simplicity on which it 
hinges. The plainness and lightness of ‘became’ as the verb make the tremendous cold seem 
to the residents, and to us, an in media res job: without knowing how it came to this, we have 
found ourselves amid a full-scale annexation by the cold, under the jackboot of winter. The 
place through which explorers had long sought a passage is now sending an expedition of its 
own to find a passage south, as if it desired a way to unite with Antarctica in polar solidarity. 
 
What we have here is ‘an artifact that has been intentionally removed from the 
domain of automatized perception’ (Theory 12). What makes it exemplary is that, aside from 
its wit, it represents, as I noted before, others ‘experiencing the process of creativity’: 
‘seeing’ the Arctic Circle – or the cold: it makes no difference which – not ‘recognising’ it 
(Theory 6). We find the reverse in the Boz sketch ‘Vauxhall Gardens by Day’, where Boz, 
entering the Gardens, looks at their ‘disenchanted’ contents and notes that ‘we just recognised 
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them, and that was all’ (129). The effect of Shklovsky’s phrase is the effect Dickens seeks 
and aspires to in his writing. In Shklovsky’s case, it is perceiving ‘the Arctic Circle’, the node 
of contexts that presupposes Shklovsky’s image, in a new context, which, in this first 
encounter, seems to be not a context but ‘a reality’. ‘Became’, then, has dual meanings, or 
rather dual subjects. Parsing the image ‘the Arctic Circle became a reality’, one finds that 
there is a kind of perceptual hypallage occurring: the true subject is the ostensible object, the 
greater populace of St Petersburg, and a paraphrase of the image would read ‘we became 
aware of the Arctic Circle’s reality’. The indefinite article is appropriate since ‘reality’ here 
merely denotes the ascendent context at that moment of perception. To ‘become a reality’ is 
to usurp the erstwhile ascendent context, or contexts. The bigger the gap between the new 
context and the old – and here it is as big as the gap between absence and presence, otherness 
and acquaintance – the bigger the thrill to the defamiliarising coup. What is important to 
remember is that familiarity does not preclude estrangement: indeed, it is a predicate of 
estrangement. Familiarity is really just a complex of fortified associations. The measure of 
aesthetic success, at least as far as ‘defamiliarisation’ goes, is the strength of the fortifications 
one is breaching. I was familiar with feathers and iron; Shklovsky, or the implied resident of 
St Petersburg, was familiar with the Arctic Circle. Our familiarity made us more susceptible 
to astonishment at the defamiliarising tropes. We were like passengers on a plane who took 
their altitude, of which they had only a partial understanding to begin with, entirely for 
granted – could ‘recognise’ it but no longer ‘see’ it – until a door opened and they were 
sucked out. 
 
But Shklovsky’s critical enterprise continually begs the question of whether 
‘defamiliarisation’ is ‘Art’ or ‘device’: the principle of aesthetic success or just one means to 
it. If the former, it follows that literature really is no more than an estrangement arms race. 
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Shklovsky appears to suggest the former. ‘The device of enstrangement is not peculiar to 
Tolstoi.... In my opinion, enstrangement can be found almost anywhere (i.e., wherever there 
is an image),’ he wrote in “Art as Device’ (Theory 9). Stacy assents to this, declaring that 
‘Shklovsky himself...clearly implies that ostranenie includes all techniques whereby the artist 
portays or describes – and thereby causes us to see – something in a fresh, defamiliarized 
way’ (39). But when in 1966 the elderly Shklovsky revisited his article and dutifully recanted 
the concept of ostranenie, he noted that the concept ‘seemed to me a phenomenon common to 
Romantic, realistic, and so-called modernist art’ (Robinson 79). Carlo Ginzburg asks whether 
the term should ‘be considered as coterminous with artistic practice in general, as Shklovsky 
suggested, or should we understand it as a procedure bound up with a particular literary 
tradition?’ (4). Ginzburg hews, in his circuitous way, to the second consideration. As he sees 
it, Shklovsky’s theory is founded on Russian texts, and in particular on Tolstoy. In this 
paradigm, Tolstoy is the inheritor, by way of Voltaire and other French Enlightenment 
writers, of Marcus Aurelius’ ‘quest for true causal principles as an antidote to false images’, 
and ‘Defamiliarization, in this tradition, is the means by which we overcome appearances and 
arrive at a deeper understanding of reality’ (18). This is not the first attempt to identify the 
historical lineage of ostranenie. Usually quoted in this connection – by, for that matter, 
Shklovsky himself, who by 1966 had become aware of it – is Novalis’s affirmation that ‘the 
art of making things in a pleasing way strange, making them alien and at the same time 
familiar and attractive – in this consists Romantic poetics’ (Robinson 79). There were more 
recent, and certainly more direct, antecedents. James M. Curtis, in his seminal article 
‘Bergson and Russian Formalism’, notes the real affinities between Shklovsky and the 
philosopher who had written less than two decades earlier, in his treatise Laughter, that ‘art 
has no other object than to brush aside...the conventionally and socially accepted generalities, 
in short, all that masks reality from us..’ (111). Shklovsky cited Bergson in one of his articles 
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on Charlie Chaplin, and his ‘friend Lev Yakubnsky associates the very important word 
“automatization” with Bergson’ (Curtis 112). There are many other circumstantial affinities 
that, taken together, establish ‘a Bergsonian resonance in the formalists’ context’ (113). The 
concepts of ‘seeing’ and ‘recognising’ posited by Bergson were later adopted by Shklovsky 
and, as I indicated earlier, are essential to his own concept of ostranenie. 
 
Proust, on the other hand, is operating within a different paradigm, one that could 
easily, though incorrectly, be subsumed into the ample portfolio of ostranenie. Proust appears 
to be ‘trying to preserve the freshness of appearances against the intrusion of ideas, by 
presenting things “in the order of perception”’, which is the reverse, or so Ginzburg thinks 
anyway, of ostranenie (18). The phrase of Proust’s occurs in a passage Ginzburg studies, the 
passage in which Proust’s narrator finds a resemblance between Madame de Sevigne and the 
fictional Impressionist Elstir, quoting the letter in which de Sevigne ‘“came across a thousand 
chimeras”’; Proust, with Ginzburg nodding in the background, suggests that this perception is 
as veracious as, and certainly more potent than, a more sober, causal explanation: namely, 
that moonlight had come over the figures she perceives (18). Interestingly, Jameson, writing a 
few decades earlier, had cited the very same passage from Proust, though in a different 
translation (thus he quotes ‘“a thousand phantoms”’ [54]). (One can only guess that the one 
eminent thinker simply had not read the other, for Jameson is nowhere mentioned in 
Ginzburg’s capacious notes.) As Jameson puts it: 
 
The implication [is] that the abstract understanding (an explanation through cause-and-effect) 
is a kind of poor substitute for perception, that there is a kind of interference between a purely 
intellectual knowledge of a thing and some genuine, spontaneous, visionary experience of it.... 
It is at the same time part of a general feeling in the modern world that life has become 
abstract, that reason and theoretical knowledge have come to separate us from a genuine 
existential contact with things and the world. (54-55) 
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Jameson, who does not distinguish Proust’s object from Shklovsy’s and Tolstoy’s, also notes 
that this goes for criticism too, since Proust’s passage is less narrative than an act of criticism. 
Proust is essaying Shklovsky’s ‘knight’s move’. 
 
* 
 
James Wood concludes that realism ‘cannot be mere verisimilitude…but what I must call 
lifeness: life on the page, life brought to different life by the highest artistry’ (186). As I have 
shown, James, too, put much store by ‘the illusion that genuine life has been presented’. 
Taken alone, these remarks could mean anything. Indeed, it may be a valid stricture on this 
thesis that it conscripts such remarks without attending to the nuances of their context. But I 
want to argue that ‘lifeness’ is predicated on illusion, falsity, and I think there is ample 
evidence to support this argument. My reading of Wood and James certainly comports with 
the classical tradition of mimesis criticism. Halliwell writes that: 
 
the persuasive vividness of a mimetic work or performance is more than the achievement of a 
specious surface. It involves the creation of something that, through its sense of life, can affect 
the viewer or hearer emotionally too: in the case of the hymn, it is a matter of the power to 
‘bewitch’ or ‘enchant’. (his italics this time [21]) 
 
To give the object represented ‘life’, Halliwell, like Wood and James, means, the writer must 
‘make the stone feel stony’. Bitzer’s anatomy of the horse is ‘hopeless’ because bereft of 
‘life’. The question remains, though, of how a writer is to do this. And here is where I want to 
concentrate on hypotyposis. Roland Barthes alludes to ‘a specific figure, hypotyposis, whose 
function was “to put things before the hearer’s eyes”’ (145-46). No reference is supplied, but 
the Oxford English Dictionary describes the function of hypotyposis the same way (‘bringing 
it, as it were, before the eyes of the hearer or reader’). So does The Cambridge History of 
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Literary Criticism, which calls hypotyposis ‘the supreme elocutionary achievement of the 
rhetorician… bringing its object to the reader’s or listener’s mind with such force that it is 
experienced as if before one’s eyes’ (193). Indeed, there is a rich fund of like descriptions in 
the classics. As James Ker writes, ‘Quintilian in his Institutio oratoria explains that 
[hypotyposis] “shows itself to the eyes of the mind in some way”’ (344-45). 
 
Earlier still than Quintilian, Aristotle admonished that ‘the words, too, ought to set the 
scene before our eyes’, which he later paraphrases as ‘making our hearers see things’ (Barnes 
2251, 2252). What is notable about all these descriptions is their peculiarly synaesthetic 
quality. The reader or auditor of what Ann Vasaly calls ‘vivid description’, seeing only by 
hearing, is itself at a kind of Platonic remove (102). And not just one. For Aristotle, the way 
to get us to see what we hear is to ‘represent things as in a state of activity’; ‘things’, 
including ‘inanimate things’, ‘are made into living beings’ (2252-53). An example of what he 
means might be the line from Macbeth, ‘the Norweyan banners flout the sky’ (55). It is, 
patently, anthropomorphic. But saying that does not quite explain why it is has ‘life’. A 
banner, like a flag, is acted upon: flown, blown, storm-tossed and so on. In Shakespeare’s 
image, though, it ‘flouts’ (gods, gravity, the elements) and rides the wind. The trick is a 
reversal much much like that I referred to in Shklovsky’s ‘The Arctic Circle became a 
reality’. The ‘banner’ is now the acting subject rather than the acted-upon object, and is 
flaunting that agency like a child that has just learned how to walk. The banner has been 
emancipated – from preconceptions, even from reality itself (indeed, by flouting the sky it is 
flouting reality) – and is revelling in its new freedom. It is given a temporary life, a life it 
does not have outside the image. Aristotle’s understanding of rhetorical representation was, in 
other words, that we see something in its fullest representation by hearing it described as 
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being utterly different from what it is. Aristotle also believed that the Sun revolved around 
the Earth. 
 
Just as, apocryphally, Inuits have so many words for ‘snow’, the act of putting things 
before the hearer’s eyes, the reader’s eyes, one’s eyes and the mind’s eyes actually has many 
words in classical rhetoric. Vasaly gamely tries to collate the terms for ‘vivid description’: 
ekphrasis, enargeia, hypotyposis, diatyposis, evidentia, repraesentio, illustratio, 
demonstratio, descriptio, and sub oculos subiectio’ (90). Hypotyposis might, however, be 
preferred for a discussion of modern literary impressionism. Unlike, say, enargeia, it is a 
term with modern associations. Barthes adduces it; Kant expends not a little of his Critique of 
Judgement and Critique of Pure Reason on it; and Lowe makes her argument for a ‘realistic 
hypotyposis’. It is not much, but it is more than can be said for the others (ekphrasis, which 
has likewise obtained in modern discussions, has a discrete meaning: broadly, the 
representation of art in writing. Barthes, for example, treats it separately from hypotyposis in 
‘The Reality Effect’). As John Carlos Rowe writes, ‘The root of the word… hupotupoun 
means “to stamp or to form”’ – which correlates with the idea of ‘artistic remaking’, of 
transfiguring (209). True, enargeia, as Richard Lanham writes, connotes a ‘visually 
powerful’ description (64). But, as Lanham also writes, ‘it would make sense to use enargeia 
as a basic umbrella term for the various special terms of vigorous ocular demonstration’ (65). 
Enargeia’s meaning, then, is perhaps too diffused for it to be applicable to the modern fiction 
I am interested in. Or, rather, it might be better employed the way ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonym’ 
are: as a specific term, to be sure, but more so as a general one. 
 
Rowe notes that ‘hypotyposes are presentations for Kant, “not mere characterizations 
[Charakterismen] or designations”’ (210). Whether its separation from ‘designations’ may 
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beg the question of whether a ‘designation’ is possible I do not know. But the emphasis here 
should be on ‘presentations’ – by which he means ‘the rendering of concepts and ideas “in 
terms of sense”’, as Howard Caygill puts it in A Kant Dictionary (231). Hypotyposis, in 
Kant’s portrayal, is an intrinsically artificial trope; not so much ‘artificial’ in the pejorative 
sense but in the older sense, the sense of making or mediation (an entire thesis could probably 
be written on the semantic souring of words like ‘artificial’ and ‘fabulist’). In fact, this 
twofold meaning is why ‘making your hearer see things’ is such a good translation of 
Aristotle. It accounts for the ‘conjuring’ facility of the language, and allows, too, for the 
artificiality, even the trickery, that the phrase ‘see things’ connotes in modern usage. Barthes 
elaborates on this: 
 
classical rhetoric had in a sense institutionalized the fantasmatic as a specific figure, 
hypotyposis, whose function was ‘to put things before the hearer’s eyes’; not in a neutral, 
constantive manner, but by imparting to representation all the luster of desire. (145-46) 
 
Hypotyposis is not ‘neutral’; is, indeed, ‘fantasmatic’. What precisely Barthes means by 
‘fantasmatic’ is something like the Grimm and Perrault folk tales. Earlier, talking about 
‘ecphrasis’, he writes that pre-modern writers ‘had no hesitation in putting lions or olive trees 
in a northern country’ (144). But, as I have shown Lowe countering, representations of 
‘familiar, common and representative scenes’ may also have the ‘luster of desire’ (86). A 
possible example of this – of hypotyposis in modern fiction – would be the opening 
paragraphs of Bleak House, the first Dickens novel I consider: 
 
London. Michaelmas term lately over, and the Lord Chancellor sitting in Lincoln’s Inn Hall. 
Implacable November weather. As much mud in the streets as if the waters had but newly retired from 
the face of the earth, and it would not be wonderful to meet a Megalosaurus, forty feet long or so, 
waddling like an elephantine lizard up Holborn Hill. Smoke lowering down from chimney–pots, 
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making a soft black drizzle, with flakes of soot in it as big as full–grown snowflakes—gone into 
mourning, one might imagine, for the death of the sun. Dogs, undistinguishable in mire. Horses, 
scarcely better; splashed to their very blinkers. Foot passengers, jostling one another’s umbrellas in a 
general infection of ill temper, and losing their foot–hold at street–corners, where tens of thousands of 
other foot passengers have been slipping and sliding since the day broke (if this day ever broke), 
adding new deposits to the crust upon crust of mud, sticking at those points tenaciously to the 
pavement, and accumulating at compound interest. 
 
Fog everywhere. Fog up the river, where it flows among green aits and meadows; fog down the river, 
where it rolls deified among the tiers of shipping and the waterside pollutions of a great (and dirty) city. 
Fog on the Essex marshes, fog on the Kentish heights. Fog creeping into the cabooses of collier–brigs; 
fog lying out on the yards and hovering in the rigging of great ships; fog drooping on the gunwales of 
barges and small boats. Fog in the eyes and throats of ancient Greenwich pensioners, wheezing by the 
firesides of their wards; fog in the stem and bowl of the afternoon pipe of the wrathful skipper, down in 
his close cabin; fog cruelly pinching the toes and fingers of his shivering little ‘prentice boy on deck. 
Chance people on the bridges peeping over the parapets into a nether sky of fog, with fog all round 
them, as if they were up in a balloon and hanging in the misty clouds. (13) 
 
The ‘impressions’ conveyed to us in this the passage have, of course, a structural purpose: to 
sound the theme that will be developed throughout the novel. The ubiquitous fog, the mud, 
‘mire’, ‘infection’ and ‘slipping and sliding’ are there as a kind of pathetic fallacy, loose 
symbols presaging what is to come (the ‘fog’ of the Chancery, the moral as well as literal 
squalor we find in many of the principals). But what I want to concentrate on is how 
fanatically, fantasmatically visual the passage is – it is, if nothing else, a ‘vigorous ocular 
demonstration’. Dickens is not simply laying it on a bit thick; he is caking an impasto as thick 
as the ‘crust upon crust of mud’. Rowe notes that, etymologically, ‘the impression is always 
an act of physical violence, ‘a pressing into or upon’, and asks why this meaning has been 
‘subordinated to the narrow philosophical meaning: the presentation of sensible data to our 
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mental faculties’ (192-193). Aesthetically, the prose is violent: the compulsive anaphora 
(‘fog’ begins eleven clauses in the second paragraph), the casual hyperbole (‘if this day ever 
broke’), the antic anthropomorphism (‘fog cruelly pinching…’), the ‘fantasmatic’ (‘a 
Megalosaurus, forty feet long or so, waddling like an elephantine lizard up Holborn Hill’). 
Diagnosing this passage and the following paragraphs as ‘fantastic realism’, Rosemary 
Jackson writes of 
 
its emphasis upon things emerging out of invisibility and amorphousness… slowly 
distinguishing discrete forms and units out of a murky, indistinct mass. The city itself has 
become fantastic, undifferentiated, a vast inchoate mass where beings merge together and 
things are promiscuous, amorphous. (133) 
 
Alter remarks of this and a similar passage from Our Mutual Friend – in which ‘inanimate 
London was a sooty spectre’, Dickens paradoxically animating the ‘inanimate’ as Aristotle 
prescribed – that it ‘vividly demonstrates that a mode of representation which may still 
justifiably be called realism is perfectly compatible with the exercise of… a faculty of 
visionary fantasy enabled by metaphor’ (76). We find the same idiom here as in Fanger, 
Smith, Douglas-Fairhurst and so on. This metaphor-enabled ‘faculty’, Alter goes on, is ‘one 
of the chief reasons that [Dickens] is a law unto himself as a novelist…’ (48). And yet the 
narrator is as much impressed upon as impressing. You can see this in the parataxis of several 
sentences (‘implacable November weather’; ‘dogs, undistinguishable in mire. Horses, 
scarcely better’). Whatever they purport to be – journalistic, diaristic – these sentences seem 
by their very nature reactive. The rapidity upon which fancy in Pictures from Italy subsisted 
is replicated here. Dickens, through his proxy the narrator, is not crafting long, lapidary 
periods but stunted, ungainly pseudo-sentences. And the figures used by Dickens have a 
conditional quality, fleeting upon the imagination in a wave of ‘sensible data’. The various 
iterations of ‘fog’ are not wilful but indicative of sensory overload. The narrator alights on 
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the most ‘sensible’ aspect, the most imposing, of the scene, and mentally rolls it around the 
tongue of the mind (underneath the eyes of the mind) to wrest some sensitivity back after the 
sense-dulling assault (something like this can be seen in the final, comic repetition of ‘fog’: 
‘into a nether sky of fog, with fog all round them’). The result is that the passage, so 
characteristic of Dickens’ prose, illustrates how Rowe’s two constructions of literary 
impressionism might be twinned; and how the visuality of hypotyposis is – aptly, given its 
bent for anthropomorphism – bodied forth in rhetoric. 
 
* 
 
As Brooks suggested, recent literary criticism has sought to cashier ‘realism’, portraying it as 
the ‘naïve and deluded’ production of ‘a reassuring interpretation of reality’. This 
misunderstands what realism is, or can be. Nobody disputes that the pseudo-scientific 
premises of Realism are false, since, as Brooks also notes, ‘the linguistic sign…in fact does 
not transparently designate the world’ (6). Words cannot retrieve and contain reality’s 
exhibits as they did for science’s naturalists. They do, however, have the power to conjure, to 
create with what Halliwell calls ‘persuasive vividness’ what Wood calls ‘life on the page’. 
Hypotyposis in Dickens seems to me an affirmation of this. Lowe appeals for a ‘realistic 
hypotyposis’, meaning a realism founded not in ‘artless’ and direct ‘word-to-world’ 
referentiality but in something quite different: a realism that is, paradoxically, artificial, a 
visual realism that consists of ‘optical illusions’. This hypotyposis is, as I see it a kind of 
defamiliarising trope, hence my invocation of Shklovsky. In the following chapters I look at 
that ‘interference between a purely intellectual knowledge of a thing and some genuine, 
spontaneous, visionary experience of it’ Jameson identified. In the next chapter I note its 
division between knowledge and Dickens’ ‘sympathetic relations’; in the third chapter I argue 
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that ‘visionary experience’ of ‘a thing’ facilitates that ‘knowledge’; and in the last chapter I 
investigate ‘visionary experience’ on its own.
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2 
Dickens famously wanted to call the journal that became known as Household Words by an 
altogether different name, ‘The Shadow’. He described ‘The Shadow’ in a letter to John 
Forster. This name represented a composite, notional agent – ‘The Shadow himself’ in 
Dickens’ odd wording, as though it were real – who was to be an indispensible companion to 
families, gadfly to society and scourge of humbug. Dickens seemed to think the rather sinister 
figure would be a cheerful presence, as consonant with the hearth as the eventual blander title 
would be (he actually calls it an ‘always welcome Shadow’ [Letters v.5 622]). It is not really 
surprising that this unfortunate name was later abandoned, although not before Dickens 
hazarded over a dozen other titles, among them, delightfully, ‘Charles Dickens’, which, as a 
kind of novel explicitly about himself, would have been a natural progression from the recent 
David Copperfield (Letters v.5 622, v.6 25)9. But the proposal for ‘The Shadow’ is worth 
discussing here. Dickens suggested that the Shadow ‘may go into any place…and be in all 
homes, and all nooks and corners, and be supposed to be to be cognisant [sic] of everything, 
and go everywhere….’ This figure, he continued, would be ‘a kind of semi-omniscient, 
omnipresent, intangible creature’ (622). 
 
Critics have taken the enticing bait, marking and elucidating links with the narratives 
of Dickens’ fiction. Audrey Jaffe, appraising the ‘fantasy of omniscience’, invokes ‘The 
Shadow’ and writes of ‘semi-omniscience’ that it ‘more accurately describes these 
knowledge-producing bodies, which can never succeed in fully capturing the subjects they set 
out to describe’ and also ‘describes Dickens’s Asmodean narrators as they hover between 
presence and absence’ (Vanishing 6-7, 15). In his recent essay ‘Knots in Glass: Dickens and 
Omniscience from Boz to Bucket’, Clayton Carlyle Tarr persuasively argues for 
                                                 
9 This project rather than the earlier one culminating in Master Humphrey’s Clock seems befitting of 
Chesterton’s remark ‘There floated before him a vision of a monstrous magazine, entirely written by himself… 
[H]e thought of the thing as a vast multiplication of himself’ (106). 
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manifestations of The Shadow within the narratives. He notes a progression from Boz to 
Quilp to Carker and finally to Inspector Bucket, a progression from ambulatory, flaneurial 
speculations to ‘semi-omniscient, omnipresen[ce]’. I believe Tarr’s argument is a good point 
from which to begin this chapter. Like his article, the chapter’s chief concern is fictional 
knowledge: seeing and apprehending within a fictional text. Later chapters are concerned 
with the fantasmatic in relation to manifestly fantasmatic subjects, fancy and phantoms, but 
this is about the fantasmatic in the very walls of the house Brigid Lowe referred to in that line 
the introduction quoted: ‘When we “see” a house in a novel, there is nothing “there”, and 
worse, there is really no “there” for a “there” to be’ (76). To do this the chapter looks at, 
appropriately, Bleak House. It is not surprising that Tarr finishes with that novel, for eminent 
critics such as Jaffe have alighted on it to discuss omniscience before. My interest is slightly 
different from theirs in that I want to explore ‘seeing what cannot be seen’, to adopt Philip 
Fisher’s phrase, in BH (121). What if realism itself is, as Lowe suggested in response to 
Barthes, fantasmatic? 
 
That is the question this chapter will try to answer, or at least to meditate on in a way 
that advances the thesis. Like Jaffe, I want to consider omniscience in BH, in particular the 
claims, or disclaims, to omniscience its two narrators share. Jaffe suggests that ‘a narrator 
who is also a character cannot be omniscient, since he is a part of the scene he observes’, yet 
I would suggest in response that this is frequently untrue of Esther (23). Adducing John O. 
Jordan’s Supposing Bleak House,10 I shall discuss knowledge withheld and permuted in her 
narrative. This is the knowledge of the supra-Esther feigning to know only what her array of 
earlier selves knew at their respective moments in the narrative. Likewise I shall discuss the 
third-person narrator’s different feigning, his subtle narrative aggrandisements wherein he 
                                                 
10 All references to Jordan throughout the thesis are to Supposing Bleak House. 
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imputes to himself knowledge he does not possess. This argument includes a suggestion of 
rather marked eccentricity and wilfulness, namely that he cannot see inside what Benjamin 
calls ‘the windowless room’; cannot, as ‘the Shadow’ is meant to, ‘go into any place’. In the 
process of these discussions, I want to suggest that knowledge itself is not primary in BH or 
elsewhere in Dickens, reality being indeed fantasmatic. Benjamin’s elevated mutterings about 
‘the windowless room’ are a way of demonstrating this. ‘The true’, in his construction, is an 
elusive, abstract figment. In the chapter’s final section I extend this argument to take in walls, 
chiefly those of Newgate. The chapter is thus about procuring the invisible ‘true’ from the 
‘windowless room’, from behind Newgate’s walls; about conjuring the thing that is not a 
thing, which vanishes upon exposure, as Bucket does when he carries off his uncanny 
vanishing acts, particularly those in which he is not the vanisher. 
 
* 
 
Everything in Bleak House vanishes, even the story itself. Much as Jarndyce and Jarndyce, 
the Chancery suit that infests the narrative and precipitates the ruin of more than a few of its 
characters, ‘“lapses and melts away”’, Esther Summerson’s concluding chapter is truncated 
mid-speech, as it were, when she writes, aposiopetically, ‘and that they can very well do 
without much beauty in me – even supposing...’ (975, 989). A novel that begins mantled with 
a terrifically dense, ubiquitous fog (‘Fog everywhere’) is, amid its vast, ostensibly discrete 
architectonics, a series of interludes between vanishings (13). The cruces of the story’s action 
as it reaches its abortive end are the murder of Mr Tulkinghorn, itself a form of vanishing, 
and the vanishing of the culprit from the scene; the vanishing in turn of the prime suspect, 
Lady Dedlock, comes soon after. But more quotidian, domestic – and yet somehow more 
peculiar – vanishing acts occur. According to Mr Kenge, Mr Jellyby ‘is, so to speak, merged 
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– Merged – in the more shining qualities of his wife’; likewise, ‘Mr and Mrs Snagsby are not 
only one bone and one flesh but, to the neighbours’ thinking, one voice too. That voice, 
appearing to proceed from Mrs Snagsby alone...’ (50, 156). This is repeated in the Bagnets’ 
marriage, in which Mr Bagnet defers to his wife on all matters pertaining to thought. But it is 
repeated in so many other ways, in so many other guises, throughout the novel. The purpose 
of this chapter is to explain how such vanishings – and their converse: appearing acts, as it 
were, self-conjurings – relate to the authority of the narrators and to the purported 
verisimilitude of their narration. As I discussed in the first chapter, realism is, by universal 
consent, predicated on decidedly shaky epistemological ground. To what extent can anyone, 
even an omniscient narrator, grasp the real, prise the true observation from reality, have the 
innermost thought of a character vouchsafed to them? In exploring these matters, I draw upon 
BH’s instances of enclosed spaces, chiefly locked rooms, and their transcendence by the 
characters. My aim is to advance the introductory discussion by looking at the posture of 
Dickensian representation in all its naivety, its artless artfulness. 
 
Esther’s narrative was for a long time considered a folly on Dickens’ part. Readers 
objected to what they saw as the vapidity of her narration, the way it becalmed in blandness, 
and often in coyness and tweeness, the onward thrust of the story. Their quarrel with Dickens 
was that he had never been much good at female characters elsewhere, so why entrust half a 
novel to one, let alone one so annoyingly sanguine and disingenuous? Harold Bloom calls her 
‘perhaps the most critically maligned of all central characters in Dickens’ (vii). Nabokov, for 
example, surveying BH in one of his Lectures on Literature, growled in medium dudgeon 
about her ‘artificial baby talk’ and ‘schoolgirl style’ (100). 
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But Esther’s narrative is better and more nuanced than this, as recent commentators 
have agreed. Suzanne Graver, writing about ‘double vision’ in BH, notes ‘an additional 
double vision, caused by self-division,’ namely that ‘between [Esther’s] affirming or 
accomodating self and that critical or desiring self she at once suppresses and obliquely 
expresses’ (3). Or, as John O. Jordan puts it, the narrative entity to whom Dickens delegates 
the first-person narrative actually comprises two people, Esther Summerson and Esther 
Woodcourt, to whom we may add ‘Esther Hawdon’ and Esther’s other soubriquets (Jordan 3, 
BH 466). Furthermore, those two people themselves comprise numerous, variegated 
perspectives, especially those of Esther Summerson, who, having only a vestigial hand in the 
authorship, cannot observe and narrate from any stable perspective, unlike Esther Woodcourt, 
who tells her story seven years later (4). An abundance of ‘temporalities’ and a ‘confusion of 
subject positions’ arise from the conflation of these disparate Esthers (3). The real narrator, 
Esther Woodcourt, is to Esther Summerson as Esther Summerson is to Lady Dedlock (and so 
on, presumably, back to Honoria Barbary and her antecedents). And, indeed, Jordan adduces 
the scene where Esther Summerson espies her mother in the church to point out the way 
‘three distinct times and three separate selves converge in the space of only a few words’, 
about which I shall say more anon (4). During the worst of her illness and its concomitant 
mental disturbances, Esther herself, or rather herselves, narrates a manifestation of this. It is 
the compression of three identities into one, a kind of Esther trinity: 
 
While I was very ill, the way in which these divisions of time became confused with one 
another, distressed my mind exceedingly. At once a child, an elder girl, and the little woman I 
had been so happy as, I was not only oppressed by cares and difficulties adapted to each 
station, but by the great perplexity of trying to reconcile them. (555) 
 
Just as ‘There’s no now for us suitors’, in Richard’s agitated words, there is no now for 
Esther (596). Another matter that interests Jordan is the way ‘[r]etrospective 
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narration...entails foreknowledge on the part of the retrospective narrator of as yet unnarrated 
events’ (4). This foreknowledge, he continues, ‘impinges on the present moment of her 
narrating’ and distorts its autobiographical fallacy, its conceit that what we are hearing from 
Esther in a given chapter represents her thoughts at that moment in the chronology of the 
narrative (5). A fairly straightforward example of this ‘ambiguity’, as Jordan calls it, occurs 
when ‘little Esther Summerson’, as she is known at school, is saved from the custody of the 
wicked harridan Mrs Rachael: ‘Mrs Rachael was too good to feel any emotion at parting, but 
I was not so good, and wept bitterly’ (29; 35). 
 
Jordan later discusses this scene at length without mentioning ‘ambiguity’. His 
interest lies more in what one might call, in the context of this discussion, backshadowings: 
instances of Esther describing minor details, which themselves bear no real narrative import, 
simply because of a tenuous ‘association’ they have with a significant future event that lent 
them a retrospective emphasis (14). They are not, like foreshadowing or prolepsis or 
whatever one wishes to call it, forward-looking; the narrative pile, so to speak, runs back 
toward them. The frivolous, illogical expedients by which Richard justifies his profligacy 
early in the novel, for example, are different from this backshadowing because they seem to 
have led in some way, however indistinct, to his later claim on the Jarndyce legacy. Thus ‘the 
little lawn-gate’ outside which the coach waits to take Esther Summerson from Mrs Rachael, 
‘recalls,’ in Jordan’s words (apt, although I believe unwittingly so, is Jordan’s use of ‘recalls’ 
here in this backward – which is to say, forward – sense) ‘the “iron-gate” of the graveyard in 
which Hawdon/Nemo is buried and where Lady Dedlock dies’ (BH 36; Jordan 14). Jordan’s 
bigger contention is that the scene itself, as the sum of its retrospectively emphasised details, 
is not a depiction of what actually occurred in it, insofar as ‘what actually occurred in it’ can 
be more than a chimera. It is a version of the keener valedictory scenes future Esthers were to 
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experience – her mother’s death, and so on – superimposed on this one. Those later scenes 
project backward to this one and further ‘to the unnarrated moment of her birth’ as much as 
the earlier scenes project forward to them (14). The integrity of the subjective experience’s 
narration, the bailiwick of a first-person narrator, is compromised by a totality of knowledge 
one would associate with a third-person narrator. 
 
I find the scene curious and remarkable – and found it so independently of Jordan’s 
discussion, I should add, which testifies to its intrinsic remarkability – for a similar, if slightly 
different, reason. Any reader can perceive the irony in those words, ‘Mrs Rachael was too 
good to feel any emotion at parting, but I was not so good’; but whose irony is it? There is no 
clear answer to that question. Is it the irony of Esther Woodcourt or is it that of some later, 
wiser version of Esther Summerson? We know that the adult Esthers, for all their ostensible 
goodness and blandness, are capable of such mordancy. Their dealings with Mrs Jellyby, Mr 
Turveydrop and, eventually, Mr Skimpole, to name a few, smart with examples of it. Take 
Esther’s cynical assessment of what achievements qualify one for ennoblement in the eyes of 
the Crown: of ‘men distinguished by peaceful services’, only those whose services ‘consisted 
of the accumulation of some very large amount of money’ are eligible, she says, parrying 
Miss Flite’s ingenuous faith in the honours system with ‘I am afraid she believed what she 
said; for there were moments when she was very mad indeed’ (570). But mordancy is not the 
only possible explanation. Is the irony instead – or, perhaps, as well – a dramatic irony? Little 
Esther cannot discern what we and later Esthers have discerned. But both propositions are 
gainsaid by the fact that little Esther’s distress, or at least the putative cause of that distress, is 
quietly subverted over the following pages. 
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We might not ascribe to her the feeling that Mrs Rachael’s kiss upon her forehead was 
‘like a thaw-drop from the stone porch’ as it sounds too knowing (Jordan, demurring, 
nevertheless writes that ‘some readers have seen it as evidence that Dickens, not Esther, is 
doing the writing’ [13]). But two pages hence Esther Woodcourt recounts that her juvenile 
self told John Jarndyce – as yet unidentified, though of course known to be him by the 
narrator – that ‘I must have been crying...because of Mrs Rachael’s not being sorry to part 
with me’ (37). In other words, little Esther was fully cognizant of Mrs Racheal’s cruel 
indifference, therefore the irony is not a dramatic irony; and, given the knowledge she 
possessed made her capable of perpetrating the irony, it may indeed be hers. At the very least, 
it strikes the reader that she is complicit in the irony. Or, rather, that she acquiesces in the 
irony, feeling, one infers, the same mordancy in response to the snub as prompts the later 
version of herself to perpetrate the irony – though the earlier version may not command quite 
the same articulateness. Yet another possibility, though less pertinent to a discussion of such 
a local example, is that we see a meta-dramatic irony, a supra-dramatic irony, in which the 
narrative apparition of Dickens intercedes between us and the kaleidoscopic regress of 
Esthers. According to J. Hillis Miller, ‘because he is not so innocent as she’, there is ‘a subtle 
irony in Dickens’s attitude to Esther as narrator’, which Dickens makes clear through, among 
other things, ‘the juxtaposition of the two modes of narration’ (World 222). But, as I say, this 
further, final permutation of irony may not be applicable here. The irony, like Esther herself, 
is strangely orphaned, its attribution as unclear as the distribution of the Jarndyce legacy. 
 
 The issue of who is seeing, of where the focalisation resides, is complex and often 
obscure in Esther’s narrative. On many occasions the narrative is muddied because of it. One 
of these occasions, when it is assuredly not clear who is seeing, is that most neglected of 
bewildering slips in the book, greater even than Tulkinghorn’s infamous failure to observe 
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the disguised Lady Dedlock through the window of his study or the general failure to 
apprehend the definitive Jarndyce will: Esther hearing and not recognising ‘the name of 
Barbary’ from the would-be jurist Mr Krook among the surnames connected with Jarndyce 
and Jarndyce (71). We know, or think we know, she has heard it before because we have seen 
her record it in her narration. ‘I needn’t inform you [Mrs Rachael], who were acquainted with 
the late Miss Barbary’s affairs...and that this young lady, now her aunt is dead – ,’ Kenge 
says during the meeting to settle Esther’s future; and Mrs Rachael soon adds, ‘Miss Barbary, 
sir...who is now among the Seraphim –’ (33, 34). Lest it still not be clear to whom the 
speakers refer, Mr Kenge clarifies in an address to Esther herself: ‘Miss Barbary, your sole 
relation...being deceased...you are in a position to receive the renewal of an offer which I was 
instructed to make to Miss Barbary some two years ago...’ (34). Esther has heard this name, 
probably not for the first time either, repeated by both her interlocuters. She has, one 
presumes, retained this exacting memory of a conversation that completely altered her life 
and nursed it as she nurses Charley. Then, when the time came to commit her memoir to 
paper, she has repeated the conversation in it. Yet she completely overlooks the significance 
of that name, surely not a common name (‘Dear me, that’s not a common name,’ Grandfather 
Smallweed remarks of ‘Honoria’, which seems the appropriate thought for Esther) – indeed, 
an exotic one, with its suggestion of oriental piracy, a second African link in the book (824). 
And then she overlooks it again in her narrative. She does not so much as enquire about the 
origins of her patronage, whereas Pip in Great Expectations, say, is consumed with the 
origins of his. 
 
It is the name that one dwells on, then, mainly because Esther never does. She 
foreshadows learning the nickname ‘Conversation Kenge’ and having her initial estimation of 
its bearer coloured, or at least that is what I take her meaning to be despite an ambiguous 
‘even then’ (‘I was very much impressed by him – even then, before I knew that he formed 
himself on the model of a great lord who was his client…’ [34-35]). Yet she makes no 
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allusion to the power of the name ‘Miss Barbary’. She is reduced to Mr Jellyby-esque 
muteness – ‘I was not able to speak, though I tried’ – the younger Esther sundered from the 
elder one who narrates: 
 
What the destitute subject of such an offer tried to say, I need not repeat. What she did say, I 
could more easily tell, if it were worth the telling. What she felt, and will feel to her dying 
hour, I could never relate (35). 
 
Perhaps Jordan could find in Esther’s peculiar choice of ‘destitute’ the faint ring of future 
events – her mother’s death, perhaps, or Richard’s face ‘destitute of colour’ (976) – but 
generally this prose seems to me oblivious of those events. I do not see discretion here, nor, 
worse, secretiveness, but a jarring lacuna, a narrative subsidence that is never amended. 
When Esther discovers that ‘Barbary’ was her mother’s maiden name, she does not remark 
on having heard it before; it takes the gormless extortioner Guppy to insinuate the name back 
into the narrative, though not into Esther’s. Why is this so? ‘Is the hand not always pointing 
there?’ as the Allegory does to the window and Lady Dedlock (259). 
 
Often for so perspicacious a character Esther abdicates her narrative eyrie and 
becomes almost obtuse; or, at any rate, she becomes incidental to the very story she is telling, 
incidental in the way that all non-narrating characters are incidental. She becomes, to invoke 
what I suppose is an anachronistic term, unreliable. Audrey Jaffe, ruminating on the 
‘problem’ of knowledge in BH, writes that by ‘insisting upon her status as one who does not 
know, who does not even occupy the subject’s position in her own narrative, Esther works to 
efface her own knowledge’, and that this effacement is by design (131, 132). In the example I 
have just cited, that is highly questionable – as I say, the effacement of knowledge is not 
strategic, it is just an inexplicable omission – but there are other examples that seem to 
confirm Jaffe’s assertion. Only much later in the novel do readers deduce that Esther is 
herself a beauty (if Lady Dedlock is one, and Esther bears a startling resemblance to her – 
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‘how well I know that picture!’ Guppy, thinking unconsciously of Esther, says twice of Lady 
Dedlock’s ‘perfect likeness’ – then Esther by extension is too [110-111]). Indeed, Esther is 
the rival in looks of her beloved companion Ada, whose looks she repeatedly extols; and her 
sedulous humility, not always so far from the ‘bombastic humility’ of Josiah Bounderby in 
Hard Times, has acted as a kind of misdirection (Graver uses ‘indirection’ but I prefer the 
more resonant ‘misdirection’, pertinent to vanishings [9]). Allan Woodcourt laughs at her for 
saying ‘my old looks – such as they were’, quoting ‘such as they were’ back to her in the 
form of a question, as if her self-disparagement were not only mistaken but a silly peccadillo 
he had long ago got used to. This impression is reinforced by the way her final words, ‘even 
supposing’, seem coyly to concede the point (989). 
 
When Esther meets the Lord Chancellor, ‘His lordship gave me an indulgent look, 
and acknowledged my curtsey very graciously’ (46). Words like ‘indulgent’ and ‘graciously’ 
come to seem rather gnomic, as if written in a code, and one begins to wonder why the 
sentence is there in the first place. At first, ‘indulgent’ inculcates little Esther’s littleness, 
suggesting that his flicker of attention is a gratuity from so eminent a man to so modest, in 
both senses, a girl. Or it could be that his arch jest to Kenge a moment before about Esther 
being a suitable companion for Richard lingers in his mind. But one’s later knowledge makes 
the ‘indulgent look’ seem pregnant. It is possible that the Lord Chancellor, having consulted 
his briefing papers, is apprised of the delicate – which is to say, indelicate – reasons for Mr 
Jarndyce’s patronage. But one begins to detect a counter-reading, flipping Esther’s quote 
‘That he admired her, and was interested by her, even I could see in a moment’ (45). Where 
she means young, ingenuous Ada, to whom the Lord Chancellor takes only a proprietorial 
interest (he is a surrogate father, ‘a poor substitute for the love and pride of parents’), a reader 
with foreknowledge intuits that this gush more befits the maturer, cleverer Esther (45). 
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* 
 
I dwell on these points for a couple of reasons. I want to elucidate the permutations of 
knowledge in the novel: ‘knowledge’ as Jaffe means it, as the apprehension of those events 
taking place within the narrative ken, both at the broad level of the narrators and at the 
subsidiary level of the characters. And, further to this, I am taken by the converse of 
knowledge, by Esther’s studies in naiviety, for example, and what they betoken. This will 
become clearer, I hope, presently. For now, it is worth dwelling on other points, points to do 
with the apprehension of events, the mimetic capturing of them. Walter Benjamin, discussing 
panorama in a sketch toward his Arcades Project, holds that ‘What is found within the 
windowless house is the true’ (840). I am mindful of Michael Hollington’s admonition not to 
make too much of Benjamin in criticism of Dickens. Benjamin, Hollington noted, did not 
really care for Dickens and had read even less of him, whereas his friend Adorno did and 
had.11 Quite so. But Grahame Smith and Jeremy Tambling disobey in their excellent 
Benjamin-seasoned Dickens and the Dream of Cinema and Going Astray. The ‘vision’ of 
Arcades, Smith writes, ‘provides a cue for my reading of Dickens in relation to film’ – and I 
feel I might profitably do the same here (50). So, what is Benjamin on about? Does 
‘windowless’ mean devoid of any aperture for the exchange of light with the world outside 
the house, or does it mean devoid of any material – namely glass – within that aperture, as the 
fourth wall between stage and audience is usually windowless (he suggests both 
interpretations in turn)? He offers nothing helpful to elucidate or qualify this assertion, here 
or in the similar draft elsewhere in the book, adding only that the true does not look outside: 
which, if anything, confuses one’s initial reading. One’s initial reading is that the true can 
                                                 
11 Refer to Works Cited. 
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only be hermetic, unaffected by the medium of the window and the tacit behavioural 
transaction it prompts. To know that one might be watched, as one does when near an 
unobscured window, taints one’s behaviour there. One might temper or refrain from certain 
habits and acts: sex, bathing, picking one’s nose, and so on; and not to do so, to flout the view 
any observer could be getting, would not be to escape that taint. 
 
The true, then, is immanent: it ‘has no windows,’ Benjamin writes elsewhere in 
Arcades (532). This might explain his remark about it not looking out, for, the practical 
obstacle of not having any windows through which to look out notwithstanding, it has no 
need to look out, being discrete, self-sufficient, self-completing, utterly monologic. It is, after 
a fashion, Platonic, an ideal. Or perhaps, though the two things do not have to be in conflict, 
it is merely unconscious. ‘The true’ is certainly also inaccessible to those outside the 
windowless house, a hypothetical, a latent fallacy, an illusion waiting to happen. It is 
nonesuch reality, its integrity never compromised. There is a witty analogy to this 
construction of ‘the true’ in BH. When Jo squires the disguised Lady Dedlock to the pauper’s 
grave of her former lover, Captain Hawdon, he is transfigured into Orpheus. Instructed not to 
look back at her, his Eurydice, he ‘sticks to the terms imposed upon him, and does not look 
round’; but when, finally, he ‘look[s] aside to see if he has made himself intelligible, he finds 
that he is alone’ (262, 264). Looking upon Lady Dedlock is akin to looking upon the real. 
This makes ‘found’ nicely ironic, since ‘finding’ is not an activity one could engage in 
without violating the fundamental precept of the windowless house. One would have to be in 
the windowless house itself, perpetrating truth, not looking out, to ‘find’ anything, thereby 
obviating the need – and, by definition, one’s ability – to do so. 
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Perhaps to take this as the corollary of the foregoing line of thought is unfair, and we 
must accord his words a degree of reflexivity, an aphoristic provisionality. To quote the poet 
and aphorist Don Paterson, an aphorism comes from ‘a sudden momentary conviction... The 
truth of that conviction is neither here nor there; nor is the fact that you might disagree with it 
five minutes later’ (188). Aphorisms are Nietzsche’s ‘wicked thoughts’, samizdat versions of 
those ‘sudden momentary convictions’, their contingent truths liable to crumble before the 
basilisk-like interrogations of the scholar. They are like the bandaged nuts thrown by 
Tarkovsky’s Stalker to guide his own journey to that other windowless house, The Room. 
They arrogate certitude and therefore a degree of authority but nevertheless stand outside 
those ersatz qualities, holding them up matadorially. Indeed, they are rather similar to 
hypotyposis. But I digress, or digress ahead of myself, so to speak. Contrast Benjamin’s 
remark with Tolstoy’s, quoted by Shklovsky, on the sensory desuetude brought about by 
repeat performances of an act: 
 
Since these movements are habitual and unconscious, I felt that it was already impossible to 
remember it [dusting]. If I had in fact dusted the sofa and forgotten that I had done so, i.e., if I 
had acted unconsciously, then this is tantamount to not having done it at all. If someone had 
seen me doing this consciously, then it might have been possible to restore this in my mind. 
(Theory 5) 
 
Tolstoy’s point, which he amplifies in the next sentence, is that awareness of an act, 
observation of it, is essential to its reality; without it, our ‘complex life’ is not merely 
impoverished but retroactively annulled: ‘it’s as if this life had never been,’ Tolstoy writes, 
promoting the arm’s-length ‘tantamount to’ to the more freely fraternal ‘as if’. In other 
words, the windowless house only exists when it has been exposed to consciousness, even an 
external consciousness, and vanishes if it has not been: precisely the opposite of Benjamin’s 
point, or at any rate the conjecture I filleted from its vatic opacity. But as I shall go on to 
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explain, BH manages to yoke these contradictory views together. At crucial moments, the 
windowless house is exempt from scrutiny, from consciousness let alone observation; yet, 
paradoxically in the light of Benjamin and Tolstoy, it is the attentions of the observer that are 
necessary for its ‘truth’ to be transmitted. 
 
Whatever the truth of Benjamin’s assessment of the true, it is suggestive, and 
pertinent to the enterprise of narration. Narration is, after all, fanatical about places into 
which observers cannot look and the coveted seam of reality, whether social or mental, those 
places enclose. These are the places Dickens writes of in the famous passage near the 
beginning of A Tale of Two Cities: ‘A solemn consideration...that every one of those darkly 
clustered houses encloses its own secret; that every room in every one of them encloses its 
own secret’ (12). As Kate Flint says in commentary on this passage, ‘for Dickens, one of the 
tasks which a narrator can perform is to reveal those closely guarded secrets. The narrator can 
lift off the roofs...and adopt a panoramic viewpoint’ (Dickens 70). This impulse to wrest the 
‘true’ from enclosed places, windowless houses, is there from the beginning of the novel. 
Peter Brooks cites a moment from Le Sage’s 1707 novel Le Diable boiteux in which ‘the 
benevolent devil Asmodée takes the novel’s protagonist, Don Cleofas, up to the top of the 
highest tower in Madrid, then removes all the city’s rooftops’ (3). Together the pair behold 
all that occurs in the residences within their purview, a veritable cross-section of society. In 
one house, there is an old man dozing in his armchair; in another, feasting and merriment; in 
yet another, what appears to be two lovers in conversation (5). Novelists purport to be 
Asmodées, pretending to offer readers this magical vision and the secret knowledge it yields. 
As Brooks notes, ‘realist literature is attached to the visual, to looking at things, registering 
their presence in the world through sight...mak[ing] sight paramount’ (3). 
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To see is, pace Benjamin, to prise ‘the true’ from the world surveyed; and the narrator 
is an overseer. Flint notes that Le Sage’s novel was ‘a text with which Dickens was familiar 
in translation’ and that he alluded to it in Dombey and Son (‘Oh for a good spirit who would 
take the house-tops off’ [71]). Flint continues, ‘Dickens most notably organises his texts 
around the roof- and wall-penetrating abilities of a roving narrative viewpoint’ (71). But 
omniscience in BH, such as it is, does not always confer panoptic abilities upon the 
omniscient. When Mr Guppy is courting Esther, she notes that ‘I never looked at him, but I 
found him looking at me’, and indeed Audrey Jaffe, noting the implausible extent of Esther’s 
prodigious recall, contends that ‘for much of her narrative...[she] might as well be 
omniscient’ (BH 148, Vanishing 130). But the supposedly omniscient narrator can never find 
without looking, which in turn he can almost never do without surrogate eyes to look 
through. It is notable that whereas in the illustration cited by Brooks empty rooms are among 
the fantastical conspectus, in BH empty rooms are seldom even seen, let alone described. Or 
not empty rooms but windowless empty rooms, rooms devoid of habitation that admit no 
observation from without. 
 
Look at two scenes; two deaths, as it happens, both of them taking place in Mr 
Krook’s foul rag-and-bone shop. Look especially at the way the purportedly omnisicent 
narrator can only see these death scenes when witnesses have arrived. The deaths are those of 
Nemo (né Captain Hawdon) and Krook. The scenes share more than a location; indeed, the 
first is a template for the second, though the causes of death are, to say the least, somewhat 
different. In both scenes, the narration follows two men – Tulkinghorn and Krook in the first 
scene, Guppy and Weevle (né Jobling) – whom the grisly task of finding the dead man’s 
remains, such as they are in the latter scene, awaits. In neither scene does the death actually 
occur, so that the deaths, whose causes are never properly solved despite the arcane 
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ceremonies of investigation they provoke, become objects of speculation, fulcrums for the 
fantasies of all the would-be witnesses thereabouts. The deaths occur off-stage, as it were, 
and manifest themselves through what you might call noises-on: forebodings, a mood, a grain 
of palpable omens running toward death. David Paroissien’s casual summary is an orthodox, 
and by no means incorrect, way of looking at the first scene: ‘The lawyer’s words [‘“He’s 
dead!”’], addressed to the landlord of the deceased, make explicit the intimations of death 
with which the previous chapter [10] closed’ (24). The entire room comes across as an 
objective correlative of death, everything within it seeming to be a metonymic sentinel, 
bruiting the central death, the core death, by dying in sympathy: the ‘rusty skeleton of a 
grate’, ‘it collapses like the cheeks of a starved man’, ‘one old mat...lies perishing’ (164).12 
 
But the neat trajectory of discovery is more complex than it appears to be. Leave aside 
the question of whether the narrator is narrating events as they happen (although I do not 
believe he is – a line such as ‘Railroads shall soon traverse all this country... but as yet such 
things are non-existent in these parts’, for example, seems more like an acknowledgement of 
subsequent events than a prophecy – meaning the present-tense is a contrivance [839])13. In 
that first scene, none of Paroissien’s ‘intimations’ occur until after Tulkinghorn and Krook 
have stepped foot in Nemo’s room; though, it must be said, in the second scene the pitchy 
muck that Guppy and Weevle find in Nemo’s old room presages the discovery of Krook’s 
spontaneous combustion downstairs. But the point stands: that there is no inkling of the 
witnesses’ appointments with death, let alone of the victims’ themselves, independent of the 
witnesses. It takes Tulkinghorn and Krook, Guppy and Weevle to initiate the stirrings of 
                                                 
12 As an aside, there is a passage in Little Dorrit I refer to in the conclusion, a description of Arthur Clennam’s  
lodgings upon his return home, that is very similar to the description of Nemo’s room. 
13 John R. Reed writes perceptively in the chapter ‘Present Tense’ about the way Esther uses the ‘traditional past 
tense of history’ of a third-person narrator  and the third-person narrator eschews this for present tense (33-35). 
In connection with my suggestion above, he writes the following about instances of present tense in The Mystery 
of Edwin Drood: ‘in some of these instances it appears as though the simultaneous narration is compromised 
and the narrator is providing an account of events that have already transpired’ (35). 
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morbidity; the stirrings do not come about otherwise. Even though the apprehension of these 
stirrings cannot necessarily be ascribed to those characters, it is concomitant on those 
characters’ ventures. The narration is a ghostwritten account of what they see and feel, with 
the narrator acting as ghostwriter. As Bert Hornback writes, ‘The omniscient narrator invades 
Tony Jobling’s and Mr. Guppy’s discovery of Mr. Krook’s combustion,’ and indeed 
‘invasion’ and ‘borrowing’ are words he uses often (5). 
 
I differ from Hornback, who sees the third-person (or ‘omnisicient’) narrator’s 
invasions as few and exceptional. Certainly they are common in these scenes since, as I 
indicated, these scenes are entirely predicated on the characters being the observers. To take 
one example of ‘invasion’, Tulkinghorn, addressing what he does not yet know is a corpse, 
says ‘“Hallo, my friend!”’ and the narrator follows with ‘He thinks he has awakened his 
friend. He lies a little turned away, but his eyes are surely open’ (165). ‘Friend’ and ‘surely 
open’ here are both compounds of irony and fidelity, since the narrator, while choosing the 
free indirect discourse for comic purposes (Nemo was not Tulkinghorn’s friend and 
Tulkinghorn was not there for friendly reasons; his eyes are open, but not because he is alive, 
therefore it is Tulkinghorn’s eyes that are not open), is also beholden to Tulkinghorn, who is 
seeing what he, or it, cannot. The death, then, does not really seem to have occurred until 
Tulkinghorn and Krook arrive to verify it. In this way, it recalls the account of Marley’s death 
that opens A Christmas Carol: 
 
Marley was dead: to begin with. There is no doubt whatever about that. The register of hs 
burial was signed by the clergyman, the clerk, the undertaker, and the chief mourner. Scrooge 
signed it: and Scrooge’s name was good upon ’Change, for anything he chose to put his hand 
to. Old Marley was a dead as a door-nail. (33) 
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Marley is only dead because a document says he is, in the circular logic of the paragraph, 
because those officials and the obdurate chief mourner are signatories to his death; that and 
not the physical symptoms of death – the lack of breath, pulse or sentience, say, none of 
which is so much as alluded to – is what removed ‘doubt’. Noting the slight pun on ‘hand’ 
here, we might adapt it and say that Marley is dead by the hand of those four public men. 
Likewise, Nemo is only dead because Tulkinghorn marked the effect his handwriting had on 
Lady Dedlock and sought him out (in that sense, Nemo is dead by his own hand in more 
ways than one). Hitherto, his death existed in suspension, in a vaccuum: he was both dead 
and not dead, a kind of Schrodinger’s Nemo. So was Krook later on, even if we have seen his 
remains in the ‘thick, yellow liquor...A stagnant, sickening oil, with some natural repulsion in 
it’ that has transpired out of his room and onto the window sill of Weevle’s tenement (516). 
Both deaths take place in a virtual ‘windowless house’, in windowless rooms. Well, that is not 
strictly true: both rooms actually have windows. And though ‘the discoloured shutters are 
drawn together’ in Nemo’s room, ‘two gaunt holes [are] pierced in them’, which Jordan calls 
‘a notable example of inanimate watching in the text’ (BH 164, Jordan 28). But the eyes are 
unseeing, too small for surveillance, and instead seem to be tokens of observation: only 
‘famine might be staring in’, much as, in another case of symbols looking, ‘Allegory’ 
watches over Tulkinghorn’s murder. And Krook, in a closed room with ‘“the shutters up”’ is 
hidden from view, his cat Lady Jane the only witness to his death (663). 
 
* 
 
I have been trying to discredit the third-person narrator. But I have done this for a reason. I 
want to argue that even such workaday acts of omniscience – knowing what is going behind 
closed doors in the story you are telling – are impeachable, and their content fantasmatic in 
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some way. Now I want to expand upon a reference I made earlier to third-person narration. I 
said the narrator could ‘almost’ never observe without surrogate eyes, and that empty rooms 
were ‘seldom’ seen. I deployed these qualifiers, both a kind of word-asterisk, as a means of 
anticipating the inconvenient exceptions to the drift of my argument that take place 
exclusively, as nearly as I can tell, in the scenes at Chesney Wold. But the point I was making 
might indeed stand unchaperoned by those protective handlers. The times when the third-
person narrator does disclose secret knowledge – surprisingly few for a novel of such size 
and breadth – are frequently equivocal; the means by which he procured the knowledge, and 
indeed the veracity of his accounts, are not clear. Only once during the entire novel does the 
narrator make explicit that he is seeing events occurring beyond the sight of others. This 
scene takes place as late as the beginning of Chapter 40, when Chesney Wold, hitherto shut 
up for the season, is awaiting the return of its master and mistress (‘though no instructions 
have yet come down’, Mrs Rouncewell is able to divine its imminence [639]). What is 
described is a kind of danse macabre in which the family portraits morph into grotesque 
sprites or engage in incongruous activities, ‘strange movements com[ing] upon their features, 
as the shadows of leaves play there’ (641). An ‘ancestress of Volumina’ is canonised by the 
nimbus the setting Sun bestows on her; ‘A maid of honour of the court of Charles the Second, 
with large round eyes (and other charms to correspond), seems to bathe in glowing water’ 
(641). 
 
The scene foreshadows the impending cavalcade of Dedlocks, entitled relatives and 
distinguished hangers-on (‘a pretty large accession’ of them, with ‘accession’ subtly ironic 
for a family that is about to be brought so low [639]). It is also richly symbolic. The portrait 
of the maid of honour, whose dishonour in the libidinous Restored court is heavily implied, is 
the last portrait mentioned before Lady Dedlock’s for a reason; and darkness succeeds the 
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late afternoon brilliance in a house headed for, if not ruin, then receivership. The narrator 
describes this with all the licence it behoves his fancy to take. But, unusually, he makes a 
point of avowing his corporal presence at the scene. This is quite irregular, and counters 
George Levine’s assertion about epistemology in BH and other ‘classic Victorian narratives’ 
that ‘the best way to acquire knowledge is to be nowhere’ (Dying 148, 149). BH’s third-
person narrator says: 
 
So did these come and go, a Dedlock in possession might have ruminated passing along; so 
did they see this gallery hushed and quiet, as I see it now; so think, as I think, of the gap that 
they would make in this domain when they were gone; so find it, as I find it, difficult to 
believe that it could be without them; so pass from my world, as I pass from theirs, now 
closing the reverberating door; so leave no blank to miss them, and so die. (639) 
 
Jordan, adducing the illustration of this scene, writes that ‘Since no living human figure is 
mentioned as present at the scene, the focalization of this image’ – the illustration – must 
come from either ‘the homoperceptive viewpoint of a fellow ghost’ or ‘the heteroperceptive 
viewpoint of the “narrator”, or else a combination of both (117-18). But the narrator 
obfuscates the issue of whether others are present in the house. ‘Dreary and solemn the old 
house looks,’ he writes, ‘with so many appliances of habitation, and no inhabitants except the 
pictured forms upon the wall’ (639). But that depends on what one construes as an 
‘inhabitant’ and what the ‘house’. Mrs Rouncewell is there, we know, because the narrator 
tells us she is there, as is a groom, and perhaps other staff, in what we take to be a concurrent 
exchange between her and the groom over Lady Dedlock’s health (642). We know that Mrs 
Rouncewell resides in the house because the narrator told us she did in Chapter 7: 
 
...the house, as she expresses it, “is what she looks at.” She sits in her room (in a side passage 
on the ground floor, with an arched window commanding a smooth quadrangle, adorned at 
regular intervals with smooth round trees and smooth round blocks of stone, as if the trees 
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were going to play at bowls with the stones), and the whole house reposes on her mind. She 
can open it on occasion and be busy and fluttered, but it is shut up now and lies on the breadth 
of Mrs. Rouncewell's iron-bound bosom in a majestic sleep. (105-06) 
 
Why does he say there are no inhabitants when there is one, and probably several others, 
since it is unthinkable that Mrs Rouncewell would occupy such a grand house alone? Perhaps 
as a mere servant of the house Mrs Rouncewell does not qualify as an ‘inhabitant’, although 
there is no evidence for this usage elsewhere in the book. All of those who reside in a 
dwelling are its inhabitants in the narrative census, or, at any rate, those identified as 
‘inhabitants’ are not thus sundered from other residents; even the fowls Mr Bagnet is duped 
into buying are ‘the oldest inhabitants of any coop in Europe’ (753). Or perhaps Mrs 
Rouncewell, residing in what appears to be an annex – a servants’ quarter connected with the 
house physically and professionally but regarded as foreign – is not technically an 
‘inhabitant’ of Chesney Wold. But the house is, if not inhabited by, certainly incident upon 
Mrs Rouncewell herself: it ‘reposes on her mind’ and ‘lies on the breadth of [her] iron-bound 
bosom in a majestic sleep’. By implication, the house suckles at Mrs Rouncewell (‘iron-
bound’ is a peculiar allusion to her son, the ‘iron gentleman’, who appears almost to have had 
his course in life predestined at his mother’s teat). It gains nourishment and hence life from 
her bosom. She is, we are soon told, ‘as upright as the house itself’ (134). It is not very 
surprising, then, that she can divine the return of her master and mistress unaided by a single 
portent. 
 
But what one really notices here is her control over the ‘open[ing]’ and ‘shutt[ing]’ of 
the house; the enclosure of it is wholly hers to administer. When Mr Guppy arrives without 
forewarning, Mrs Rouncewell is aghast – ‘“Guppy!” repeats Mrs. Rouncewell, "MR. Guppy! 
Nonsense, I never heard of him!”’ – and she only rights the situation, after Guppy assuages 
her with the shibboleth ‘Mr Tulkinghorn’, by superintending the entire tour herself, 
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attempting, as Rosa’s peripheral overseer, to make sure that what is seen is what ought to be 
seen, the official, expurgated version (109). But she does not succeed. As the narrator reports 
in this appropriately centaur-like formulation, a mix-up in which the perspective is Mrs 
Rouncewell’s but the idiom Guppy’s, Guppy and his companion ‘straggle about in wrong 
places, look at wrong things, don’t care for the right things, gape when more rooms are 
opened, exhibit profound depression of spirits, and are clearly knocked up’ (110). They will 
not be guided. Finally, crucially, Guppy’s attention is piqued by the portrait of Lady Dedlock, 
which, as far as he is unwittingly concerned, is notable solely for being a poor facsimile of 
his beloved Esther’s face, and the vast train of disgrace gains a little further impetus. Mrs 
Rouncewell’s industry has not availed her, but her intent on regulating the house’s narrative, 
on maintaining her power of admission, is plain. For the narrator to flout that power and 
trangress the dominion she wields it over, as he does in the later scene, is a tremendous 
usurpation, and a tremendous assertion of his own power. No wonder he is so keen to vaunt 
his ability to bear witness. 
 
* 
 
Before I resume this examination of omniscience and enclosure, permit me to digress 
momentarily with regard to Guppy and a different sort of enclosure. D.A. Miller, writing 
about delinquency in Oliver Twist, says that Dickens ‘makes [the novel] an enclosed world 
from which it is all but impossible to escape. Characters may move from more to less 
advantageous positions in the system, but they never depart from it altogether’ (5). This is 
true of BH too, and in subtler ways. To take just one example, we see characters incarcarated 
by their verbal inaptitude, characters who try, and usually fail, to use language to move from 
less to more advantageous positions in the system. Jo, for example, is not only illiterate but 
scarcely able to speak, and this deficiency counts against him several times. At the inquest 
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into Hawdon’s death, he is dismissed because he ‘can’t exactly say’ (177). ‘It seemed’ poor, 
benighted Mr Jellyby ‘several times opened his mouth when alone with Richard… as if he 
had something on his mind; but had always shut it, to Richard’s extreme confusion, without 
saying anything’; much later he resembles Lord Burleigh in The Critic: ‘He opened his mouth 
now, a great many times, and shook his head in a melancholy manner’ (57; 481). He endures 
similar troubles later in the novel, when Caddy Jellyby is preparing for her wedding, thrice 
failing to finish the sentence ‘Never have a Mission, my dear child’, and eventually reposing 
with his head against the wall in catatonic silence (481). George is partly ‘a ne’er-do-weel’ 
because ‘I have no head for papers, sir. I can stand any fire better than a fire of cross 
questions…. [W]hen I come into things of this kind I feel as if I was being smothered’ (435). 
The same is true of George’s comrade Bagnet, who, as I noted in the introduction, needs his 
wife to act as kind of oracle for his thoughts and, when Tulkinghorn reads out an undertaking, 
‘puts his hand on his bald head again under this new verbal shower-bath’ (552). 
 
The faculty of speech, the ability to master different discourses, is often 
commensurate with one’s identity and place in society. The French maid Mademoiselle 
Hortense is ‘almost an Englishwoman in her acquaintance with the language’ (187). The 
importance of speech to status is most keenly represented in the diction of the law clerk Mr 
Guppy, who has designs on a loftier station in society but whose efforts to attain it are 
comically cackhanded. Upon being granted an audience with Lady Dedlock, for example, he 
is anxious to impress on her that at the firm Kenge and Carboy ‘my standing – and I may add 
my income – is tolerably good’, and in an absurd speech later on: 
 
‘Now, it’s a very singular circumstance, your ladyship… though one of those circumstances 
that do fall in the way of professional men – which I may call myself; for though not admitted, 
yet I have had a present of my articles made to me by Kenge and Carboy, on my mother’s 
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advancing from the principal of her little income the money for the stamp, which comes 
heavy…’ (462, 465) 
 
Guppy’s standing may be ‘tolerably good’ but it is nevertheless precarious, and Guppy knows 
that. He ‘is not admitted’. In that bathetic parenthesis, the ‘present of [his] articles’ is clearly 
no present at all, being contingent on his own impecunious mother (‘her little income’) 
making provision for a trifling object that Kenge and Carboy, of whose wealth from the 
Chancery racket Kenge himself boasts, would surely have had. It recalls an earlier description 
of Guppy: ‘Mr Guppy suspects everybody who enters upon the occupation of a stool in 
Kenge and Carboy…. He is clear that every such person wants to depose him’ (316). 
Throughout the novel he is on the make, but the modesty of his background always seems to 
clash with his premature airs: compare his ‘tall hat’, for example, and his ‘not… very 
impressive letter of introduction in his manner and appearance’ when presented to Lady 
Dedlock (460). 
 
The precariousness is manifest in his language, with its comical slips of grammar and 
register. As Hortense is ‘almost an Englishwoman in her acquaintance with the language’, 
Guppy is only almost a gentleman. Elsewhere he says, with Jo’s command of English, things 
like ‘I dare say you was not aware of me’ (464). But here there is the pretentious, tortuous 
passive construction of the clause ‘I have had a present of my articles made to me by’, when 
what he means is ‘Kenge and Carboy have given me my articles’. Even better is the way he 
gets above himself with the legalese ‘advancing from the principal of’ for what he candidly 
acknowledges is a pittance, and the odd poetry of ‘the stamp, which comes heavy’. Again, 
low colloquialism keeps company with high magniloquence; and there is a pathetic irony in 
the ‘heavy’ stamp, since Kenge and Carboy has withheld its stamp from Guppy, who himself 
seems ‘heavy’ with the insecurity that the withholding perpetuates. Such changes in register 
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are evident elsewhere too, such as in his proposal to Esther. (That scene’s juxtaposition of 
caption and illustration expresses it wonderfully: Guppy portrayed down on one knee while 
underneath the caption says ‘In re Guppy. Extraordinary Proceedings’ [151].) Or in his 
affectations of a barrister in front of Jobling and Smallweed, with whom he nevertheless falls 
into a blokey patois that fits nearly as ill (‘it might pay you to knock up a sort of knowledge 
of him’ (326). His speech is a gauche compound. Earlier in the novel, there is an exchange 
between Kenge and Richard: 
 
‘Mr Richard Carstone, who has so meritoriously acquitted himself in the – shall I say the 
classic shades? – in which his youth has been passed, will, no doubt, apply the habits, if not 
the principles and practice, versification in that tongue in which a poet was said (unless I 
mistake) to be born, not made, to the more eminently practical field of action on which he 
enters.’ 
‘You may rely upon it,’ said Richard in his off-hand manner, ‘that I shall go at it and do my 
best.’ 
‘Very well, Mr Jarndyce! …Really when we are assured by Mr Richard that he means to go at 
it, and to do his best,’ nodding feelingly and smoothly over those expressions… (200) 
 
Richard’s mocking rejoinder is a droll counterpoint to Kenge’s pompous maundering, which 
is simply a mess (not least in its amusingly mystifying implied condemnation of classical 
‘principles and practice’). Guppy, so much Kenge’s apprentice in pompous maundering, can 
nevertheless go beyond it and complement it, as Kenge plainly cannot, with the idiom of 
Richard’s ‘off-hand manner’. Indeed, he manages to do it in the same sentence. But, though 
he can move between registers, he can escape his social enclosure. It is what leaves Guppy, in 
that entirely coincidental naming of which Dickens appears have been astonishingly 
prescient, a guppy, a tiny fish at the mercy of the bigger ones.14 
                                                 
14 Amusingly, Guppy the character precedes his marine namesake by more than a decade. The OED supplies 
this etymology:  
R. J. Lechmere Guppy (1836–1916), British-born naturalist of Trinidad, who sent the first recorded 
specimen to the British Museum, used as the specific epithet in Gerardinus guppyi (A. Günther Catal. 
Fishes Brit. Mus. (1866) VI. 353), the name used when the fish was first described. 
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* 
 
To return now to my earlier point, the reality of Nemo’s and Krook’s deaths is only 
accessible upon the arrival of characters. It is as if looking upon the uninhabited room, the 
room where no living being perceives, is outside the narrator’s terms of reference. The 
narrator is less a roof-raising demon than a parasite (he is able to ‘invade’, in Hornback’s 
words, humans, those windowed houses: ‘If Mr Snagsby could stand his little woman’s look, 
as it enters at his eyes, the windows of his soul, and searches the whole tenement...’ [414]). 
Perhaps, in a novel so consumed with infection, it is apt that the ‘omniscient’ narration be a 
contagion. Gases and contagions, ambient, incorporeal things, can transcend the carceral 
strictures that local, solid people, with the exception of Bucket and Tulkinghorn and, to an 
extent, Woodcourt, Mrs Rouncewell and Mrs Snagsby, cannot. And, as I shall go on to 
explain, those people are themselves fairly ambient and incorporeal. In a typical description 
of Tulkinghorn, for example, we learn that 
 
His manner of coming and going between the two places [Chesney Wold and his home in 
London] is one of his impenetrabilities.... He melted out of his turret-room this morning, just 
as now, in the late twilight, he melts into his own square. (661) 
 
Tulkinghorn ‘melts’, changes state and is thereby able to change location. He and the others I 
just noted are shape-shifters, itinerant, unknowable and, Tulkinghorn’s murder aside, 
immutable. As, in what could serve as an epigraph for the novel, all of the ‘slime’ and 
‘pestilential gas’ and manifold other iniquities and defects ‘shall work its retribution through 
every order of society up to the proudest of the proud and to the highest of the high’, so shall 
Tulkinghorn, and indeed so shall Bucket and Woodcourt, similarly travel (710). They 
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regulate the exchanges between open and enclosed spaces, windowless houses, and in this 
way they are expert conjurers. We have seen Mrs Rouncewell’s domain; Mr Woodcourt’s 
abilities are likewise partial. For a romantic hero, a noble gentleman whose good deeds we 
see evidence of, he is also a spooky figure, a harbinger of death who is ready to act as 
Charon. He is there for Nemo’s death and for Lady Dedlock’s, among others. It makes his 
ostensibly generous offer of succour to Jo, terrified of Inspector Bucket finding him, look 
much darker: soon after Jo has declared ‘“he’ll see me if I’m above ground”’, Woodcourt 
tells him ‘“I will find you a better place than this to lie down and hide in”’ (718). That better 
place turns out to be, via the Shooting Gallery, a pauper’s grave in ‘“that there berryin-
ground”’, which is, to be sure, a better place to lie down and hide in (733). 
 
But, excluding his personal absence from much of Esther’s narrative, here is where 
Woodcourt’s conjuring powers end; he cannot enclose or permit escape from enclosure in 
any other way. In truth, the closest thing in the novel to real omnisicence, that ultimate ability 
to penetrate enclosed spaces, belongs to neither character and certainly neither narrator. 
Rather, it is those anthologists of hidden affairs, Tulkinghorn and Bucket, who possess it, as 
they possess so much else. When Tulkinghorn strides home in triumph after the disclosure of 
his intention to reveal Lady Dedlock’s secret, the prose, focalised through his eyes, blithely 
takes in the street and its houses and it records, with a generous dash of congratulation, that 
 
many of [their] mysteries, difficulties, mortgages, delicate affairs of all kinds, are treasured up 
within his old black satin waistcoat. He is in the confidence of the very bricks and mortar. The 
high chimney-stacks telegraph family secrets to him. (747) 
 
Tulkinghorn would have no truck with the wistful expression ‘If these walls...’, for 
walls talk to him. They traffic in their intelligences, inform on their occupants. For him, the 
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darkly clustered houses and their rooms enclose no secrets. As we know, or infer, depending 
on our familiarity with the story, Tulkinghorn is about to receive his comeuppance. The 
narrator makes much of his failure to recognise this, his failure to see the portents that the 
narrator, effacing his own retrospective knowledge through the equivocal use of the present 
tense, freely concedes do not exist outside of his fancy (in this respect they are like Esther’s 
backshadowings, a retrospective imposition in this superficially present tense). The portents, 
the refrain they do not say outside of the narration, ‘Don’t go home!’, serve not just as an 
instrument to tauten the terrible foreboding afflicting the reader – and, again, not 
Tulkinghorn, who blunders on – but as instruments to jeer Tulkinghorn for being the only one 
who cannot see this, for being so obtuse. The end of the chapter – the report of the shot that 
slew Tulkinghorn having just been heard and ignored outside, where the reader has been 
detained – dwells on the irony that the Allegory on the ceiling, though a ‘paralysed dumb 
witness’, also foretold the death (752). Had Tulkinghorn been in the confidence of his own 
bricks and mortar, he might have been privy to this. But he was not, and by dwelling on this 
oversight the narrator vaunts his superiority over his dead rival. 
 
Bucket, about whose capabilities I shall say more anon, is able to do more than simply 
know the ‘mysteries, difficulties, mortgages, delicate affairs of all kinds’ that are occluded by 
the walls of the windowless houses: he is able to breach the walls themselves. He conjures Jo 
out of his makeshift hospice at Bleak House (497). He conjures the indefatigable Hortense 
out of a room like ‘a homely Jupiter’ (‘it is impossible to describe how Mr Bucket gets her 
out’ [837]). He conjures George out of the friendly Bagnet household, the heads of which 
look at the arrest differently as Bucket takes George away: ‘Mrs Bagnet remarks...that Mr 
Bucket “almost clings to George like, and seems to be really fond of him”’ (765). This is the 
triumph of Bucket’s dark art. He has managed to spirit away George in plain sight and make 
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it look like he is doing exactly the opposite, like he and George are actually old chums 
partaking of their companionship. Looked at this way, it is a more remarkable escape than 
any George could have made through the escape-proof backyard at the Bagnets’, whose 
inviolability Bucket had ascertained prior to this with a meticulous reconnoitre: 
 
‘What a very nice backyard, ma’am! Any way out of that yard, now?’ 
There is no way out of that yard. 
‘Ain’t there really?’ says Mr. Bucket. ‘I should have thought there might have been. 
Well, I don’t know as I ever saw a backyard that took my fancy more. Would you allow me to 
look at it? Thank you. No, I see there’s no way out. But what a very good-proportioned yard it 
is!’ 
Having cast his sharp eye all about it, Mr. Bucket returns to his chair next his friend 
Mr. George and pats Mr. George affectionately on the shoulder (762). 
 
So successful is Bucket’s ruse that he has begun to gull not just the Bagnets but the narrator 
too: ‘friend’ – whether irony or free indirect discourse, or both – subtly, insidiously intrudes 
into the narration much as Bucket has intruded into the house (indeed, much as it did in the 
example I quoted earlier, when another man, Tulkinghorn, kept up a pretense of friendship). 
‘Affectionately’ facilitates the subsequent misapprehension. 
 
* 
 
The commonplace, my conventional initial reading of Benjamin, is that by looking into the 
windowless house we change the windowless house. The pristine ‘true’, eternally moot, 
becomes a truth-compound, reacting to the intrusion of the world outside and forming some 
sort of less-than-‘true’ molecule, a bowdlerisation of the ‘true’. But this still begs, while 
infinitely deferring, the question of what that seminal ‘true’ was. What is going on inside 
those darkly clustered houses? The omniscience of the two omniscient figures in BH, 
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Tulkinghorn and Bucket, finally fails. Tulkinghorn carelessly accepts a walk-on part in his 
own murder scene, and Bucket, for all his uncanny powers, cannot prevent that murder, nor 
can he find Lady Dedlock and prevent her death. But Benjamin’s ‘the true’, the changeling 
that always eludes us, that always switches clothes with Jenny and sends her the opposite way 
as a diversion, paradoxically becomes through its reticence the opposite, the false: the wild 
conjecture that attends on Nemo’s and Krook’s deaths, for example. We cannot know the 
‘true’. Indeed, the stability of ‘the true’ – which is to say, the instability – is all we can be 
sure of. Discussing phantasmagoria, Terry Castle adduces another great novelist, Proust, 
whose narrator reminisces about an episode from his youth in which a magic lantern was 
given to him to lift his spirits: 
 
[The magic lantern] substituted for the opaqueness of my walls an impalpable iridescence, 
supernatural phenomena of many colours, in which legends were depicted as on a shifting and 
transitory window. But my sorrows were only increased thereby, because this mere change of 
lighting was enough to destroy the familiar impression I had of the room, thanks to which, 
save for the torture of going to bed, it had become quite endurable. Now I no longer 
recognised it, and felt uneasy in it, as in a room in some hotel or chalet, in a place where I had 
just arrived for the first time... The anaesthetic effect of habit being destroyed, I would begin 
to think – and to feel – such melancholy things (43). 
 
As Castle adds, ‘Here, ironically, the magic lantern produces nothing but estrangement’. Here 
we find the marriage of Benjamin’s and Tolstoy’s ideas and their transcendence. Within the 
windowless house (‘the opaqueness of my walls’ means the same thing) is ‘the true’, or 
variegated forms of it, but perceiving it is contingent on ‘the anaesthetic effect of habit being 
destroyed’. The distortion of the room by the window that is not a window is also inherent in 
the room, another truth; for, though it is the agent of the magic lantern that produces this 
distortion, the distortion is organic distortion: ‘this mere change of lighting was enough to 
destroy the familiar impression I had of the room’. The room is still what it was, still tangibly 
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the same – it would still look the same – but the narrator Marcel ‘no longer recognise[s] it’. 
Importantly, Marcel recognises that it is still tangibly the same room while continuing to 
believe in its alteration. Tales of people believing such things, believing in the illusions 
created by a magical apparatus even when they know them to be fake, are legion. Grahame 
Smith writes that spectators at panoramas 
 
could hardly believe that they were facing an illusion. In the words of one spectator, you ‘are 
obliged almost to reason with yourself...that it is not nature, instead of a work of art’. Indeed, 
there are stories of viewers putting out their hands to touch objects which they believed were 
three-dimensional despite the fact that they had been painted on a flat surface (30). 
 
According to Castle, a contemporary observer of the phantasmagoria saw ‘a man striking at 
one of his phantoms with a stick’ (39). There are many such instances – and reversals, the 
transformation of reality into illusion, which is exactly what the ‘Pepper’s “Ghost”’ illusion, 
for example, would perform – in BH. Lynda Nead writes in Victorian Babylon of how 
gaslights ‘produced the dream-images of the city at night… an uncanny, nocturnal city’, and 
that Dickens’ sketch ‘Night Walks’, which I discuss below, provides ‘a hallucinatory, dream-
like evocation of the city as a phantasmagoria of past and present’ (9, 102). This evocation is 
reprised when Mr Snagsby, a witness to this phantasmagoria, is ‘so confused’ as to be 
‘doubtful of his being awake and out – doubtful of the reality of the streets through which he 
goes – doubtful of the reality of the moon that shines above him’ (365). 
 
What is real and what is not is, in Marcel’s words, ‘shifting and transitory’. When 
Bucket, accompanied by Snagsby and a police constable, literally alights upon Jo with his 
bull’s-eye lantern, ‘Jo stands amazed in the disc of light, like a ragged figure in a magic-
lanthorn’ (361-62). This simile does not come until after their search for Jo through the slums 
of Tom-all-Alone’s, but it is essential to understanding Dickens portrayal of the search. Upon 
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the trio’s entrance, ‘the crowd… hovers around the three visitors, like a dream of horrible 
faces, and fades away up alleys and into ruins, and behind walls’ (358). Of course, the crowd 
is not a ‘dream’, though society wishes to regard it as such, but the belief that it is infuses the 
language (it is not the narrator who is seeing here but one of the trio), and the crowd’s 
incorporeality is reified, as it were, and perpetuated. It is, however, unreal: this is an attempt 
to suppress its reality. More interesting to me are moments in which illusion persuades a 
viewer or reader of a reality, much as Marcel’s magic lantern does. In the scene of Gridley’s 
death, George returns to his shooting gallery accompanied by Jarndyce and Esther to find: 
 
As he pulled a bell-handle which hung by a chain to the door-post, a very respectable old 
gentleman, with grey hair, wearing spectacles, and dressed in a black spencer and gaiters and a 
broad-brimmed hat, and carrying a large gold-headed cane, addressed him (400). 
 
As soon as they are inside, the ‘physician stopped, and, taking off his hat, appeared to vanish 
by magic, and to leave another and quite a different man in his place’ (401). The ‘different 
man’ is Inspector Bucket. Bucket’s simple disguise is dressed up, so to speak, as an act of 
‘magic’, a kind of visual alchemy. It is not the same man wearing different clothes but 
‘another and quite a different man’, as if they really were two separate people. Notice also the 
gap between George’s pulling of the bell-handle and Bucket’s addressing him; what ought to 
have occurred between these two acts, Bucket’s approach, is omitted. This is all the stranger 
given that, in Esther’s account, the party approached the shooting gallery through ‘narrow 
courts’ (400). The implication is that Bucket has simply materialised next to them. Elsewhere 
in the novel it is more than implied, when we learn that ‘time and place cannot bind’ him: 
‘Like man in the abstract, he is here today and gone tomorrow – but, very unlike man indeed 
he is here again the next day’ (803). The omniscient narrator, again unable to ‘bind’ a subject, 
imputes to Bucket supernatural powers. He is as one risen from the dead, ‘here again the next 
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day’, his humanity sequestered into abstraction and his uncanny reanimation bodied forth in 
reality. 
 
Marcel Mauss, in A General Theory of Magic, remarks of the magician that ‘the ritual 
[of magic] itself…turns him into another man’ (32) – as Bucket is turned when he becomes 
the doctor – and that ‘His words, his gestures, his glances, even his thoughts are forces in 
themselves. His own person emanates influences before which nature and men, spirits and 
gods must give way’ (41). This notion of Bucket as magus of some kind is evident from the 
beginning of his portrayal. When Snagsby sits in Tulkinghorn’s office, he notices Bucket, 
‘who was not there when he himself came in, and who has not since entered by the door or 
either of the windows’ and who has a ‘ghostly manner of appearing’ (355)15. Bucket’s means 
of entry is not reckoned, but nor is it elided as it is by Esther in the passage cited above. 
Snagsby in this focalisation – which is perhaps too grand a term for it, since by seeing things 
through Snagsby’s perspective we see next to nothing – is actually engaging in the kind of 
ratiocination Bucket might employ. Look at his shabby little inventory of the knowable when 
he goes on to think, at least in the narrator’s paraphrase, that ‘There is a press in the room, but 
its hinges have not creaked, nor has a step been audible upon the floor. Yet this third person 
stands there…’ But it little avails him. Prosaic observation, the recording of significant 
absences, those uncreaking hinges and inaudible footfalls, yields only a profound, unresolved 
absence, which is itself absented as it is recorded. Snagsby and the narrator are so adamant 
too that these absences existed, as it were; it is implicit that their knowledge of the 
perceptible is absolute and they do not so much as countenance, let alone brook, fault. The 
only conclusion is no conclusion at all, the evanescence of Bucket before Snagsby’s, and our, 
discombobulated eyes. Bucket goes from being ‘a person’, ‘stoutly built, steady-looking’, to 
                                                 
15 The reference applies to all BH quotes in this and the following paragraph. 
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something both less and more than a person, a figure with ‘a ghostly manner of appearing’. 
The earlier certitude precipitates a kind of clumsy subterfuge. Snagsby and the narrator 
conclude that ‘there is nothing remarkable about him at first sight’, except that ‘manner’, as 
though the performance of something impossible, surely a working definition of a miracle, 
could so be airily dismissed. But Snagsby is out of his depth. If nature, spirits and gods ‘must 
give way’ to such a figure, what hope has poor old Snagsby got? 
 
Albert D. Hutter has observed that in this first perception of Bucket, Bucket is 
constantly deferred by the clotted syntax, so that one whose livelihood is apprehension cannot 
be apprehended himself; one who fingers, in the literal and inculpatory metaphorical senses, 
others and says ‘that’s what you are’: what he is nobody can say, nobody can point to. ‘Mr 
Snagsby is dismayed to see…’, which begins the first sentence of the paragraph, is sundered 
from its object by several subordinate, qualifying clauses, a rhetorical device repeated two 
sentences later (89). Snagsby has trouble seeing anything here. All we see is the verbal 
equivalent of the fog. The device – later taken to its extreme by Conrad in the portrayal of Mr 
Kurtz in Heart of Darkness, who seems to exist almost entirely in the novella-length 
catalogue of rumours about him, and is seen in the ill, mortally-wounded flesh only as a kind 
of vanishing point at the end of them – ironically takes us further away from discerning the 
character of Bucket. That is, for all the verbiage slopping about his name in instances like 
Snagsby’s, and our, first encounter with him, he absconds: helped, paradoxically, by the 
verbiage itself. 
 
Bucket, like Benjamin’s windowless house, is a pending disappearance, perpetually 
inscrutable, a ‘man in the abstract’ whose reality can never be perceived, who is always 
beyond the attentions of others. Perhaps it is this that allows credulity to be confronted and 
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imposed on – squatted in – as it is above and elsewhere. Peter Carey, reconstituting in Jack 
Maggs the scene Esther describes, captures the main point of it. In a ‘tight little alcove’ much 
like the ‘narrow court’ in BH, we find this observation: ‘This doctor, with his twisted red 
mouth and wild bright eyes, was incredible, ridiculous, and yet he existed, given life by some 
violent magic in his creator’s heart’ (174). This is Jack Maggs’s perception of the author 
Tobias Oates, fictional counterpart to the young Charles Dickens. Oates has been dragooned 
into pacifying Maggs, for which purpose he has disguised himself as doctor. What makes the 
passage notable is the way Maggs, who has already been apprised of the doctor’s identity and 
finds it ‘incredible, ridiculous’, must nevertheless concede that ‘the doctor... existed’, that the 
vivifying gusto of the performance transcended scepticism without at all effacing it. 
Paradoxically, Maggs is convinced by what he finds to be unconvincing and knows to be 
unreal. It is a convincing unconvincing impossibility, to adapt Aristotle. It recalls the Karen 
Petroski observation I quoted in the introduction that, in much the same way, the Dickens 
who wrote American Notes ‘explicitly put readers in a position’ in which they ‘know[...] that 
what they witness is illusion but nevertheless temporarily allow[...] themselves to believe in 
its reality and to be affected by it’ (73). 
 
* 
 
Earlier I invoked the allusion to Asmodée in D&S. This comes amid an impassioned jeremiad 
about ‘Nature’ and the ‘unnatural’. The irony of this passage is that what it calls for is 
actually inimical to Dickens’ preferred means of attaining and conveying understanding, as 
distinct from knowledge. The Dickens adumbrating ‘The Shadow’ is not saying that he wants 
to know what is taking place at all those hearths. That is not interesting to him. Knowledge is 
easily debased, liable to be vulgar gossip or sinister intelligences, the stuff the Tulkinghorns 
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of this world possess and exploit. Instead, he craves distance, the better to foster the 
efflorescence of fancy. Proximity deadens. Wittman is very good on the ways that Dickens 
contrives to preserve some measure of distance even where one might conclude he is 
surmounting it. Noting the ‘narratable and narrative distance between the viewer and the 
object’ in Sketches, particularly ‘A Visit to Newgate’, she observes that ‘The familiar walls of 
Newgate in effect go from being “whats” to “what ifs?” or “hows?” as soon as they begin to 
generate narrative’ (220). This follows from Jaffe, who notes that ‘Seeking out in order to 
sympathise, [Boz] provides a model for sympathy that intervenes, if at all, only from a 
distance’ (Vanishing 44). This should not be a stricture on Dickensian sympathy, however, 
since the point of the sympathy is that Dickens wants his readers to imagine the distant 
experience of those wretches, not familiar experience (that is, within the ‘familiar’ walls lurks 
something distant, foreign16). Sympathy’s ability to vault distance and permeate divides is 
what makes it salutary; provoking sympathy for those who are not distant is otiose. This is 
why ‘sympathy retains for Dickens…its postive potential’, as Lowe puts it (10). It is why, to 
use the Harry Stone quote from the introduction, ‘Dickens…champions the power of 
imaginative sympathy,’ which he says ‘humanises and saves’.17 
 
                                                 
16 Perhaps remissly, I do not discuss Dickensian coincidence in the thesis, where I am not interested in plot. But 
it is germane to this tendency. Forster writes that ‘On the coincidences, resemblances and surprises of life 
Dickens liked especially to dwell, and few things moved his fancy so pleasantly’, especially the fact that ‘people 
supposed to be far apart were so constantly elbowing each other’ (Life v.1 59). The existence of convicts ‘within 
one yard’ of convivial free men and women is both ‘coincidence’ and ‘surprise’, a template for those 
coincidences Dickens engenders in his novels. Esther, for all that her faculty of noticing avails her, could have 
forestalled many problems by imagining the ‘wretched creature[…] pent up’ on the other side of the door at 
Krook’s (Boz 199). In this way, sympathy has an appreciable utility. 
17 Lowe sharply differs from Jaffe in her conception of ‘Sympathy’, and in this summary I am perhaps guilty of 
falling between two formidable stools, or even favouring Jaffe’s conception despite my enthusiasm for Lowe’s 
treatise. Lowe writes of ‘sympathy’ and the much later coinage ‘empathy’ that  
 
the two words are now often opposed to one other, with ‘empathy’ comprehending feelings with 
another person from their point of view, the feeling of their feelings, and ‘sympathy’ indicating a 
feeling for them from distant, outside, or still separate perspective. (9) 
  
I do not see why ‘sympathy’ cannot imagine ‘the feeling of their feelings’ from a ‘distant, outside, or still 
separate perspective’. As I write above, and argue through the rest of this section, in Dickens the distance is 
what gives the act of sympathy its meaning. 
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The distance kept means, however, that knowledge is eschewed. As Tambling notes, 
the two condemned prisoners who did not win a reprieve as the third did, John Smith and 
John Pratt, were lovers, the last homosexuals to be executed in Britain. Furthermore, their 
wretched outing and incrimination arose from their wretched lodgings, where, the sitting 
magistrate noted, ‘the room was so poor that what was going on inside was easily visible 
from without’ (Going Astray 42-43). They were the victims of poverty’s Asmodée. Dickens 
does not want to relay these squalid tidings, writing euphemistically that ‘the nature of [their] 
offence rendered it necessary to separate them even from their companions in guilt’ (Boz 
207). Perhaps it is a kind of probity or perhaps simple distate that prompts Dickens’ 
discretion on this matter, almost as if he were once again a court reporter and were belatedly 
respecting a suppression order. In that passage from D&S that alludes to Asmodée, Dickens 
writes of 
 
rousing some who never have looked out upon the world of human life around them, to a 
knowledge of their own relation to it, and for making them acquainted with a perversion of 
nature in their own contracted sympathies and estimates. (685) 
 
The ‘knowledge’ here is not the knowledge that goes with omniscience; indeed, omniscience 
may vitiate it. It is imaginative ‘sympathy’, the engagement that refreshes minds. Wittman 
finds the notion of a ‘sympathetic identification between the “helpless” fellow-creature [in 
gaol] and the reader’ to be ‘facile and unsatisfactory’ (223). But the point of ‘Newgate’ is 
surely to nourish that ‘sympathetic identification’. Throughout we are privy to the terrible 
brutalisation the prisoners suffer. As much as anything, the want of deviations from 
familiarity induces this state. To the prisoners, ‘such scenes were too familiar to them…to 
excite more than a passing thought’ (202). But knowledge of this is only meaningful if it 
permits the reader to accept the invitation to ‘Imagine what have been the feelings of the men 
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whom that fearful pew has enclosed’ and then again to ‘Conceive the situation of a man, 
spending his last night on earth in this cell’, a template for which the text provides (206, 208). 
It is an invitation to imagine the invisible, something that cannot be grasped no matter how 
‘easily visible from without the prisoners’ – though it is notable that in both instances the 
figures are ‘enclosed’, the cell pointedly having only ‘a small high window in the back [that] 
admitted as much air and light as could struggle in’ (208). Those ‘utterly unmindful’ outside 
the gaol, ‘not even knowing, or if they do, not even heeding, the fact [of their closeness to the 
condemned]’, may possess the knowledge but decline the invitation (199). We seen indirect 
confirmation of this elsewhere in that passage from D&S: 
 
Look round upon the world of odious sights—millions of immortal creatures have no other 
world on earth—at the lightest mention of which humanity revolts, and dainty delicacy living 
in the next street, stops her ears, and lisps ‘I don’t believe it!’ (684) 
 
The point is the failure of imagination, not of knowledge. The genteel ‘dainty delicacy’ has 
bred this incredulity and obduracy, a kind of civilised barbarousness that will lead its victims 
to cover their ears like a child. Such people are no better off than the prisoners ‘no more 
concerned by what was passing before there eyes, and within their hearing, than if they were 
blind and deaf’ (Boz 202). They might know something, but in a cursory way, and without 
the exercise, let alone the enlargement, of sympathy. As with the ‘Vauxhall Gardens by Day’, 
so with the prison and its occupants: ‘we just recognised them, and that was all’ (Boz 129). It 
is notable that the best means of provoking this imaginative sympathy is, by Boz’s own 
admission, a wild fancy of defamiliarising hypotyposis: ‘If Bedlam could be suddenly 
removed like another Aladdin’s palace, and set down on the space now occupied by 
Newgate,’ almost nobody who passed the site’s ‘familiar’ walls would do so ‘without 
bestowing a hasty glance on its small, grated windows, and a transient thought upon the 
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condition of the unhappy beings immured in its dismal cells’ (199). In lieu of this, we have 
Dickens’ sketch so that readers can visit the interior of Newgate, like Italy in Pictures, ‘in 
fancy’. To ‘visit…in fancy’ is the important thing. 
 
In a later sketch, ‘Night Walks’ from The Uncommercial Traveller, Dickens’ engages 
in a reprise of Boz’s mobile speculations. By this time the spectator is an exile: The 
Uncommercial Traveller has been rendered ‘houseless’ by insomnia – that word a borrowing 
from De Quincey, as Michael Slater and John Drew note – and a concomitant impulse to 
wander the streets (Uncommercial 149). Amid these wanderings he encounters other of what 
soon become ‘us houseless people’, a noticeably less jocular collective of the shunned, with 
whom he establishes ‘sympathetic relations’ (150). But these ‘sympathetic relations’ are not 
what one expects. He does not interact with anyone, much less converse with them. For him, 
‘capital company’ and ‘good society’ is ‘the reek, and the smell of grains, and the rattling of 
the pump dray horses’ from inside a brewery (152). Farther on in his wanderings, he observes 
that ‘When a church clock strikes, on houseless ears…it may be at first mistaken for company 
and hailed as such’ (154). A ‘railway terminus’ is ‘remunerative company’ until lamps are 
lighted and porters emerge (156). He is seeking his ‘own solitary way’ (157). Those people 
he does interact with are ghosts or beasts: ‘the ghost of a watchman’, ‘the most spectral 
person’ and ‘a thing’, a ‘creature’, an ‘ugly object’ who – or, rather that, since it is an ‘it’ – is 
‘like a worried dog (152, 156, 154-55). The ‘driven cattle’ the Traveller elsewhere espies are 
beasts invested with more sympathy, because distant and enclosed in ‘stone walls’ and ‘six 
inches’ worth of iron railing’ with ‘their heads down…for tossing-purchase at quite 
imaginary dogs’ (157). ‘Sympathetic relations’, akin to the ‘sympathetic identification’ 
Wittman scorns, means to watch and fancy, which is its own form of edification. Dickens is 
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alluding to the edifying properties of “sympathetic relations” in the earnest, rather pious letter 
salving the unhappiness of young Danish correspondent Emmely Gotschalk: 
 
In every human existence, however quiet or monotonous, there is range enough for active 
sympathy and cheerful usefulness… It is through such means that I humbly believe God must 
be approached… Sympathize, not in thought only, but in action, with all about you. (Letters 
v.6 25) 
 
He is talking in part, one infers, about charitable ministrations, Good Works. But ‘sympathy’ 
also evokes, and not inadvertantly either, its usage in ‘Night Walks’. 
 
The Uncommercial Traveller desires not only stimuli for his fancy but locations that 
might license and sponsor it. He goes to Bethlehem Hospital ‘partly, because I had a night-
fancy in my head which could best be pursued within sight of its walls and dome’ (153). He 
must be outside because his interest is only piqued insofar as an insurmountable barrier is in 
place, the better to embellish the fancy that makes that barrier wonderfully permeable. As 
Jaffe writes, ‘though sympathy supposedly transcends difference, it in fact depends on 
establishing the difference it proposes to transcend’ (Vanishing 36). Fittingly, the author so 
taken with extremities in people and things desires them of places too. He is obsessed with 
walls, hewing to them wherever he goes as though he were blind. It is notable that among 
these walls is Newgate’s: ‘it afforded matter for reflection to take Newgate in the way, and, 
touching its rough stone, to think of the prisoners in their sleep’ (152). Here he seems to read 
the tactility of the ‘rough stone’, its ordered abrasions, and in doing so projects his sympathy 
through it. This is what he seeks for the ‘utterly unmindful’: imaginative ‘synpathetic 
relations’. 
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Externals, exteriors, extremities: these are the keys to their opposites, to their 
transcendence, palpable tokens of the invisible. At one point he sees watchmen doing their 
rounds in a cemetery ‘among the graves at stated times, and mov[ing] the tell-tale handle of 
an index which recorded that they had touched it at such an hour’. Merely this vicarious 
experience of touching an exterior foments a ‘solemn consideration’, a flare of fancy about 
the ‘enormous hosts of dead’ beneath in the graves themselves (154). The Uncommercial 
Traveller then entertains a wonderful and terrible fancy, one of Wittman’s ‘what ifs?’: ‘if 
they were raised while the living slept, there would not be the space of a pin’s point in all the 
streets and ways for the living…’ (154). But they have been raised, here in the narration, and 
the living still sleep. 
 
* 
 
In BH, the narrator is ostensibly like ‘the Thing at…the window, by the fire, in the street, in 
the house, from infancy to old age, everyone’s inseparable companion’ but is in important 
ways different. He is frustrated – as all such narrators must be frustrated, not being able to 
intervene, not having agency in this imagined world. There is a sense, as I have argued, that 
not all the world of which he appears to have such absolute mastery is accessible to him. The 
reality within the fiction is as tenuous and fantasmatic as Lady Dedlock is to Jo in their 
parody of Orpheus and Eurydice’s flight from the underworld. It is so even to its narrator, for 
all his knowing purports. Yet as I have also argued, the worth of accessibility is questionable, 
the apprehension of Benjamin’s ‘the true’ being beyond such simple, linear transactions. We 
see an example in the failure of postivist observation in Snagsby’s manful, thwarted effort to 
apprehend Bucket. This is an especially important point, as it presages the next chapter’s 
discussion of Hard Times and modes of scientific observation and knowledge. 
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Moreover, the worth of accessibility is also moot. One can enter Newgate – though 
Boz makes much of the labyrinthine floorplan and innumerable gates and turnkeys, tacitly 
inculcating the difficulty of his procession – but one is watching people cognizant of being 
watched, and their behaviour, ‘the true’ within the ‘windowless room’, is changed. Some 
‘were evidently quite gratified at being thought worth the trouble of looking at. Their idea 
appeared to be, that we had come to see Newgate as a grand affair…’ (206). This applies to 
the less ostentatious too. Those ‘desirous to avoid even the casual observation of the 
strangers’ cannot escape the observers’ influence (206). To lift the rooftops and see men 
having sex together when such an act is furtive and illegal is probably to see something 
unfamiliar, yet it is not to enter ‘sympathetic relations’ with those rather differently 
sympathetic relations. It is to become a mere voyeur and an informant, a potential accessory 
to Bucket’s or Tulkinghorn’s equally disturbing simulacra of ‘semi-omniscience’. In ‘Night 
Walks’ we find the narrator pursuing his ‘solitary way’ to preserve and enact his fancy, a 
fancy that gives him better ‘sympathetic relations’ with the chimerical ‘true’ on the other side 
than any Asmodée. 
 
The next chapter takes up that idea by discussing how fancy came to be an agent of 
knowledge in nineteenth-century science, supplanting an epistemological paradigm in which 
‘the true’, the ‘facts’ of Hard Times, was sundered from sight. This paradigm proscribed 
fancy, as indeed do HT’s proponents of ‘fact’, abjuring even hypothesis, that imaginative 
extrapolation from the known. Dickens, I argue, saw the importance of fancy to fact in 
scientific investigation and appreciation. Fancy in the next chapter is not a process that could 
be morally improving in a nebulous way, as it was in this chapter. It is the harbinger of 
discovery. 
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The previous chapter looked at knowledge and fancy in BH and elsewhere in Dickens as if 
they were in opposition, the former sequestered from the latter by the ‘rough stone’ of 
Newgate’s walls. I argued that knowledge, or the reality it must apprehend to be so, dwelt in 
Benjamin’s ‘windowless room’ and fancy was left outside to conjure its prodigies of illusion. 
If that argument seemed like a derogation of fancy, it should not have. The point was that 
knowledge – the complacent airs of omniscience in BH’s third-person narration, the dogged 
empirical investigation of Newgate by Boz – was either dubious or insufficient. That is, the 
point was that knowledge was not the point for Dickens. Its utility in Boz’s ‘A Visit to 
Newgate’ was as a means to stir the reader’s fancy and thereby rouse him from ‘“the force of 
habit”’, ‘the power which habit and custom exercise’, those potent narcotics of the quotidian. 
This chapter takes up that stirring, but it tweaks the relationship with knowledge. What if 
instead of a relationship in which fancy supervened upon knowledge, knowledge supervened 
upon fancy? What if it were fancy that were primary? Indeed, that is the persistent 
implication of ‘Night Walks’, the sketch I finished the previous chapter discussing. 
 
It is more than an implication in the novel I discuss this chapter, Hard Times. HT 
presents us with a town where the want of fancy is so pervasive and grievous that much of the 
populace are as brutalised as the prisoners in Newgate. The Gradgrind children and their 
school cohort are no better off than Newgate’s piteous urchins, children ‘who have never 
known what childhood is’, who ‘have entered at once upon the stern realities and miseries of 
life, and to their better nature it is almost hopeless to appeal’ (Boz 202-203). In the recesses 
of the gaol and in HT’s Coketown, there is a clear answer to the question posed in that 
passage from Dombey & Son I cited: ‘whether…it is not natural to be unnatural’ (683). 
Furthermore, HT inculpates the education in those ‘stern realities’ as an accessory to Tom 
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Gradgrind’s crime, the pivotal moment in the novel. The peaceable obduracy of those free 
men and women dulled by habit outside ‘Newgate’ is unsustainable in HT; a want of fancy 
begets delinquency, threatening to make delinquency a social pandemic. 
 
This chapter examines HT and fancy – and with it wonder, as I shall explain – in 
relation to scientific vision in the nineteenth century. My main interest is what Jude V. Nixon, 
writing recently on Dickens, calls ‘the scientific eye’18. The chapter looks at nineteenth-
century constructions of science as a legacy of disembodied facts, these facts as hermetic in 
their way as ‘the true’ in ‘the windowless room’. Such constructions were antithetical to 
Dickens’ own construction of science, which I shall argue was the one that began to prevail 
as the century went on. Adducing his review of Robert Hunt’s The Poetry of Science for The 
Examiner newspaper in late 1848, I note Dickens’ belief that ‘the facts of science are at least 
as fully of poetry, as the most poetical fancies ever founded on an imperfect observation and 
a distant suspicion of them’. Knowledge itself, in this construction, can be wondrous; facts, 
those disenchanted units wielded by early scientists such as William Whewell and later on 
Joseph Gradgrind and his colleagues in HT, fanciful. It revives the Romantic notion that 
fancy and wonder have a place in science. 
 
Throughout this thesis the main question I try to answer is the one I adapted from 
Grahame Smith in the introduction: how can writing ‘essentially…distorting’ also be ‘more 
real than reality itself’? My suggestion is that distortion, far from an obstacle to being ‘more 
real’, is actually essential to it. The last chapter considered the ways in which the ‘real’ itself 
might not be real, might indeed be fantasmatic. This chapter proceeds by examining how the 
distortions of fancy are intrinsic to the discovery and representation of scientific knowledge 
                                                 
18 This chapter is indebted to Nixon’s and K.J. Fieldings articles, a fact I see I have not made quite clear. It will 
be apparent to anyone familiar with the articles and their vital, compendious learning. 
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in the nineteenth century. In the previous chapter, I tried to show that Dickens ultimately 
preferred The Uncommercial Traveller fancying outside Newgate’s walls to the seeing Boz 
inside them. In this chapter, however, I try to show that Dickens believed fancying and seeing 
were mutually necessary when it came to science, and that the unfancying invigilators of HT 
are unseeing too. The ‘fanciful imagination’ HT and Dickens in his non-fiction cleave to as 
salutary might yield, as I argue, the fabulous distortions of evolutionary theory in its various 
iterations. 
 
There is an even deeper bond with the preceding chapters. In the previous chapter I 
tried to show that the most convincing entity in BH was its falsest, Bucket, and that he was at 
his most convincing when his falsity was plainest. The sheer ostentatiousness of his falsity 
served to display and accentuate the barriers his extraordinary fancies – his entance to the 
‘narrow courts’ and his disguise as a physician, say – were surmounting. This trait, which is 
the essence of hypotyposis’s rhetorical efficacy, I shall in this chapter identify with wonder. 
Wonder is at its most potent when most unbelievable: to use the Stephen Greenblatt quote 
from later in the chapter, ‘It calls attention to the problem of credibility and at the same time 
insists upon the undeniability, the exigency of the experience’. In flaunting its simultaneous 
incredibility and ‘undeniability’ it recalls both Petroski and, further back, Lewes’s ‘even 
while knowing it was false we could not help, for a moment, being affected’. To provoke 
wonder is to provoke knowledge, I argue, and these twin provocations arise from distortion, 
from the defamiliarising speculation that courts fallacy as it yields truth. As I note later, Beer 
writes that Darwin took ‘pleasure in “making strange”, in skimming off the familiar and 
restoring it’ and that he practised this in his scientific investigations. Indeed, as I shall argue, 
Darwin was practising a rigorous modern update of hypotyposis’s extravagant Latin 
descendent, Impossibilia. 
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* 
 
HT begins with contempt for the ‘suppositious, non-existent’ and ends with a chapter-length 
egress into it (8). ‘Hard facts’ cede their dominion to ‘imaginative graces and delights’ (7, 
219). At first that ‘man of realities’, Thomas Gradgrind, intones with blind certitude about the 
perniciousness of fancy: ‘Ay, ay, ay! But you mustn’t fancy… You are never to fancy’ (8, 
11). His blindness has already been figured in the text: ‘his eyes found commodious cellarage 
in two dark caves’, the eyes either a surplus good or, it is suggested, gouged out (7). But at 
last this gives way to visionary foreknowledge, notably that of his daughter and what she had 
earlier called ‘that wild escape into something visionary’: ‘watching the fire… How much of 
the future might arise before her vision?’ (162, 218). The narrator is acting as the presumed 
surrogate for her pyromantic divinations by relating them (‘These things were to be’ [219]). 
Blindness gives way to vision, to ‘seeing things’, and the novel proclaims, in contravention of 
its origins, its magical power to transcend them. How does that come about? This chapter 
tries to delineate the context and significance of that transcendence. The chapter’s broader 
purpose, as I indicated above, is to show how Dickens’ attitude to science is not only of a 
piece with his approach to representation, but also illuminates it. There exists ample 
scholarship by eminent Victorianists on Dickens’ vexed relationship with science. But I 
might begin by taking up a few almost incidental remarks from one such scholar, Jude V. 
Nixon. Nixon contends that although ‘Dickens could, occasionally, get the description just 
right’ as scientific observation in certain letters, the writings, ‘despite the desire… lack the 
scientific eye and/or vocabulary’, unlike those of Gerard Manley Hopkins, to whom Nixon 
compares him (275). What the ‘scientific eye’ and ‘get[ting] the description just right’ mean 
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Nixon does not elaborate on; neither do all the other words spent in that commodious 
cellarage of scholarship on Dickens and science. Consider this an elaboration. 
 
To proceed, however, it is necessary to retreat. Coinciding with the start of Dickens’ 
career as a writer came the ramification of the old ‘natural philosophy’ into the sciences we 
recognise today: physics, biology, and the sundry other ‘Ologies of all kinds’, as Mrs 
Gradgrind calls them in HT (149). Indeed, William Whewell did not officially mint the term 
‘scientist’ until 1840, well after Dickens had retired the soubriquet ‘Boz’ (Chapple 1). The 
Royal Astronomical Society was formed in 1831, the Botanical Society in 1836 and many 
other scientific groups besides during this period19. Dickens’ great friend and influence 
Thomas Carlyle affirmed in his 1829 jeremiad ‘Signs of the Times’ that ‘the science of the 
age…is physical, chemical, physiological’, supplanting, to Carlyle’s regret, Metaphysics 
(67). Furthermore, the ‘intellectual bias of our time’ was an ‘all-pervading disposition to that 
line of inquiry’ (70). Carlyle contrasted the prevailing ‘Mechanism’ of the age with the 
‘Dynamism’ of the individual genius; the great achievements of ‘Science and Art’ were 
‘Dynamical’, and were not abetted, indeed were hampered, in Carlyle’s opinion, by 
institutions such as the British Association for the Advancement of Science, also founded in 
1831. In the ascendant was the view propounded by Lord Kelvin later in the century: that 
one’s knowledge of a thing was ‘of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind’ unless one could 
measure that thing or ‘express it in numbers’ (73). Or as Carlyle put it earlier in the century, 
‘what cannot be investigated and understood mechanically, cannot be investigated and 
understood at all’ (70). The ‘English scientific movement’, though it had abjured the splitting 
of the two into rigid ‘cultures’, had made ‘its own publicly visible steps toward literature and 
science differentiation’: 
                                                 
19 Knowledge of this efflorescence is probably common enough for me to assume it, and many of the sources 
cited here anyhow mention the societies’ establishment. Refer, for example, to Holmes’s The Age of Wonder 
(xix). 
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As a writing practice, science would now forego the whole realm of rhetorical persuasion and 
figuration. Instead it would cultivate plain, naked, unadorned language, a univocality fit to 
express the true meaning of nature as understood through the authoritative interrogation of 
experimental method. (2) 
 
Writers tended to deal with these nascent sciences in one of two general ways. Some took the 
adversarial view put by Keats in his contention that Newton had taken the poetry out of 
rainbows by explaining them. ‘Do not all charms fly / At the mere touch of cold philosophy?’ 
Keats asks in ‘Lamia’, going on to write that this ‘cold philosophy’ could ‘Conquer all 
mysteries by rule and line’ and ‘Unweave a rainbow’ (193). This is the classic example of 
what John Christie and Sally Shuttleworth call ‘a kind of expressive practice termed 
rhetorical and figural…redefined, bounded and mapped in terms of its opposition to science’ 
(2). Keats’s lines seem gratuitous and even slightly wrong – in a strictly visual sense, it was 
surely white light that was unwoven by water droplets, not the rainbow by Newton – but they 
unweave an atmosphere of disquiet over that burgeoning ken of ‘rule and line’ that could 
make poets redundant and, in doing so, brutalise everyone else. Even the contemporary 
popular astronomy author John Bonnycastle, hardly a partisan, acquiesced in the sundering of 
poetry and science: ‘Poetical descriptions, though they may not be strictly conformable to the 
rigid principles of the Science they are meant to elucidate…’ (in Holmes 206). Carlyle might 
inform the thinking behind HT, but before Carlyle comes Keats. 
 
Not all Romantic writers shared this view of science, it should be said. Wordsworth, 
and eventually Coleridge, were among those dissenting. Perhaps inevitably, one infers from 
the tenor of his other ideas, Coleridge ‘came…to believe in a unifying complementarity 
between science and poetry, the latter being not the substitute but “the corolla and fragrance 
of the austere and many science’” (in Levere 88). Coleridge found in Sir Humphry Davy 
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‘poetry, as it were, substantiated and realised in nature: yea, nature itself disclosed to us…as 
at once the poet and the poem’ (in Levere 88). Newton’s science was indeed to be abhorred, 
but because rather than precluding poetry it was unimpressed by the ‘shaping spirit of 
Imagination’20 that could render its ‘complementarity’ with its kith in nature’s unity. 
(‘Newton’s astronomy was “not only depressive from its monotony but revolting from its 
want of analogy to…all our other experiences of…Nature” [Levere 94].) Wordsworth, in his 
1800 Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, forecast that in future ‘the remotest discoveries of the 
Chemist, the Botanist, or Mineralologist, will be as proper objects of the Poet’s art’ (423). 
Science, the physical ‘form of flesh and blood’, and the Poet, he of the ‘divine spirit’, would 
plight their troth, become a single ‘Being’, ‘a dear and genuine inmate of the household of 
man’ (418). Bliss would it have been in that dawn to be alive. 
 
But it did not quite happen that way, and if their troth remained unplighted it may 
have been because the conception itself was faulty. The ‘scientific’ was sundered from the 
‘poetic’, ‘flesh’ from ‘spirit’, neither of them willing. And this was an enduring division. 
Three-quarters of a century later, Darwin famously confessed to suffering ‘atrophy of that 
part of the brain alone, on which the higher tastes depend’ (Autobiography 54). He, much like 
Wordsworth, distinguished the ‘higher tastes’, the poetic, from the more workaday faculties 
of science: the ethereal from the material. Or, in the terms of HT, ‘fanciful imagination’ from 
the ‘eminently practical’, from ‘Facts’. By century’s end, Wordsworth’s augury of an 
ecumenical love-in between the poetic and the scientific had not come about; indeed, 
something closer to its opposite had. In his speech ‘Literature and Science’, Matthew Arnold 
struck a familiar note. When ‘the generality of men’, he said, have heard that 
                                                 
20 It is useful at this point to remind the reader that, as I noted in the introduction, Dickens did not observe 
Coleridge’s or anyone else’s distinction between ‘fancy’ and ‘imagination’. He used the terms interchangeably, 
as I shall in this chapter. That said, I must concede there is an example in this chapter of him invoking ‘fancy 
and imagination’ together, but not to any purpose – indeed, pleonastically, helping to clinch a rhetorical point at 
the end of a speech. As it happens, Wordsworth did not observe Coleridge’s distinction either (Brett 49). 
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their ancestor was [as Charles Darwin said] ‘a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and 
pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits’, there will be found to arise an invincible desire 
to relate this proposition to…the sense for beauty. But this the men of science will not do for 
us, and will hardly, even, profess to do. (Essays 335-36) 
 
Such a complaint was advanced in slightly different form a decade later by Joseph Conrad’s 
assertion that whereas ‘the scientist [plunges] into facts’, ‘It is otherwise with the artist’, who 
‘speaks to our capacity for delight and wonder’ (231). The crudity of this was doubtless in no 
small way provoked by the triumphal march of science’s partisans, but it would be cruder of 
me not to mention that many scientists were not partisans. As early as 1823, Yeo notes, 
Whewell ‘did not want science to be constructed as the obvious antithesis to poetry, and 
hence to the realm of imagination, feelings, and emotions’ and protests to a friend who, 
‘following Coleridge’, had expounded such a view that he has embraced irrationality merely 
for its own sake (Telling Lives 68). At any rate, some portion of those voluminous talking 
points that spanned the century from Coleridge to Conrad, establishing ‘beauty’ and related 
notions as a bulwark against science’s cultural annexation, inform Dickens’ work and foment 
a roiling equivocalness in its disposition toward science that never really settles. 
 
* 
 
How Dickens felt about science is not easy to discern, his own views on such matters being, 
despite the industry of critics such as George Levine and K.J. Fielding, less coherent. He was, 
after all, the novelist who made a character, Krook in Bleak House, spontaneously combust 
and then, rather than explain when challenged by G.H. Lewes that of course it was meant to 
be fantastic, mounted a humourless appeal to forgotten works of cod science like Robert 
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Macnish’s The Anatomy of Drunkenness that he had scarcely read anyway21. Dickens was the 
novelist who readily subscribed to the veracity of Mesmerism as medical science, and was a 
great sponsor of John Elliotson’s sensational proseltysing on behalf of Mesmerism’s 
scientific legitimacy. This thread of scientific cluelessness has long fomented the critical 
impression that Dickens was ignorant on such matters, perhaps even out of hostility toward 
science (Winyard and Furneaux 1). At a general, conceptual level, it is easy to find the 
imputation of hostility from reputable sources. Philip Collins, writing of ‘the anti-scientific 
and anti-rational tendency of the Romantics’ that so vexed Whewell, notes that among its 
manifestations were ‘such rubbish as…Keats’s distress at the prismatic explanation of the 
rainbow, [which] recurs with a similar naivety in Dickens’ (193). Donald Stone supports this 
view, finding that ‘a simplified and sentimentalized version of the Wordsworthian-
Coleridgean trust in the spontaneous, untutored imagination placed in opposition to the 
scientific-rationalist strain’ was endemic (250). At a specific, practical level, moreover, the 
picture of Dickens’ scientific awareness would seem hardly more favourable. Andrew 
Sanders’ dry caveat about the engineer Daniel Doyce in Little Dorrit – ‘It is, however, 
indicative of Dickens’s ignorance of engineering that the nature and quality of his great 
invention is never actually spelled out to readers’ – has an antecedent in a review of The 
Haunted Man by one of Dickens’ contemporaries: 
 
It is amusing to notice Mr Dickens’s conscious ignorance of chemistry. He, who is so 
painfully minute in describing the occupations of his heroes, who points out every pin lying 
on the floor of their daily life, and who introduces into his sketches each smallest particular, 
yet dares not give an inventory of Mr Redlaw’s laboratory, but simply fills it with “the 
reflection of glass vessels that held liquids”! (Sanders 161; Critical Assessments v.I 326) 
 
                                                 
21 He rebutted Lewes, with a piquant irony of which he does not seem to have been aware: ‘I looked into a 
number of books with great care, expressly to learn what the truth was. I examined the subject as a Judge might 
have done’ (Letters v.7 28). Not a ‘Judge’ in Chancery, one hopes. 
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Such facts naturally tell against Dickens. We have a credible impression of someone who was 
a fellow traveller with the ‘anti-scientific and anti-rational…Romantics’; who invoked cranks 
to acquire and defend what little scientific knowledge, such as it was, he had; and who 
scarcely bothered about scientific details in his fiction. Yet that impression is, if not 
misrepresentative, not entirely representive either. In the words of William F. Axton, ‘the 
breadth of [Dickens’] scientific knowledge was greater than many have been led to believe’ 
(Nixon 359). The scientific debts of Bleak House, for example, have been teased out by 
numerous critics, most influentially Ann Wilkinson. Fielding notes that that novel’s famous 
opening cribbed some of its details from William Buckland’s sixth Bridgewater Treatise – 
Buckland being the discoverer of the Megalosaurus in 1824 – and Reverend John Kirby’s 
seventh (214). Furthermore, John M. Picker notes that Dickens also owned and was ‘startled’ 
by his friend Charles Babbage’s apocryphal Ninth Bridegwater Treatise; indeed, three 
decades on he was still citing Babbage’s idea that the air was ‘“one vast library”’ of every 
utterance ever spoken, as if the transmission of the idea was itself ‘“immutable”’ (Picker 16-
17). The examples of Dickens’ fellowship with scientists are likewise legion. Dickens 
counted among his friends such eminent scientists as the palaeontologist Richard Owen, and 
had a spirited correspondence with Michael Faraday about his ‘talk on the chemistry of a 
candle’ in 1850 (Winyard and Furneaux 4). His personal library contained voluminous 
science writing, much of it, contrary to the gossip bruited by Lewes, legitimate and important, 
including Darwin’s On the Origin of Species and Charles Lyell’s Geological Evidence of the 
Antiquity of Man (Winyard and Furneux 1; Fielding 205-06). 
 
What decides the issue, I think, is this: Dickens did not hold to any partitioning of 
science and ‘poetry’. We know he did not hold to it because of the review he wrote in 
December 1848 for the London newspaper The Examiner. The review was of a book – which, 
124 
Fielding avers, his close friend Forster probably set aside for him – called The Poetry of 
Science, Or Studies of the Physical Phenomena of Nature by a physicist-cum-geologist called 
Robert Hunt (Fielding 201). Though several scholars have already dined out on this fugitive 
morsel of Dickensian science journalism, it remains necessary to sketch what Dickens said. 
Here is the most illustrative passage, in which he observes that it is ‘salutary to the spirit of 
the age’ 
 
To show that the facts of science are at least as fully of poetry, as the most poetical fancies 
ever founded on an imperfect observation and a distant suspicion of them…[T]o show that if 
the Dryades no longer haunt the woods, there is, in every forest, in every tree, in every leaf, 
and in every ring on every sturdy trunk, always changing, always going on…and always 
leading the student from wonder to wonder, until he is wrapt and lost in the vast worlds of 
wonder. (Amusements 131) 
 
Dickens’ encomium to science does not end there. He defends science against those who held 
that it was ‘binding us, as some would have it, in stern utilitarian chains’. Moreover, 
seconding Wordsworth, he waxes giddy about the ‘ample compensation, in respect of poetry 
alone, that Science has given us in return for what she has taken away’, the latter including 
such fantastic inventions as ‘sirens, mermaids, shining cities glittering at the bottom of the 
quiet seas, and in deep lakes’, ‘the noted dragons of the fables’, and so on (132). Dickens’ 
enthusiasm for scientific discoveries is reinforced by the fact that his journal All the Year 
Round commissioned no fewer than three articles on The Origin of Species in 1860-61, all of 
them to varying degrees favourable (Fielding 201). Indeed, Fielding goes so far as to assert 
that ‘Dickens was a decided evolutionist about a dozen years before the Origin of Species’ 
(10). Dickens had been a convert to Robert Chambers’ incendiary, proto-evolutionary 1844 
pamphlet Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, the ‘famous’ work, as Gosse put it in 
Father and Son, ‘which had been supplying a sugar-and-water panacea for those who could 
not escape from the trend of evidence, and who yet clung to revelation’ (60). Chambers was a 
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gentleman amateur and a resourceful speculator in scientific ideas, ‘commendably well-
disposed toward new ideas that might possibly exhibit merit, however strange they might 
appear to his more cautious (and more scientifically experienced) contemporaries’ (Hutchison 
78). It is clear from Dickens’ review how much he shared Chambers’ cavalier temperament 
with regard to science. That is important, since it meant that like Chambers he cherished the 
‘strange’, the ‘ideas’ that distorted reality as it was seen at the time. Dickens’ review, then, is 
very interesting and useful. It shows that he had clearly nursed a passion for science. It also 
shows, in that line about ‘stern utilitarian chains’, a prefiguring of HT. But more than 
anything it shows Dickens’ conflation of science and fact with poetry and wonder, fidelity to 
the observed with the speculative. 
 
It is useful to think about what ‘wonder’ might be. The word is certainly precious to 
Dickens as a fecund heuristic, much as I have indicated ‘fancy’ was. Kara Elizabeth Wittman 
asserts that ‘the centrality of the term in Dickens’ work [has been] deemphasized, or 
overlooked completely’ (192-93). Moreover, she adds, ‘the move to provoke a sense of 
wonder is inherent in or constitutive of Dickens’ representational and narrative strategies’, 
although this is of a piece with her assertion that ‘wonder is immanent in the form of the 
novel’ (194). As I mentioned earlier, Stephen Greenblatt, meditating on the word, surmises 
that wonder 
 
is the quintessential human response to what Descartes calls a ‘first encounter…. [B]y 
definition wonder is an instinctive recognition of difference, the sign of heightened attention, 
‘a sudden surprise of the soul,’ as Descartes puts it…in the face of the new. The expression of 
wonder stands for all that cannot be understood, that can scarcely be believed. It calls attention 
to the problem of credibility and at the same time insists upon the undeniability, the exigency 
of the experience. (20) 
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By this standard, wonder is, to say the least, problematic in its guise as a scientific term. If it 
‘insists upon [its] undeniability’, its unfalsifiability, and if its expression ‘stands for all that 
cannot be understood’, then it stands against science, surely, and it is no wonder that 
Gradgrind and his colleagues are relentless invigilators against any utterance of the word 
‘wonder’(‘never wonder’ is the frequent injunction to students). Whether that stance ‘for all 
that cannot be understood, that can scarcely be believed’ is militant or passive, merely 
definitional – though necessarily indefinite – is moot. Wonder resides outside science’s 
purview, and is therefore impervious to it. Science, however, is not impervious to its 
imperviousness. A contributor to All the Year Round, anonymous as usual but sounding very 
much like his proprietor, wrote an article in 1859 called ‘Wonders Will Never Cease’ in 
which he suggested that ‘imagination…demands wonderful facts, false or true – but in either 
case strange matter that is credited’ (ATYR 497). While it had hitherto slaked ‘the common 
thirst for wonderment’, the contributor notes, superstition had been superseded, and this was 
no bad thing. Meanwhile, the ‘Marvels of Science’ were the pretenders to its position as the 
age’s wonder-dispenser. But from ‘false or true’ one infers that science needed not be other 
than an ersatz neo-superstition, and that pseudo-science was as entitled to prosper as the 
British Association for the Advancement of Science’s edifying enlightenment. Even in this, 
wonder could appear to debase the epistemological integrity of science. 
 
Yet there was, as I have suggested, a strain of thought resistant to all that I have just 
said. Its adherents propounded the view that it was science that was baleful, science that 
could not merely debase but annul wonder. Professor Teufelsdrockh in Sartor Resartus, 
prefiguring HT, records ‘that progress of Science, which is to destroy Wonder, and in its 
stead substitute Mensuration and Numeration…’ (104). And it is true that disciplinary 
standards were zealously guarded. Yeo finds that responses to Chambers’ book by scientists 
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were clearly meant ‘to ostracize the anonymous author from [their] ranks, to separate 
reputable science from irresponsible amateurism’ (‘Scientific Method’ 71). Their quarrel with 
Chambers was over methodology; they could not abide ‘the extent of hypothetical 
speculation in the book’ (‘Scientific Method’ 71). Though anatagonists such as David 
Brewster were themselves repudiators of the neo-Baconianism promulgated by John Herschel 
and all of British science before him, that a posteriori fundamentalism holding that facts 
preceded theories and were discrete from them, Chambers, both upstart and throwback, 
infringed their disciplinary conventions. ‘Non hypothesi fingo’, ‘avoid the fictions of 
hypothesis’, Levine quotes Newton as saying, and notes his nineteenth-century inheritors as 
espousing (Novelists 101). Speculation, a word that still made semantic oscillations across the 
ambiguous hinterland between this sort of abstract hypothesis and practical observation, was 
frivolous and unbecoming: 
 
We must not direct the unformed youthful mind to launch its little bark upon the waters of 
speculation, till all the agitation of discovery, with its consequent fluctuation and controversy, 
has well subsided. (Whewell 521) 
 
As Yeo observes, those ‘gentlemen of science’ like Brewster and Whewell ‘stressed the 
methods of scientific thinking rather than scientific facts’, and while ostensibly this seems to 
align them with the Chambers-Hunt-Dickens nexus, the meaning of ‘scientific thinking’ was 
contentious (‘Scientific Method’ 78). To be ‘wrapt and lost in the vast worlds of wonder’ was 
no place for a scientist, the attendant speculation no way for a scientist to think. As John 
Herschel notes in his 1831 work Preliminary Discourse, the human mind’s pesky disposal to 
‘speculation’ means that ‘on the least idea of an analogy between a few phenomena, it leaps 
forward, as it were, to a cause or law’, intoxicated by its caprice (164). ‘[E]ven the return of 
comets…has ceased to amaze’, he says elsewhere in the work, as if rebutting Dickens in 
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advance; ‘the age of mere wonder in such things is past, and men prefer being guided and 
enlightened, to being astonished and dazzled’ (27). An enthusiasm such as Dickens’ in his 
review for ‘the coming of some unknown body through the realms of space’ is, in Herschel’s 
words, ‘[un]enlightened’ (132). 
 
* 
 
Ostensibly, though, Dickens’ enthusiasm for scientific discovery and its ‘ample 
compensation’ is not clear, to put it mildly, from his ‘philosophical treatise on science’ HT 
(Nixon 288). For a start, the dedicatee is Carlyle, whom Dickens told ‘it contains nothing in 
which you do not think with me, for no man knows your books better than I’ (HT 274). It is 
salient that M’Choakumchild discards Coleridge’s embellishing ‘corolla and fragrance’ in his 
exchange with Sissy over the desirability of ‘a carpet having a representation of flowers upon 
it’ (11). In that, it appears to treat science as, in the words of Conrad, ‘the unveiling of…those 
heartless secrets which are called the Laws of Nature’ (233). A reading might employ 
Matthew Arnold’s Culture and Anarchy, in which, as James G. Paradis writes, 
‘“machinery”…stood for the rigidity, literal-mindedness, and passion for law that Arnold felt 
inspired those who consider the methods of science a sufficient model for the cultural ideal’ 
(161). It might note Arnold’s recollection of a student at one of the schools he inspected 
translating the line from Macbeth, ‘Can’st thou not minister to a mind diseased’, into ‘Can 
you not wait upon a lunatic?’ (Essays 343). This Arnold deplores as barbarous and offensive 
to all people of sensibility. He then proceeds to imagine an educational system where 
children knew ‘that the moon is two thousand one hundred and sixty miles in diameter’ and 
yet could tender nothing better than this paraphrase. Or, dare one utter it, the hypothetical 
reading might simply note the education Edmund Gosse professes to have had in Father and 
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Son. Dickens was an ally of Edmund’s father: the articles in All the Year Round mentioned 
below cleave more to Philip Gosse’s naturalism than to Darwin’s, explicitly adducing 
Gosse’s work in ‘Under the Microscope’. He might, then, have been aware of Gosse père’s 
educational methods: 
 
Never in all my early childhood did anyone address to me the affecting preamble, ‘Once upon 
a time!’ I was told about missionaries, but never about pirates; I was familiar with 
hummingbirds, but I had never heard of fairies—Jack the Giant- Killer, Rumpelstiltskin and 
Robin Hood were not of my acquaintance; and though I understood about wolves, Little Red 
Ridinghood was a stranger even by name. So far as my ‘dedication’ was concerned, I can but 
think that my parents were in error thus to exclude the imaginary from my outlook upon facts. 
They desired to make me truthful; the tendency was to make me positive and sceptical. Had 
they wrapped me in the soft folds of supernatural fancy, my mind might have been longer 
content to follow their traditions in an unquestioning spirit. (17) 
 
‘[W]rapped me in the soft folds of supernatural fancy’ sounds exactly like ‘wrapt and lost in 
the vast worlds of wonder’, the inculcation of ‘facts’ at the expense of fairy tales and ‘the 
imaginary’ as depicted in HT. And yet the novel does not so much look forward to any of 
those texts as hearken back, but not to the Poetry of Science review. Between October 1837 
and September 1838 Dickens published two facetious squibs on the meetings of ‘The Mudfog 
Association For the Advancement of Everything’ that, as Michael Slater notes, anticipate the 
tone and concerns of HT (Boz 513). The pieces are coloured by a juvenile parochialism and 
the satire is indiscriminate, yoking science with the ‘stern utilitarian chains’ where the later 
text is more nuanced. Yet there is in the following, for example, the same tone and tenor, the 
same satire of the Utililitarian notion that children be put through the John Stuart Mill and 
come out as prodigies: 
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‘[The children] had not the slightest conception of the commonest principles of 
mathematics, and considered Sindbad the Sailor the most enterprising voyager that the world 
had ever produced. 
‘A Member strongly deprecating the use of all the other books mentioned, suggested 
that Jack and Gill might perhaps be exempted from the general censure, inasmuch as the hero 
and heroine, in the very outset of the tale, were depicted as going up a hill to fetch a pail of 
water, which was a laborious and useful occupation.’ (Boz 527) 
 
Such writing was not the exclusive province of Dickens, though; far from it. Concurrent with 
the establishment of those aforementioned scientific organisations – one of which, the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science, was the butt of Dickens’ mockery here – was 
the emergence of rebarbative scientific parodies much like this. As Paradis writes, there was 
‘friction and an extraordinary range of argument as Victorian society sought accommodation 
with the rapid consolidation of sciences’. Amid this welter of subversive ideas, he continues, 
‘[i]rony, and its militant form, satire, was an important Victorian choice for expressing the 
difficulty of assimilating science and its trends’ (146-47). Thus, as Paradis goes on to 
illustrate, there were many upstart scribblers like Dickens, many of them his acquaintances, 
who were employing ‘irony’ or ‘satire’ to fleer at the ‘farcical scientific proceeding, which 
was used from the late 1830s through the 1870s’ (154). One of these, Albert Smith, later to be 
a close friend of Dickens’, published in 1848 his Natural History of the Idler Upon Town; it 
was what Margaret A. Rose calls a work of ‘mock anthropology’, and what his publisher 
slyly advertised as ‘Social Zoologies’ (40). Rose notes that ‘Smith’s “physiologies” of the 
idler… speak of several types or categories of the same as idlers, mooners, and loungers so 
as… to ironically imitate the more scientific physiology’ (41). 
 
Dickens’ novel likewise makes great sport with scientific discourse. As we see early 
on, Thomas Gradgrind, the ossified educator of Coketown, wandering among Mr Sleary’s 
travelling circus and alighting on a group of children, ‘took his eyeglasses out…. 
131 
Phenomenon almost incredible though distinctly seen, what did he then behold but his own 
metallurgical Louisa peeping with all her might through a hole’ (15). ‘Phenomenon 
incredible though distinctly seen’ is focalised through Gradgrind and his monocle, unable to 
see his own daughter except as a ‘phenomenon’. Later, and more wittily, we are told of ‘the 
daring vaulting act…the Wild Huntsman of the North American Prairies’22 comprising the 
circus performer Childers and ‘his infant son’ – in reality his co-performer – Kidderminster, 
the latter 
 
being carried upside down over his father’s shoulder, by one foot, and held by the crown of 
his head, heels upwards, in the palm of his father’s hand, according to the violent paternal 
manner in which wild huntsmen may be observed to fondle their offspring. (27) 
 
The last line here is one of exquisite bathos, a Gradgrindian anthropological observation that 
seeks, with absurd feebleness, to regulate the foregoing irregularity. That is, it seeks to put 
the ‘upside down’ aright and bring it back down to earth by giving this performance a 
spurious context, the context having been credulously extrapolated from the title of the show. 
The incursion of what is really a pseudo-scientific register – who has ever ‘observed’ this? – 
is funny because it misses the vital point that none of the act is real. The ‘Wild Huntsman of 
the North American Prairies’ is just schtick, the patter used to cloak the central stunt in 
narrative. It may have been with such an example in mind that James Clerk Maxwell 
remarked in 1871 that, owing to the cultural ascendance of science, ‘the most absurd opinions 
may become current, provided they are expressed in language, the sound of which recalls 
some well-known scientific phrase’ (‘Scientific Method’ 79). In HT, these travesties of 
scientific discourse become as pervasive as the black muck benighting Coketown. ‘This 
                                                 
22 This recalls ‘the Indian Savage and the Maiden’, the ballet interpretation of a Native American seduction in 
Nicholas Nickleby (64). The description of the dance allows Dickens to flaunt the trusty comic device of 
deadpan literalism, itself not far from the defamiliarisation Shklvosky finds in Tolstoy. Pip indulges in the same 
when he watches Mr Wopsle’s Hamlet. Tore Rem is very insightful on these matters (235-36). 
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observation must be limited exclusively to his daughter’, the narrator tells us at one point, as 
if making a note on an experiment (51). 
 
The avatar of this discourse is Bitzer, the precocious idiot-savant of Gradgrind’s 
‘model’ school where the pedagogical units of ‘hard facts’ are meted out. Bitzer’s brain 
seems almost completely impervious to the non-literal: he is perplexed, or at least pretends to 
be, by the question ‘Do you have a heart?’, supplying its self-evident answer with reference 
to ‘the facts established by [William] Harvey’ (211). As with Harthouse – who is ‘touched in 
the cavity where his heart should have been’ – the heart is, to borrow Levine’s borrowing of 
Hopkins’s phrase, ‘in hiding’ (HT 172; Novelists 214). One even finds that ‘a complaint of 
the heart’ afflicts the railway station as the train arrives to take Louisa toward her reckoning 
and reformation (159). Furthermore, the heart’s surreptitious industry is what saves Louisa: 
as Gradgrind acknowledges, ‘“what the Head had left undone and could not do, the Heart 
may have been doing silently”’ (166). Dickens is satirising and repudiating the view that 
Lord Kelvin would come to express, a pursuit he enjoyed elsewhere in his writing23. 
Focalising again through Gradgrind as he walks toward Coketown with Josiah Bounderby at 
the beginning of chapter five, the narrator tells us that ‘what you couldn’t state in 
figures…was not, and never should be’, ‘state in figures’ being virtually identical to Kelvin’s 
‘express in numbers’ (23). 
 
* 
 
                                                 
23 Dickens’ disdain for ‘rule and line’, to introduce Keats’s synecdoche again, is apparent in the high-handed 
squib ‘Mr Barlow’, where he writes that the eponymous character ‘would have proved, by map and compass, 
that there was no such kingdom as the delightful kingdom of Casgar’ (Uncommercial 373). To adapt 
Chesterton’s quip, Mr Barlow is the man who would prove that Micawber never lived. 
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The fictional world of HT is consumed with observation. Surveillance recurs throughout the 
novel. Mrs Pegler owns up to having looked at her son Mr Bounderby ‘once a year, when he 
has never knowed it’ (193). If Stone Lodge is what Tom Jr calls a ‘Jaundiced Gaol’, if Tom is 
later ‘an inmate of Bounderby’s house’, then Coketown is a Benthamite panopticon, with the 
‘evil eye’ of the Sun watching over it (43, 71, 86). Early on in Barnaby Rudge, John Willet is 
described as a kind of Argus, the mythical hundred-eyed giant: ‘he seemed all eyes from head 
to foot’ (5). In rather the same way, there is a description of Bounderby’s housekeeper Mrs. 
Sparsit that refers in a peculiar construction to ‘the dark eyes of her body’ (156). Further, 
Stephen dreams that ‘there was not one pitying or friendly eye among the millions that were 
fastened on his face’ (68). But Coketown can also be read as a giant experiment, much as the 
‘model’ schools and their ‘model’ students and teachers are part of an experiment, each a 
scientific replication as well as a dehumanised industrial product. 
 
I bring up observation because I think it is of no little significance here. To return to 
Darwin’s autobiography, there is a passage in it where he modestly records his superiority ‘in 
noticing things which easily escape attention, and in observing them carefully…in the 
observation and collection of facts’ (55). A central rupture in HT, if perhaps one that has 
easily escaped attention, is that between those two things Darwin mentions last: observation 
and facts. Let me be clear that by ‘observation’ I do not simply mean the way Gradgrind fails 
to observe, say, that his ‘system’, as he calls it, is loathed. Rather, I mean the rupture between 
scientific observation and the desiccated ‘Facts’. The former does not, if you like, irrigate the 
latter. This rupture is bodied forth, I submit, in that difference between the novel’s beginning 
and end I alluded to at this chapter’s beginning. Dickens is more astute than he is given credit 
for in his exploration of this. He will, in an identical vein to that of the earlier examples I 
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gave, deftly parody the language of scientific process. Talking about the changes wrought by 
age, the narrator writes: 
 
Young Thomas and Sissy being both at such a stage of their working up, these changes were 
effected in a year or two; while Mr Gradgrind himself seemed stationary in his course, and 
underwent no alteration. (72-73) 
 
The register alters in Gradgrind’s clause, as if he were himself an experiment, the last three 
words finally betraying this sense (an equally deft touch it is, too, that Young Thomas and 
Sissy are ‘working up’). But this is inaccurate, for the novel is concerned with, I suggest, how 
unobservant this type of scientific process is; how, as the novel says, ‘Reason…and its big 
dumb shape set up with a sightless stare, never to be moved by anything but so many 
calculated tons of leverage’ (148). The problem is that it is not simply ‘Reason’ without 
‘Fancy’, without ‘Imagination’, but ‘Reason’ with a ‘sightless stare’, ‘Reason’ without 
observation of the ordinary kind, unleavened by it and impoverished because of that. A few 
pages later this is reinforced: 
 
As if an astronomical observatory should be made without windows, and the astronomer 
within should arrange the starry universe solely by pen, ink, and paper, so Mr Gradgrind in his 
Observatory…had no need to cast an eye upon the teeming myriads of human beings around 
him, but could settle all their destinies on a slate. (75) 
 
In his review of The Poetry of Science, Dickens’ encomium to scientific discovery was in part 
an encomium to what he called ‘two astronomers, far apart, each looking from his solitary 
study up into the sky, [who] observe, in a known star, a trembling which forewarns them of 
the coming of some unknown body through the realms of space’ (132). These he called 
‘professor[s] of an exact science’. ‘Exact science’, then, need not be arid; what makes it so in 
Gradgrindian pedagogy is observation, and hence the chance to be ‘wrapt and lost in the vast 
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worlds of wonder’, being proscribed (‘never wonder’). Louisa Gradgrind looking through an 
aperture into the circus booth, for example, is scandalous.24 
 
Moreover, it is worth pointing out that whereas the dogma of ‘Facts’ exists almost a 
priori, observation where it does take place usually exists without facts in the novel. There is 
again a notable disjunction between ‘observation’ and ‘facts’. Mrs Sparsit’s sedulous ‘cat-like 
observation’ of Louisa and James Harthouse’s affair, culminating in her sodden vigil in the 
bushes at Bounderby’s retreat as the two conduct their final rendezvous, is obviated by the 
fact that no such affair has taken place nor is one desired by Louisa, who leaves not to attend 
a tryst at Harthouse’s, as Mrs. Sparsit believes, but to avoid one. Likewise, Mrs Pegler comes 
yearly to observe her son Bounderby, never once intervening in his life, and thereby 
remaining unaware of what a hectoring, vainglorious cretin he is. Stephen Blackpool’s ‘being 
seen – night after night – watching the Bank’, an intelligence Bounderby loudly puts about, is 
a fiction that yields the further fiction that Blackpool was the bank robbery’s culprit. And of 
course, to return to the earlier quote about the ‘wild huntsman’ and his offspring-fondling, the 
‘violent paternal manner’ is not really ‘observed’, as it says, at all. Or, rather, the observation 
is false and the extrapolation anyhow does not follow from it. It is the weakest sort of 
induction, imputing to wild huntsmen an imagined set of behaviours. 
 
                                                 
24 Indeed, more scandalous than it appears, for there were actual restrictions on observation by women. The 
Literary Gazette thundered that permitting ladies to attend the BAAS’s ‘Sections’ was ‘utterly inconsistent with 
the scientific pursuits of the Association, and subversive of the purposes for which it has been instituted’ 
(Morrell and Thackray 457). Further, Beer, citing Huxley’s charge that women would be responsible for 
‘hindering the progress of...science’, indeed for its ‘degradation’, notes that to this mentality ‘Observing is a 
strong and objective activity when undertaken by professional men’, but ‘the presence of other, uninitiated 
observers, whether they be workers or women’ would seem to undermine those virtues, to be ‘subversive’ of 
their licit undertaking (Open Fields 205, 206). Observation was licensed and therefore political, determined as it 
was by a cartel. Dickens, probably obtuse on this point, here blunders his way into satire. The politics are 
outside the ken of this chapter but the circumscription is still pertinent. Coincidentally, of those whose futures 
are foretold at the novel’s end, Bounderby’s and Gradgrind’s ability to see them is disavowed; only Louisa’s is 
not. 
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Yet perhaps, one might say, it is my observation that is false. Certainly, the remarks I 
have just been making may seem to be gainsaid by a fact, a nuisance exchange hard upon the 
action’s denouement. Louisa and Sissy seek intelligence on Tom’s safety and whereabouts, 
and Sleary directs them to ‘“take a peep at the Ring”’ (207). The two ‘“find a thpy-hole”’ 
each, ‘a chink in the boards’, and gaze at the figures arrayed there. What they see is a tableau 
of props and characters from ‘Jack the Giant killer’, which one infers from the fact that the 
‘two comic black thervanth’ are ‘twithe ath big ath the [prop] houthe’ to be a slapstick 
rendering of the fairy tale (‘a piethe of comic infant bithnith’). Sleary exhorts the two girls to 
look at what they see again and more closely, though neither is able to apprehend his design. 
‘“Look at ‘em again”, said Sleary, “look at ‘em well”’, yet still they do not see, and only ‘see’ 
when told. ‘“Ith a fact”’, Sleary says of his illusion, not without irony. He adds that ‘“even 
knowin’ it, you couldn’t put your finger on him”’. If observation has succeeded, it has done 
so by default. 
 
We can see from both the Examiner review and from HT that Dickens sought after a 
type of science that would, as he said all representations and studies ought to in the 
‘Preliminary Word’ to his journal Household Words: ‘show to all, that in familiar things, 
even in those which are repellent on the surface, there is Romance enough’ (Amusements 
177). Penetrating surfaces – noticing things that, in Darwin’s words, ‘easily escape attention’ 
– is what is important here. It is what Bitzer, and the whole ‘hard facts’ project with him, 
does not do. As Levine notes, Dickens was ‘particularly fascinated by the minutiae revealed 
under the microscope – the dramatic disparity between what is visible to the naked eye and 
what is really there’ (Novelists 126). In an essay for All the Year Round in September 1859 
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that Levine rather boldly attributes to Dickens, though it remains apocryphal25, the author 
declares: 
 
we venture to say that the poet who spoke of butterflies kissing the sweet lips of the 
flower…never looked through a microscope at that flat coiled tongue bristling with hairs and 
armed with hooks, rifling and spoiling like a thing of worse fame, but of no worse life. 
(Novelists 126; ATYR 490) 
 
As Levine goes on to say, Dickens had the ‘instinctive view that matter of fact is really 
mysterious and wonderful’, seconding Beer, who noted this and also that ‘the study of “fact” 
was for Dickens… an exploration of the fantastic’, not at all like the deformations of HT, 
fetishising as they do hermetic ‘fact’ so that, by eliding this first look through the microscope 
(or, for Louisa, through the ‘hole in a deal board’), they omit all observation and therefore all 
experience (Novelists 127; Plots 74). For Dickens here, what might be called poetic 
knowledge, failing to show the ‘romantic side of familiar things’, is discredited; it leaves us, 
if you like, Imagination without Observation (of the scientific kind: note the capital O). This 
is the fervid Imagination culpable in that erroneous truckling to the specious trill of 
convention, ‘butterflies kissing the sweet lips of the flower’ (although, poor old Shelley 
might counter, it is Dickens whose attention something has easily escaped, since it is a moth 
that does the kissing, not a butterfly). This is what Dickens meant in his review when he 
spoke of ‘the most poetical fancies ever founded on an imperfect observation’. Yet, while 
showing this, Dickens also shows how it is nevertheless subsumed into the scientific 
discovery, the science’s ‘form of flesh and blood’, in Wordsworth’s words, imbued with the 
‘divine spirit’ of poetry to become ‘a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man’. Or 
as HT puts it, we are given ‘Reason through the tender light of Fancy’. 
                                                 
25 Levine gives no evidence for this attribution in Darwin and the Novelists or, as nearly as I can tell, any other 
of his erudite books. The piece he refers to is not in the Slater Gone Astray or the Slater and Drew 
Uncommercial Traveller, nor is it in Harry Stone’s editions of the Uncollected Writings. I believe the attribution 
remains intact the 1992 edition. 
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* 
 
I am using ‘observation’, and ‘Observation’, heuristically and doubtless too loosely. Yet there 
are appreciable distinctions to be made between types of observation. As Chapple notes, the 
French scientist E. Geoffroy Saint Hillaire held in 1830 that ‘I observe facts merely, and go 
no further’, as if the scientist were nothing more than a sentinel whose task it was to accrue 
‘facts’ (17). This impoverished construction of science and the scientist’s place is not quite 
the construction of science in HT, however, as I have tried to show; there science has its 
‘sightless stare’. But it is no less denuded. For what does it mean to ‘observe facts’, with the 
implicit Baconian sundering of observation from theory? What is a ‘fact’? The siblings in 
Dickens’ ‘tender’ little tale ‘A Child’s Dream of a Star’, ‘wonder[ing] all day long’, 
‘wondered at the height and blueness of the sky’ (Amusements 185-86). It might be observed 
as a ‘fact’ that in daylight, people with normal eyesight register a clear sky as blue. Yet this 
‘fact’ is also deceptive, since it conceals what one might say are more factual ‘facts’: the 
blueness is illusory, the product of scattered light. The great scientific explicator John 
Tyndall’s 1870 lecture ‘Scientific Use of the Imagination’ conveys this limpidly: ‘an undue 
fraction of the smaller waves is scattered by the particles, and, as a consequence, in the 
scattered light, blue will be the predominant colour’ (114-15). In fact, so to speak, the ‘sky’ 
itself is illusory, a kind of descriptive convention. It is the strata of invisible spheres, with no 
practical application as a term. In much the same way, Darwin and others felt that ‘species’ 
were what Levine calls ‘mere conventions of thought’; while the term itself was, in Darwin’s 
words, ‘“one arbitrarily given for the sake of convenience”’ despite his famous employment 
of it (Novelists 98). Tyndall explains that as the Sun lowers and therefore gets farther away, 
‘the transmitted light,’ as distinct from the scattered shorter waves responsible for the blue 
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sky, ‘must pass from yellow through orange to red’ (115). Likewise, the author of ‘Under the 
Microscope’, writing about ‘blood disks’, notes that ‘Alone, they are simply of a light 
yellowish tinge, as a mass they are a deep bright scarlet’ (487). In both cases, the observable 
phenomena are paradoxically truth and illusion at the same time, fact and its refutation, as 
even the observed butterfly is not. 
 
The clearest example in HT would be the presentation of Tom in his gaudy kit to his 
father, ‘In a preposterous coat…with cuffs and flaps exaggerated to an unspeakable extent…’ 
and so on, despite the incredibility of which Tom’s identity remains obscured: ‘Mr Gradgrind 
never could by any other means have believed in [the outfit], weighable and measurable fact 
though this was’ (208). Here, as with Louisa’s ‘exclamation, partly of distress, partly of 
satisfaction’ at the same fact, we have an expression of wonder precisely as Greenblatt 
defined it, ‘call[ing] attention to the problem of credibility and at the same time insist[ing] 
upon the undeniability, the exigency of the experience’; or perhaps even better, his comment 
upon citing an excerpt from Paradise Lost: ‘The transformation of the rebel angels is at once 
unbelievable and true’ (20-21). What Gradgrind is seeing is ‘at once unbelievable and true’, 
illusion and truth. Moreover, it is the very absurdity of the apparel and make-up – 
‘preposterous’, ‘exaggerated’, ‘full of holes’, the make-up running down his face – the very 
‘problem of credibility’, that sustain the persuasiveness of their deception, almost as if they 
were an after-image in a thaumatrope (‘literally, “wonder-turner”’) or phenakistiscope 
(‘literally, “deceptive view”’) (Crary 105, 109). An observer like Hillaire, ‘going no further’ 
according to his precept, would be liable to interpret the ‘fact’ of the sky’s blueness or 
blood’s redness as homogenous and self-sustaining. As I have suggested, though, facts are 
never like this; they exist in a continuum, not a vacuum. They are theory reservists, always 
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waiting for an imagination to conscript them into service, the permanent constituents of 
explanations live, lost and still to be made. A theory or explanation is just realised facts. 
 
None of which, of course, I say because it is profound or original. My purpose is 
merely to indicate the necessity of imagination. What Dickens intuits, I think, is the necessity 
of a transfiguring ‘fanciful imagination’ to science. If, as Tyndall’s lecture derisively notes, 
‘There are tories even in science who regard imagination as a faculty to be feared and 
avoided rather than employed,’ Dickens was one of the earliest whigs (103). To return to my 
earlier point, the necessity of ‘fanciful imagination’ is one Darwin intuited early on too: as 
Beer writes, one of the two books he took with him on the Beagle, and the only one he kept 
with him always, was a collection of Milton’s poetry (Open Fields 34; DP 5). This chimes 
with Robert Hunt’s assertion that ‘The philosophy of physical science is a grand epic, the 
record of natural science a great didactic poem,’ which suggestively conflates Milton’s grand 
didactic epics and nature (401). G.H. Lewes himself eventually came to recognise it. As he 
wrote in 1865, ‘both poet and [natural] philosopher draw their power from the energy of their 
mental vision – an energy which disengages the mind from the somnolence of habit…’ 
(Principles 18). Peter Allan Dale notes that Lewes’s construction of scientific discovery 
becomes akin to the aesthetic ‘principle of vision…a power of “insight” into the unapparent, 
typical structure of things’. It is the same ‘principle of vision’ affirmed throughout HT and 
figured fantastically in its last chapter. Lewes goes on to say, in his final work Problems of 
Life and Mind, that ‘The grandest discoveries…have revealed by the telescope of Imagination 
what the microscope of observation could never have seen’ (in Dale 107). 
 
One finds Hopkins coming to a similar conclusion, although for utterly different 
reasons; it is a view of scientific observation that belies the one ascribed to him by Nixon. 
141 
Beer gives a précis of it, declaring that in Hopkins’s view, one ‘must look from a point of 
view contrary to the ordinary’ and that ‘[n]ew circumstances… can make things fresh…de-
familiarization can make things seem new’ (Open Fields 253). Likewise, she writes of 
Darwin that he also felt a ‘pleasure in “making strange”, in skimming off the familiar and 
restoring it, enriched and stabilised… fulfilling, bodying forth, and replenishing what has 
appeared humdrum, inexplicable, or taken for granted’ (Plots 75). In Hopkins and Darwin as 
in Lewes, there obtains the belief that a foundation of scientific discovery is in making things 
‘fresh’; in a ‘de-famliarisation’, a hypotyposis, that ‘disengages the mind from the 
somnolence of habit’; in ‘renew[ing] the fullness of thing in themselves’, which, Beer writes, 
Darwin sought (Plots 40). They are all of them Coleridge’s spawn, the Coleridge who 
valiantly opposes the depredations of ‘custom’, averring that ‘genius’ is the ability ‘to 
represent familiar objects as to awaken in the minds of others a kindred feeling concerning 
them, and that freshness of sensation’, thereby retrieving ‘the most admitted truths from the 
impotence caused by the very circumstance of their universal admission’ (Biographia 48-49). 
So Lewes, for example, will write that ‘Ordinary men live among marvels and feel no 
wonder, grow familiar with objects and learn nothing new about them’ (18). 
 
In his essay ‘Fishes in the Trees’, A.D. Nuttall talks about hypotyposis’s kindred trope 
Impossibilia. This mode is, as its name suggests, a vacation from the verisimilar. Rather as 
hypotyposis features lions in northern countries, in Barthes’s terms, Impossibilia is ‘a way of 
talking about what could never happen, the absurd’; although at other, more respectable 
times, it is redeemed from this faintly shabby occupation and cast ‘as a way of describing 
miracles’ (Stoic 76). Usually, however, the term retains the pejorative connotations of the 
former: Nuttall’s essay begins with Horace, and the Ars Poetica’s disparagement of 
prodigialiters, those who substitute fantastic dissembling for good noticing, puffing up their 
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jerry-written verse with the leaven of tawdry marvels (Stoic 70). It is, to Horace, a dereliction 
of probity, an unethical shortcut. Yet, the Renaissance Italian critic Minturno asserts, ‘No one 
can be called a poet who does not excel in the power of arousing wonder’, and as Nuttall 
makes plain, Horace is not averse to a spot of Impossibilia himself: the poet is too good to 
obey the prohibitions of his austere critical strictures (Greenblatt 79). What is especially 
noteworthy about these manifestations is that they are not always on furlough in the fantastic; 
they are, indeed, very far from an abdication of seriousness. ‘Only a bad poet, Horace says, 
would give us fishes in trees’, a precept he violates in his own Odes. Moreover, as Nuttall 
indicates, trees are quite apt to be fruitful of fish on occasion of a flood. In the same way, 
there is preternatural insight in this ‘deliberately extravagant conjuration’ (Stoic 77). Nuttall 
relates a ‘slave in Lycophron’s Alexandra who sought to apprise King Priam of his danger by 
telling him how once before the dolphin browsed on the oat, the acorn and the grape’ (Stoic 
77). And, indeed, that is approximately what the dolphin once did. ‘Pigs grow[ing] wings’ is 
a figure of incongruity to Horace, but it is not so very removed from the notion of dolphins 
growing legs, vestiges of which are extant in the dolphin’s skeleton and those of other aquatic 
mammals. 
 
The writer of science in the nineteenth century was, whatever stern sobriety of style 
he practised and espoused, engaged in such Impossibilia, such hypotyposis. Darwin was a 
writer who, as Horace puts it, ‘to vary his subject in the / most marvellous way paints the 
dolphin in the woods’ (in Stoic 68). In the first edition of The Origin of Species, he reports 
another’s observation of a black bear in North America swimming around in water with its 
mouth open, catching insects, ‘like a whale’; he speculates fantastically on ‘a race of bears’ 
being gradually metamorphosed into leviathans ‘as monstrous as a whale’ (184). It is 
instructive that for Baroque prodigialiter Saint-Amant ‘[i]t was a matter of no small 
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delight…that in the southern hemisphere (where the world really is reversed) there really are 
flying fishes’ (in Stoic 71). Darwin shares his wonderment, and essays a conjecture as bold as 
the flying fish’s ‘glide through the air’, transmitting with all the literary graces he could 
summon the smacks of pleasure he felt in its world-reversing emancipations: 
 
[I]t is conceivable that flying fish, which now glide through the air, slightly rising and turning 
by the aid of their fluttering fins, might have been modified into perfectly winged animals. If 
this had been effect, who would have ever imagined that in an early transitional state they had 
been inhabitants of the open ocean[?] (137) 
 
Who indeed. It is worth dwelling on this point further, for Darwin seems to be conceding that 
scientific observation would little avail one in respect to his hypothetical flying fish: its 
perfection would resist detection. His use of the word ‘imagined’ recognises that only an 
imaginative conceit even more daring than his own would suffice. It is striking how 
Dickensian Lamarck – who had the right idea the wrong way round, as it were – sounds when 
he is postulating his explanations for the unique characteristics of certain animals. The 
giraffe, like the platypus a walking Impossibilia (Camelo-pardalis, as Lamarck tell us, or 
‘camel leopard’), is ‘obliged’ by its food source to cultivate a longer neck and thereby fore-
legs longer than its hind ones (in Carey 59). It is an extraordinary notion, verily a piece of 
‘fanciful imagination’. That Dickensian tone is not surprising, really, for as the great scientist 
Hermann von Helmholtz declared in his lecture ‘On Thought in Medicine’: 
 
The first discovery of a new law, is the discovery of a similarity which has hitherto been 
concealed in the course of natural processes. It is a manifestation of that which our forefathers 
in a serious sense described as “wit”, it is of the same quality as the highest performances of 
artistic perception in the discovery of new types of expression’. (Open Fields 180-81) 
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The ‘first discovery’ is akin to ‘artistic perception’. Again, penetrating the surface is what 
matters; and, indeed, we find Lewes and Tyndall making an identical point about 
‘conceal[ment]’: the one, extolling ‘the independent mind’, finding that by its preternatural 
insight ‘the link so long hidden, has now been made visible to us; the other, that ‘hidden 
things to be revealed’ is the business of science (Lewes 18; Tyndall 103). But more important 
is how those hidden things are revealed, how the hidden link is made visible. To return to 
Hunt for a moment, it is his pious hope that ‘those minds which are allowed the privilege of 
tracing out [a grain of dust’s] marvellous properties’ may bring the laity closer to God, and in 
so doing may grant those minds admission ‘to that infinite power to which the great secrets of 
creation will be unveiled’ (410). Tyndall submits this to an iconoclastic reversal, however, 
finding that there is ‘a power of expansion – I might almost call it a power of creation – 
which is brought into play by the simple brooding upon facts’, going so far as to insinuate 
that our theistic beliefs may have been borne from this faculty (106). The ignition of 
discovery transmutes nature’s clerics into its gods. The wicked effrontery of Tyndall’s 
amusing thrust is not the point; rather, it is that he is, like Helmholtz but to a greater extent, 
acknowledging the scientist’s fraternity with the creative artist. The scientist’s creativeness is 
no longer the sinister kind of a Frankenstein but the legitimate one of ordinary scientific 
praxis. And if it takes ‘wit’ to make the discoveries, it takes wit to convey them. Jeff Wallace 
writes of Darwin that the ‘animation’ in his prose is 
 
borne out of the realisation that some mental energy and projection is required on the part of 
his reader to envisage some of the practical effects of the abstract process of species “striving 
to increase at a geometrical ratio”. (32) 
 
That is important to note. Insofar as novels have points, a variant of this is a basic point of 
HT: that language gets it wrong, fails at its mimetic task, when it aspires to ‘get[ting] the 
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description just right’, for that ‘get[ting] the description just right’ does not renew the fullness 
of things in themselves. Bitzer’s description of a horse – ‘Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty 
teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-teeth and twelve incisors…’ – Peter Brooks 
correctly pronounces ‘flawless and hopeless’, for it contains an impeccable taxonomic profile 
that does nothing at all to convey the animal (HT 9; Brooks 41). The reason for its 
hopelessness is indicated by that quote from Shklovsky, setting forth his concept of 
defamiliarisation: the purpose of art is ‘to make us feel objects, to make a stone feel stony’ 
(Sher 6). What Bitzer does not do, and why his description is ‘hopeless’, is that, as Brooks 
notes, he does not make the horse horsy. What Dickens seeks is for language that, like ‘the 
image’ in Shklovsky, ‘allow[s] us to perceive the object in a special way, in short, to lead us 
to a “vision” of this object rather than mere “recognition”’ (Shklovsky 10).26 All the counting 
serves only to subtract from its presence in the mind’s eye, not the ‘the bodily eye’, although 
it is notable that in the description of Bitzer just before his performance he is, like Gradgrind, 
unseeing: ‘His cold eyes would hardly have been eyes, but for the short ends of lashes 
which… expressed their form’ (9). There is no ‘complete and scientific view’, to borrow 
Whewell’s phrasing; indeed, it took the mechanical eye of the camera to observe the true gait 
of the horse in full stride, famously reproving the rank inaccuracy of great observers like 
Degas (Whewell 94). In exactly the same way as Bitzer’s inventory of a horse, Macauley’s 
invented zoological description of a porcupine, which, with its talk of ‘grinders’ and such, 
Dickens must surely have seen, is also ‘hopeless’: 
 
[O]f the genus mammalia, and the order glires. There are whiskers on its face; it is two feet 
long; it has four toes before, five behind, two fore teeth, and eight grinders. Its body is covered 
with hair and quills. (in Chapple 148) 
 
                                                 
26 For consistency, I have kept Sher’s translations here despite their clunkiness. An alternative translation of the 
first point, for example, is ‘art exists so that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel 
things, to make the stone stony’ (Lodge 20). This seems preferable. 
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As Macauley asks rhetorically, ‘when all this is said, would any one of the auditors have 
formed a just idea of a porcupine?’ (148). The risk of language sponsored by ‘fanciful 
imagination’ is that it may not engender a ‘just idea’, may indeed be riotously, perfidiously 
unjust; for it must be that dual agent, compound of truth and illusion: the ‘deep bright scarlet’ 
mass of blood that comprises only ‘light yellowish’ discs, the ‘black thervant’ who is 
unrecognisably Tom. Postivist language, that ‘patent de-odorized and non resonant 
language’, as George Eliot calls it, expressing only what can be measured in an object needs 
must fail at getting that object’s measure; ‘it may be a perfect medium of expression to 
science,’ Eliot continues, ‘but will never express life, which is a great deal more than science’ 
(in Plots 34). Mimesis is got wrong in these ways and others time and again in HT. There is a 
covert joke in M’Choakumchild’s admonition that ‘You don’t find that foreign birds and 
butterflies come and perch upon your crockery’; perhaps intentionally, it alludes to the tale 
about the classical Greek painter Zeuxis, whose portrait of grapes was so exact that it had 
birds pecking at them (HT 11; Halliwell 3). The illusory fecundity is so potent that it creates 
its own reality, sanctions its own truthfulness. For the birds’ part, their delectation is as 
understandable as that of patrons who thrill to the spry mendacity of Heston Blumenthal’s 
puckish culinary conjurations. 
 
A good analogy is with that ubiquitous artefact of Victorian popular entertainment, 
the spectroscope, whose patenting and vogue was contemporaneous with HT’s publication. 
As Jonathan Crary notes, ‘By 1856, two years after its founding, the London Stereoscopic 
Company alone had sold over half a million viewers’ (118n). Its relevance to a discussion of 
mimesis, however, is that its main progenitor, Charles Wheatstone, ‘aimed to stimulate the 
actual presence of a physical object or scene, not to discover another way to exhibit a print or 
drawing’ (Crary 122). His co-progenitor Brewster, writing a history of the spectroscope in 
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1856, goes further, tacitly promoting it as not merely ‘an amusing and useful instrument’ but 
a superior mimetic medium to painting (3). He affirms that a painting is less ‘truthful’ – an 
idiom he is comfortable using – than a spectroscopic image because, perversely, not illusion 
enough; for when in the former ‘art has exhausted its powers, we seldom, if ever, mistake the 
plane picture for the solid it represents’ (2). The spectroscope, with, in both senses, its deeper 
illusion, wrests from the plane the solid it represents; it comes closer to being ‘truthful’. 
Moreover, its illusion is a distortion within a distortion, an illusion achieved by the opposite 
of the means the layviewer might expect. The device ‘throw[s] the image of N a little to the 
right side of the optic axis of the left eye, and a little to the left of the optic axis of the right 
eye’ (Brewster 82-83). Yet its effects were profound. Crary quotes Helmholtz testifying, 
again in the 1850s, that the stereoscope, ‘so true to nature and so lifelike’, could implant 
counterfeit memories in the viewer: ‘we get the impression when we actually do see the 
object, that we have already seen it before and are more or less familiar with it’ (124). The 
hypotyposis, the defamiliarisation, of the illusion radically confers ‘familiarity’ on it. It 
recalls Sleary’s comment, ‘even knowin’ it, you couldn’t put your finger on him’. The 
illusion persists; in Greenblatt’s terms, it cannot be denied even though its incredibility is 
plain. 
 
* 
 
What then of the ‘scientific eye’? Lewes condescends to ‘The incurious unimpassioned gaze 
of the Alpine peasant on the scenes which mysteriously and profoundly affect the cultivated 
tourist’. The latter’s cultivation, his climb up to the slightly lower altitudes but more rarefied 
air of Parnassus, has bequeathed him ‘an education of the eye’: the poet has ‘taught [him] to 
look’ (21). Lewes does not pause to consider whether that mysteriousness and profundity of 
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effect is in fact a species of what he earlier described; that the tourist’s response is a stock one 
to ‘the somnolence of habit’, better known as convention, in the poetry he consumed, in the 
same way a poet might see butterflies kissing the sweet lips of a flower. Nevertheless, two 
years after Lewes published those words a young compatriot, Gerard Manley Hopkins, 
travelled through the Alps and made sketches like this: 
 
If you took the skin of a white tiger or the deep fell of some other animal and swung it tossing 
high in the air and then cast it out before you it would fall and so clasp and lap round anything 
in its way just as this glacier does and the fleece would part in the same rifts; you must 
suppose a lazuli-like under-flix would appear. This spray out of one end I tried to catch but it 
would have taken hours: it was this which first made me think of a tiger-skin, and it ends in 
tongues and points like the tail and claws indeed the ends of the glaciers are knotted or 
knuckled like talons. Above, in a plane nearly parallel to the eye, becoming thus fore-
shortened, it forms saddle-curves with dips and swells. (194) 
 
Nixon also cites this, and it does indeed have a very mysterious and profound effect on one. I 
confess I still do not know what Nixon means by ‘scientific eye’. Nevertheless, surely no 
cultivated tourist ever looked on an Alpine scene with such discrimination and invention. 
‘The discoverer and poet are inventors,’ Lewes writes, ‘and they are so because their mental 
vision detects the unapparent, unsuspected facts’ (26). That extraordinary conceit, the 
whirling of the white tiger pelt, seems almost to impel the perspective centripetally back to its 
point of origin – the eye, to court glibness, of the storm – which we hear about much as we 
have just heard about the glacier’s. ‘It was this which first made me think of a tiger-skin’, 
Hopkins writes, as if he had wound back to before he threw his prodigy away – 
metaphorically and perhaps literally as well, since it is stowed in his journals. There is a 
constant threat of imbalance in the passage; several times he seems to check himself lest he 
go the way of his projectile. 
 
149 
Appropriately, we see the conceit falter, and after ‘rifts’ at that: hypothesis becomes 
the solicitation of ‘you must suppose’. In the next sentence, the conceit briefly appears to 
dissolve as the ‘spray’ does into the air. ‘The spray out of one end I tried to catch but it would 
have taken hours’ he writes with a pinch of bathos, but also with integrity, for he is at the 
precipice of words too. Indeed, the irony, even the paradox, is that the object he could not 
apprehend is the source of the conceit. Notice also how the wide gyres of the swinging tiger 
affect the rest of the passage in other ways. The conceit slips from his grasp, and as it does so 
he redoubles his exactitude with those ‘tongues and points like the tail and claws’. It does not 
avail him: away hurtles his heady conceit, as the animal figuration slips in a different way 
from tiger claws to bird ‘talons’, and at the end to ‘saddle-curves’, suggesting a horse. A 
week later Hopkins wrote of a tree’s ‘eye-taking sky-clusters’ (195). ‘Eye-taking’ is a 
strange, alluring locution, as if it were not the banal, idiomatic piquing of one’s attention so 
much as an act of visual larceny. 
 
But Hopkins is not a victim here; his perspective has successfully righted itself, which 
he demonstrates with the sudden change in register to the scientific, invoking optics: ‘a plane 
nearly parallel to the eye, thus becoming fore-shortened’. The eye – I suppose we shall call it 
the ‘scientific eye’ – has remained steady; it has not swooned at the sublimity; it has not been 
subverted, nor even disturbed. Hopkins drolly, or again bathetically, begins the next 
paragraph with: ‘The view was not good’. Whether artful or artless, this is certainly 
bemusing. What is he saying about his conceit? Perhaps that it was mere whimsy, an 
indulgence. Another conjecture, not unrelated, is that Hopkins is qualifying it out of modesty, 
that he is retracting his brazen imposture. As Phillips notes, some critics ‘have seen a conflict 
in Hopkins’s verse between his recording of a full and free response to natural beauty and a 
castigating of that response into religious didacticism’ (263). Perhaps, though, it is as much a 
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conflict between that response and scientific didacticism. Hopkins is not unlike Sleary, whose 
‘one fixed eye…and one loose’, more than drawing attention to the ‘sightless stare’ of 
Gradgrind and his kind, seem to ironise their surroundings (34). Hopkins’s eye is both 
constant and moving, ‘taken’ and retained. The voluptuous prose bodies forth this conflict, 
lost in the vast worlds of wonder yet unmoved and keenly, almost fanatically observing; 
turning facts into extraordinary figures, breaking ‘the somnolence of habit’, yet, with 
Horace’s approbation, remaining aware of its duty. 
 
After HT, then, if not necessarily because of it, a change occurs in the orientation of 
science toward imagination. Dickens had trouble foreseeing it, the steam arising from his 
polemical fury, or the haze of Coketown, having perhaps clouded his vision. Had he but 
known it, many of the scientists were actually not so very far from his way of thinking, at 
least with regard to ‘facts’. But he could not, as Bounderby does, ‘project[…] himself…into 
futurity’ and grasp this (217). Writing about the ‘stimulus of the imagination’, Tyndall asserts 
that: 
 
Scientific men fight shy of the word because of its ultra-scientific connotations; but the fact is 
that without the exercise of this power, our knowledge of nature would be a mere tabulation of 
co-existences and sequences. We should still believe in the succession of day and night, of 
summer and winter; but the conception of Force would vanish from our universe; causal 
relations would disappear, and with them that science which is now binding the parts of nature 
to an organic whole. (104) 
 
Tyndall’s exemplar of this is Davy, whom, recollect, Coleridge lauded for the same quality. 
There is, then, a unification of sorts taking place here. The irony of this change, this 
rehabilitation of wonder and the imagination, is that it took place just as the sciences were 
beginning to abdicate referentiality. ‘Many chemists of the present day,’ says Tyndall, ‘refuse 
to speak of atoms and molecules as real things’ (108). Atoms were inherently speculative; 
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one could not display the carbon atom in a museum. They were like the dread smudge in the 
distance that travellers infer to be Coketown, ‘suggestive of itself, though not a brick of it 
could be seen’ (85). Daniel Brown, writing about Tyndall, observes that ‘Physics and 
mathematics became increasingly dependent upon the imagination during the early to mid-
Victorian period… marking a shift from positivist experiment to a priori analysis and 
speculation’ (142). He goes on to note ‘[William Rowan] Hamilton’s dictum that “imagined 
possibility affects us otherwise than believed reality”’ and that ‘The sober professional 
science that the BAAS had been instrumental in establishing in the preceding decades looked 
like it was being undermined by a spate of rash apriorism’ (144). Science was going toward 
the abstruse and abstract, in the direction of Louisa’s fabulous divination27. Indeed, this was 
already true. ‘Major scientific theories have the function of prophecy’, Beer observes, as if 
reiterating the observation made by Lewes more than a century before that 
 
A good chemist does not need to test many a proposition by bringing actual gases or acids into 
operation, and seeing the result; he foresees the result: his mental vision of the objects and 
their properties is so keen, his experience is so organised, that the result which would be 
visible in an experiment, is visible to him in an intuition. (Plots 84; Principles 19) 
 
Science profits by the mind’s eye, the ‘mental vision’. The good scientist is one capable, as 
Louisa and the narrator are, of foretelling events that have not yet occurred, proofs that have 
not yet yielded to observation, his gift the same enchanted afflatus as Louisa finds in the fire. 
The difference between Darwin and his gainsayer Philip Gosse, for example, is the difference 
between these imaginative prodigies and that imaginative poverty. Edmund Gosse, remarking 
                                                 
27  As Srdjan Smajić writes in his excellent Ghost-Seers, Detectives and Spiritualists: 
 
nineteenth-century science opened up new paths into the occult by virtue of its explorations of objects 
and phenomena that elude the limited register of the bodily senses – the invisible, unseen world 
surrounding us, whose properties we cannot directly observe and measure, but about which we can 
make strong, seemingly incontrovertible inferences. (137) 
 
This is worth quoting because it illuminates not just the present point but also the following chapter, which 
counts among its interests Dickens’ ghost story The Haunted Man and mesmerism. 
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on his father’s ‘very absence of imagination’, declares that ‘as a collector of facts and 
marshaller of observations, he had not rival in that age…But he was more an attorney than a 
philosopher’ (68). 
 
* 
 
 HT and scientific contemporaries ask us to behold a paradigm of scientific discovery in 
which the ‘loose’ eye that takes in everything but the obvious. This eye is the agent of fancy, 
the mind’s eye. To see with a ‘fixed eye’ only is to see nothing more than Bitzer sees, a 
barbarous grotesque precisely because Bitzer has not distorted it; rather, he has truncated it to 
these abstract satellites, the sum of its parts.To adapt Wittman, the only distortion here is of 
Dickens’ own fondness for metonymic description, of which this is a betrayal. The horse’s 
externalities are ones that, unlike those from ‘Night Walks’ I discussed in the previous 
chapter, conjure nothing, wrap no reader or auditor in wonder about the horse, since what 
Dickens elsewhere called ‘the tender light of fancy’ has been extinguished. To such a 
sensibility, the contraband of incongruity in those ‘Wild Huntsmen’, with its whiff of 
hypotyposis, must be repudiated, delegated to a ‘fixed eye’ somewhere else that nevertheless 
is, ironically, just as fanciful. Yet this ‘fixed eye’ is not really seeing in the book. It is 
‘Reason with a sightless stare’, akin to that fetish of ‘facts’ in early scientific thought that 
sought to efface the observer. 
 
The thread of this thesis is becoming clear. So far the distinction between seeing 
things and ‘seeing things’ I established in the introduction has undergone two differents 
treatments: one in which they remain distinct; the other in which ‘seeing things’, incredibly 
yet convincingly (the essence of wonder) and finally truly in scientific hypotheses, informs 
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seeing things. In the next chapter, the final one, I shall look at vision, and descriptive prose 
with it, that is entirely distorted. In HT Dickens wishes the devoutly literal inventories of 
reality that Bitzer graces us with, under the austere tutelage of the ‘Hard Fact men’, to be 
expelled to a Coketownian perdition (188). In the prose I shall alight on next, he presents us 
with its antidote. The examples I give are nearly all examples of ‘seeing things’, even when 
no apparations are in sight. What I tilted at with amiable vexation in the introduction, the 
lexicon that finds in Dickens ‘heightening’ and ‘exaggeration’ (Grahame Smith’s words, but 
they could be anyone’s), is borne out in these examples, at least ostensibly. My intention is to 
argue at greater length about the issues I raised in the introduction when discussing Dickens’ 
extraordinary impressions of Venice, a place which to describe would be an ‘impossibility’. 
Recall the discussion of Impossibilia, that kindred mode of hypotyposis, in this chapter. 
‘Impossibility’ is crucial to hypotyposis, and this I shall make clearer with sustained textual 
analysis. Not much to get through, then.
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4 
 
In the preceding two chapters I have looked at different aspects of seeing and representation 
in Dickens. In the second chapter, those aspects were chiefly ones of textual knowledge. The 
accrual of knowledge both within Bleak House and on its hazy peripheries were quietly 
magical, I argued, a network of impossible vanishings and conjurations. I took up this theme 
again in the third chapter, albeit with a different novel, Hard Times, and a consideration of 
rather different aspects. Whereas the second chapter found representation in BH to be an 
illusion, the third considered the way in which the illusory in Dickens is a superior form of 
aesthetic transmission. But both BH and HT are interested in essentially stable vision, if you 
like. Tulkinghorn solicits intelligence on the verisimilar happenings behind the verisimilar 
walls; HT is about scientific observation that desires to make vision so stable it is cashiered, a 
vestigial faculty to be acknowledged but never truckled to. In the two novels as well as the 
writing I discussed in connection with them there slouched exceptions to this axiom, but 
generally it obtains. So what then of writing where it does not obtain? In The Haunted Man 
and The Mystery of Edwin Drood it does not. Certainly in the former text vision is unstable – 
deranged, its sensory data the fantasmatic distortions of hypotyposis – as it is at times in the 
latter text. Simply put, the central characters in both books are, to invoke my title again, 
‘seeing things’ in the colloquial sense. If the first principle of the thesis is that Dickens is 
representing things most veraciously when most falsely – recall Lewes’s ‘Falsism’, the 
distortion that Smith says is ‘more real than reality itself’ – then doubles and trances and so 
forth, modes of false perception that nevertheless appear to yield potent truths, are its natural 
terminus. Thus this chapter. 
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One purpose of this chapter is to audit THM’s peculiarity and elucidate its relation to 
trances, specifically the mesmeric pall that shadows the text. As in the preceding chapter and 
subsequent ones, my main interest is vision and language: entranced vision, entranced 
language. In the final section I want to demonstrate how similar Dickens’ aesthetic procedure 
in his long descriptive passages is to the unfolding of an hallucination, which Lewes first 
identified with Dickensian style. The point, to restate an earlier qualification, is not to suggest 
that Dickens actually was hallucinatory in his writing, which seems to me an impertinence. It 
is merely to illuminate how his style is so persuasive, how it makes its readers believe. In 
doing so I expand on a point I made in the first chapter about the ‘self-generating reverie’ 
Miller identified. 
 
* 
 
It is true that almost nobody has ever liked The Haunted Man.28 Michael Slater was being 
charitable when he noted that ‘the reception accorded to this last Christmas Book was, in fact, 
very mixed, with hostile criticism predominating’ (Christmas Books 237). Indeed, it seems to 
induce dislike in its readers in rather the same way its titular protagonist spreads his dubious 
‘gift’. Those who have felt its touch become captious and dismissive toward the unusual, 
underfed novella they behold. Angus Wilson writes that it and its remarkably similar 
Christmas predecessor The Battle of Life were ‘deservedly less successful in their own time 
and have only the interest now of being quarries in their rather peculiar stories for 
autobiographical obsessions’ (181). Its unpopularity has been so prodigious and so abiding 
that it ought by now to have reaped a belated profit: to be grubbed from its fallen state in the 
                                                 
28 Exceptions include Harry Stone and Peter Ackroyd – good exceptions to have. The latter says THM, though 
the ‘strangest’ of the Christmas books, is ‘a wonderful story, filled with darkness and shadow’ that ‘must stand 
alongside A Christmas Carol for its rendering of true feeling’ (103, 104). As to the last point, I would submit 
that Redlaw is not the only one seeing things. 
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back canon of Dickens works and, if not restored, granted some small provision of interest 
and living out its days in comfortable obscurity, with reverent loyalists occasionally visiting 
to pay tribute. Somehow, though, this has not happened. Like The Haunted Man himself, 
Redlaw, and his haunted dwelling, it exists as an anomaly, unchanged amid much change, 
free of readerly molestation. Critical availing on its behalf, though often clever and sensitive, 
has been sporadic. Yet I think this ‘rather peculiar’ work is a good deal better than its 
reputation indicates. And not merely better, but more peculiar. 
 
If THM is virtually forgotten among Dickens’ works, it might be helpful to 
recapitulate the plot and the circumstances surrounding its publication. It was the last of 
Dickens’ Christmas books, the fifth in a series of five tales, compact by his standards, that he 
published each Christmas beginning with A Christmas Carol in 1843 and ending with the 
present text in 1848, the only exception being 1847. Though the last of these books, THM 
was, as Michael Slater says in his later Penguin edition, the only one after A Christmas Carol 
‘that can be said to be actually about Christmas’ (xxi). It is set in Christmas time, and strives 
to impart a yuletide flavour, or at any rate to import it into the protragonist’s isolated, almost 
atemporal existence. The ‘haunted man’ is a famous chemist named Redlaw. Redlaw was 
once betrayed by a friend who jilted his sister to take up with the woman he, Redlaw, loved. 
This has precipitated a serious case of ‘haunting’, which is to say harrowment to the point of 
brutalisation. Years later, pent up in his chambers at the college where he teaches, roiled in a 
spin-cycle of reverie and travail, Redlaw, at least ostensibly, begins receiving an apparition, 
alternately called a ‘Ghost’, a ‘Phantom’ and a ‘spectre’. This ‘Phantom’, the soubriquet that 
Dickens uses most despite the title, is Redlaw himself: ‘the animated image of himself dead’ 
(144). The Phantom offers to annul Redlaw’s ‘sorrow and…wrong’: to, in Redlaw’s words, 
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‘blot it from my memory’, leaving him with a perfectly spotless mind (145). Redlaw accepts 
its offer. 
 
What Redlaw does not know, unfortunately, is that the offer comes with a 
disagreeable rider. His own bad memories annulled, Redlaw wields the involuntary power to 
annul the same memories in others. And so, again ostensibly, he does. For reasons that 
Dickens never elucidates, as nearly as I can tell, Redlaw does not wrest from others ‘their 
sorrow and their wrong’ but the parts of their personalities that moderate or suppress those 
feelings. He turns them into selfish, querulous grotesques, and they are only saved, and he 
redeemed, through the beatific intervention of the servant Milly. Milly and the nameless 
street urchin, ‘a young monster, a child who had never been a child…a mere beast’ who takes 
shelter in Redlaw’s dwelling because of her ministrations, are crucial to the story and 
Redlaw’s redemption (150). They alone are immune to his influence: the one because she 
possesses a ‘humanising touch’, the other because he has never received it – a point on which 
the Phantom, who it transpires is something of a bleeding heart, harangues Redlaw (204). 
They and the ‘Christmas Waits’, music that at first heralds the Phantom and then heralds 
Redlaw’s redemption, are the story’s primary motive forces. 
 
The text is in part Gothic boilerplate and in part a peculiar alloy, a kind of morbid 
whimsy. Establishing the scene, Dickens pursues a rhetorical strategy that, at first, cleaves to 
the safety of convention. The ‘haunted man’ lives in an ‘old, retired part of an ancient 
endowment’, and each succeeding period in the introduction is a tolling on this bell: ‘the 
obsolete whim of forgotten architects’, ‘old trees’, ‘mildewed earth’ (126). Redlaw’s habitat 
is sepulchral, vault-like; its depth in the ground is dwelt upon as if it were a living 
archaeological site, sunk below the city (this is not the only such occurrence in Dickens, as 
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Dorothy Van Ghent notes [Critical Assessments v.IV 63]). Not suprisingly, as I indicated 
above, Redlaw leads an austere, hidebound existence there, ‘remote in fashion, age, and 
custom’ like his dwelling (127). Stanley Tick, who does not seem to like the story very much, 
calling it ‘half-hysterical’, remarks that ‘there appears to be some force outside the text that 
unsettles the writing’; he goes on to observe that ‘Dickens composes thirty-two sentences in a 
row beginning with the word ‘when’, a kind of rhetorical eruption without cause or purpose’ 
(65). But is there really no purpose to this addled yet incantatory prose? I do not wish to get 
ahead of myself, but I submit that this magnificent prose – and I believe, contrary to Tick, 
that it is magnificent – might be likened to the ‘passes’ mesmerists performed in front of their 
subjects as they lulled them into a trance. Taylor Stoehr, an altogether more trustworthy 
reader on this matter, makes his own suggestion that is pertinent here about a trope common 
in Dickens’ writing: 
 
We recall, for example, Dickens’ anaphoric ordering of detail, where the bits and pieces of the 
visual scene are, so to speak, suspended in time by the directionless rhetorical pattern, 
producing a dreamlike ‘simultaneity’ of the separate elements. What movement there is in the 
scene appears to be an effect of simple scanning, from point to contiguous point, and the 
relations between elements are mere juxtapositions, formalized in the anaphoric 
schematization. As in dream, the realism one would expect from constant emphasis on objects 
familiar to the eyes is strangely modified by this mode of presentation. The combination of 
movement by contiguity and order without direction or classification makes the scene appear 
to present itself, so that the total effect is not realistic at all, but magical, even supernatural. 
(76) 
 
The anaphora that Tick censures, Stoehr finds to be part of a complex rhetorical strategy. The 
opening pages of THM are as perfect expression of Stoehr’s criticism as can be imagined. 
‘When’ provides a ‘visual scene…suspended in time’ as all the ‘bits and pieces’ wait for this 
long deferred ‘when’ to arrive, held together by nothing except the baroque ‘anaphoric 
schematization’, and with the ‘magical, even supernatural’ made overt in lines such as ‘when 
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twilight everywhere released the shadows, prisoned up all day, that now closed in and 
gathered like mustering swarms of ghosts’ (128). Seconding the effect that Stoehr identifies, I 
would submit that the book begins very much in the manner De Quincey famously discerned 
in Macbeth. We are ‘made sensible,’ De Quincey writes, ‘that the world of ordinary life is 
suddenly arrested – laid asleep – tranced – racked into a dread armistice: time must be 
annihilated; relation to things without abolished; and all must pass self-withdrawn’ (197). 
Something very much of the sort is here being attempted in THM. On the ‘sun-dial’ outside 
Redlaw’s dwelling ‘no sun had straggled for a hundred years’ and ‘the snow would lie for 
weeks when it lay nowhere else’ (126). Time itself has been ‘annihilated’ – the sun not 
corroborating it, winter continuing there long after it had tempered toward spring elsewhere – 
and ‘relation to things without’ has all but been ‘abolished’. It is, like Poe’s ‘Dream-Land’, 
‘Out of SPACE – out of TIME’ (70). Or, as Milly’s husband Mr. William says when he 
greets Redlaw, ‘it’s a good bit past the time to-night’ (130). 
 
The Mystery of Edwin Drood is in some ways a different book altogether. It does not 
seem to be as riven as THM, as peculiarly conflicted about its ends. It does not seem 
unconvinced by itself and therefore does not become self-compromising as THM does. THM 
is a curate’s egg of the strange and the stock. It is open to badness as Drood never is. Indeed, 
in this way THM has something in common with Drood’s predecessor Our Mutual Friend, 
whose rampant waywardness gives way to the honed functionality of Drood. In this last book 
Dickens seems to write within himself. The comic diversions are scrupulously kept in check; 
the novel proceeds soberly, purposefully. The disappearance of the title character is the direct 
result or cause of every event in the novel, a structural economy not observed in the 
sprawling novels before it. Even THM excludes some events from Redlaw’s expanding, 
diabolical purview. 
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Sobriety is an appropriate treatment of Cloisterham’s stifling abstinence, its 
provincialism and insularity, which Jasper feels more keenly than anyone else: ‘the cramped 
monotony of my existence grinds me away by the grain’ (48). Later, he adds ‘Cloisterham is 
a little place. Cooped up in it myself, I know nothing beyond it, and feel it to be a little place’ 
(64). Cloisterham is so little that the odd repetition is telling rather than merely 
circumlocutory. Jasper speaks of being ‘cooped up’ – though by what a young single man of 
his gifts and wanderlust could be cooped by, he does not say, but let that pass – and in that 
additional clause finds himself returning to ‘a little place’, as if he were ‘feeling’ the walls of 
his coop, its oppressive confines. In the midst of conversation, he has without meaning to 
enacted his predicament. The remark is doubly and trebly interesting for reasons I shall return 
to, namely for its being a lie and also for the nature of that lie: his clandestine sprees to 
London, where he dreams of the Orient. Cloisterham is sleepy, a backwater; its life, such as it 
is, has thickened to a torpor. Many of the citizens we are introduced to, if only in passing – 
or, that is, long passed – and anonymously, are sleeping. They are interred in the Cathedral, 
bearing up in its walls and grounds. Nevertheless, time passes. At certain moments we see it 
happen before our eyes. It is a testament to the novel’s lightly-worn mastery that a paragraph 
such as this seems unremarkable: 
 
The bright frosty day declined as they walked and spoke together. The sun dipped in the river 
far behind them, and the old city lay red before them, as their walk drew to a close, the 
moaning water cast its seaweed duskily at their feet, when they turned to leave its margin; and 
the rooks hovered above them with hoarse cries, darker splashes in the darkening air. (169) 
 
This passage comes as Edwin and Rosa part – for good, as they are not to know. The 
effortless virtuosity is in the writing’s ability to make a stretch of time – half an hour, say, 
perhaps longer – pass with only, as it were, a few strokes. We go from ‘bright frosty day 
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declin[ing]’ to a ‘sun dipped in the river’, which in turn bathes ‘the old city’ in ‘red’; then we 
get seaweed cast ‘duskily’ before we fetch up finally at those rooks, ‘darker splashes in the 
darkening air’, a line that makes it seem as if the quality of light is dwindling with every 
word. Moreover, implanted here are the first stirrings of intimations about Edwin’s fate. The 
faint incongruity of ‘seaweed’ in the river (the search parties will extend miles downstream to 
the sea); the ‘moaning’, itself a vague portent, combining with the ‘hoarse cries’, suggestive 
of strangulation, to hint at the imminent murder. 
 
* 
 
I think that there is an important connection between the temporal suspension in THM and 
Redlaw; indeed, that the two can be conflated. Helen Groth suggests that Redlaw has 
succumbed to ‘the dissociative hypnotic state induced by intense reverie’ (‘Reading Victorian 
Illusions’ 49). She argues that ‘the specter is an externalization of what are later described as 
the “banished recollections” underlying the “inter-twisted chain of feelings and associations 
haunting Redlaw’s conscious thought”’ (50). Citing the work of two contemporaries of 
Dickens, the physiologist William Carpenter and the critic John Addington Symonds, she 
offers the explanation that the Phantom emanates from ‘a dream-like state’ (51). Certainly 
John Forster refers to ‘the dialogue [with the Phantom] which is no dialogue, but a kind of 
dreary dreamy echo’, ‘dreary’ being meant, lest there is any confusion with other criticism I 
have quoted, in its original sense (Life v.2 59-60). And as Forster also notes, though without 
getting the poem’s title right, Dickens’ original epigraph for the book was four lines from 
Tennyson’s ‘The Day-Dream’ (Life v.2 59). In other words, all of Groth’s points are well-
taken; with the thrust of them I certainly concur. But I would go a little further than she does 
and suggest that, just as his environs are ‘laid asleep – tranced’, Redlaw is in, or is in 
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something akin to, a somnambulistic trance. Indeed, I would go much further than she does 
and suggest that the entire story could be a figment of this trance. The text itself indicates as 
much, being coy about what it calls ‘the veracity of this history’: 
 
Some people have said since, that he only thought what has here been set down; others, that he 
read it in the fire… others, that the Ghost was but the representation of his gloomy thoughts, 
and Milly the embodiment of his better wisdom. I say nothing. (228) 
 
Chauncey Hare Townshend, ‘an accomplished man, who has written better of mesmerism 
than anyone else’, Dickens declared in his correspondence years later, observes in his seminal 
1840 treatise Facts of Mesmerism that ‘A mesmeric sleepwalker rarely observes any external 
object of his own accord. His state is one of concentration, abstraction, and internal thought’, 
and we can see something of this in Redlaw (Townshend 379; Letters v.7 342). There is 
evidence that Redlaw possesses some of the primary risk factors for tranced states. It is useful 
here to cite Robert Macnish, the Scots doctor whose Anatomy of Drunkenness Dickens 
infamously cited to defend Krook’s spontaneous combustion in BH. Macnish says in his 
Philosophy of Sleep, a work Dickens possessed, that the ‘tendency to see visions, and to place 
faith in what he sees’ is commensurate with how ‘abstracted from the bustle of life’ he is; 
Macnish goes on, ‘solitary [is] the district in which [such an] individual resides; 
and…romantic and awe-inspiring the scenes that pass before his eyes’ (Letters 1844-46 725; 
Philosophy 260-61). Macnish had already identified the correlation between ‘a large 
development of the organ of Wonder’ and a personality ‘strongly inclined to believe in the 
supernaturality of ghosts, and peculiarly liable to be visited by them’ (246). Redlaw is ‘the 
wise and learned man to whom the wonders of nature were an open book’; and it is perhaps 
noteworthy that when he hears the Christmas music ‘his face became less fixed and 
wondering’, although he is about to have his final colloquy with the Phantom (218, 202). 
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Macnish’s writing is germane to THM in another way too. In his diagnosis, ‘those whose 
minds are oppressed by care, or over-stimulated by excessive study’ are most susceptible: 
 
The sorrowful man, above all others, has the most need of sleep; but, far from shedding its 
benignant influence over him, it flies away, and leaves him to the communionship of his own 
sad thoughts. (199) 
 
Such formulations as ‘over-stimulated by excessive study’ are common in Macnish’s treatise 
and others, so it is significant that Forster describes Redlaw as a ‘man of studious philosophic 
habits’ and then as ‘the over-thinking sage’ (507-08). One can adduce other writings by 
Dickens to buttress this suggestion that Redlaw is a somnambulist. In his February 1848 
Examiner review of the book The Night Side of Nature, by the novelist Catherine Crowe, 
Dickens contended that what he calls ‘the renowned Lady Beresford ghost story’ was an act 
of somnambulism; that she 
 
was actually doing them [‘her acts’], with the disturbed, imperfect consciousness of doing 
them which is not uncommon in cases of somnambulism, or even in common dreams; when 
the sleeper, lying on his own arm, or throwing off his own bedclothes, makes his own act the 
act of an imaginary person, and elaborately constructs a story in his sleep, out of which such 
incidents seem to arise . (in Amusements 86-87) 
 
It seems to me very plausible that The Haunted Man is just such a story too. Redlaw, who is 
often described as ‘abstracted’ and ‘roused’ by human activity, certainly appears to act with a 
‘disturbed, imperfect consciousness’. When we are introduced to him, he is ‘moving his thin 
mouth as in speech, but silent as the dead’, as if rent by a vatic fit (126). When Mr William 
speaks to him, Redlaw is ‘waking as from a dream’ (132). In this, indeed, he is analogous not 
so much to any figure in ‘The Day-Dream’ but to the Prince in Tennyson’s The Princess, 
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which had been published the year before, in 1847 – especially the Prince who speaks these 
spookily apposite lines: 
 
And, truly, waking dreams were, more or less, 
An old and strange affection of the house. 
Myself too had weird seizures, Heaven knows what: 
On a sudden in the midst of men and day, 
And while I walk’d and talk’d as heretofore, 
I seem’d to move among a world of ghosts, 
And feel myself the shadow of a dream. (157)29 
 
Those last three lines may as well be Redlaw, who walks and talks as heretofore while 
seeming to move among a world of ghosts, albeit ghosts that are intended to be construed as 
supernatural. Dickens makes plain to Mark Lemon, with whom he was dramatising the story, 
that ‘I don’t think it would do to shew the Phantom. I think it would involve an absurdity in 
reference to the prevailing idea of the book’ (Letters v.5 456). As Ruth Glancy notes in this 
connection, the Phantom ‘appears to Redlaw in order to dramatise the dialogue taking place 
within Redlaw’s psyche’, his ‘“spiritual desolation”’, adding that Dickens referred to the 
dialogue in a letter to the Earl of Carlisle as ‘an allegorical one’ (71). Or, as Forster puts it, it 
is ‘the darker presentment of himself embodied in those bitter recollections’ (Life v.2 59). It 
is, moreover, perfectly normal for the somnambulist not to be betrayed by his appearance, as 
Redlaw, walking and talking as heretofore, is not. In Barnaby Rudge, Barnaby dreams of 
being pursued by a monstrosity ‘in the shape of a man’, but this has been facilitated by his 
mesmerist interlocutor Gabriel, and Barnaby is in fact awake the entire time – a scene that 
                                                 
29 We could surmise that Dickens had read those lines even if ‘The Day-Dream’ had not been the source of his 
original epigraph. He was an admirer of Tennyson’s poetry: ‘I have been reading Tennyson all this morning,’ he 
begins one letter to Forster, and elsewhere writes of reading Tennyson ‘again and again’ (Letters v.3 279; Life 
v.1 329). Indeed, they were on such friendly terms that in 1845 Dickens made Tennyson a godfather to his son, 
Alfred D’Orsay Tennyson Dickens. This was not the only unhappy end of their friendship, if Forster’s allusions 
to strain are any guide (Life v2 83). 
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anticipates Dickens’ real mesmeric treatments of Madame de la Rue, to which I shall return 
(BR 47-48; Kaplan 219). Indeed, Dickens was fastidious about this, eager to correct Crowe’s 
misapprehension that ‘the strange powers [of] somnambulists….[are] generally exercised 
with closed eyes, which is not the case’ (86). 
 
It is possible too that the trance, if trance there is, is not somnambulistic but 
mesmeric; or, rather, that it is a combination, the former brought on by the latter. Macnish 
notes that ‘animal magnetism appears to have the power of inducing a peculiar species of 
somnambulism’ (176). The trance seems to me manifest later on in the story when, upon 
hearing Christmas music, Redlaw ‘rose, and stood stretching his hands about him, as if there 
were some friend approaching within his reach, on whom his desolate touch might rest’ (200-
01). It is quite possible this music, ‘the Christmas Waits’ that had begun playing when the 
Phantom first materialised and leave their ‘last chord’ in Redlaw’s ear when he materialises 
the second time, could have been responsible for starting and ending his trance (142, 202). ‘“I 
know that some change was upon me, when those sounds were in the air just now,”’ Redlaw 
says (203). Edmund Wilson, in his great essay ‘Dickens: the Two Scrooges’, contended: 
 
It was supposed in Dickens’ time that this influence [mesmerism] could be projected through 
the agency of mere sound: hence the insistent keynote in the piano scene and the swelling note 
of the organ that frightens Rosa in the garden. (81)30 
 
                                                 
30 The first, more interesting example Wilson cites from Drood is this, where Rosa Bud confesses to Helena 
Landless her fear of John Jasper: 
 
‘He has made a slave of me with his looks. He has forced me to understand him, without his saying a 
word; and he has forced me to keep silence, without his uttering a threat. When I play, he never moves 
his eyes from my hands. When I sing, he never moves his eyes from my lips. When he corrects me, and 
strikes a note, or a chord, or plays a passage, he himself is in the sounds, whispering that he pursues me 
as a lover, and commanding me to keep his secret. I avoid his eyes, but he forces me to see them 
without looking at them. Even when a glaze comes over them (which is sometimes the case), and he 
seems to wander away into a frightful sort of dream in which he threatens most, he obliges me to know 
it, and to know that he is sitting close at my side, more terrible to me than ever.’ (95) 
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Whatever the reason, supervening upon Redlaw’s comment the ‘sun-dial…shook off the finer 
particles of snow that had accumulated on his dull old face in the night’ and ‘some blind 
groping of the morning made its way down’ (205). Time has begun again. 
 
None of this is to say that Redlaw’s somnambulism makes him exclusively the 
mesmeric subject of another (after all, who could that other be?). Mesmerism rears up in the 
text through the agency of Redlaw and the dispensing of his gift. To be sure, Redlaw’s 
‘strange power’ appears mesmeric in nature, and it is this power that ultimately dominates the 
text. We see quite obvious examples of it: ‘The Chemist’s steady eye controlled him 
somewhat, or inspired him with enough submission to be raised upon his feet, and looked at’ 
(183). At times it is even a sort of ‘phreno-mesmerism’, the practice of controlling people 
mesmerically through, as Alison Winter writes, ‘touch[ing] the place on a subject’s skull 
corresponding to a particular phrenological organ,’ upon which ‘the entranced person 
manifested the appropriate sentiments’ (19). When Redlaw fruitlessly tries to mesmerise the 
guttersnipe, ‘[he] asked these questions to attract his eyes towards himself, and…now held 
him by the chin, and threw his wild hair back, though he loathed to touch him’ (185). Nor is 
mesmerism the domain of Redlaw alone. We are even led to consider Milly’s mesmeric 
powers, although perhaps that is not so surprising. This is the Milly whom it transpires is 
invested with all love and compassion, a pure, subsumed goodness that she is able to bestow 
on those around her. She becomes, as I noted earlier, the vessel of divinity, a figure no longer 
quite human. This impression is reinforced by the fact that her avatar is magically transmitted 
to Redlaw’s sight. Given all this, mesmeric powers would seem to be the least of her 
faculties. Notice the ambiguity here in her innocuous relation of an encounter with the young 
student who, it transpires, is Redlaw’s nephew: 
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Milly’s voice resumed, like quiet music very softly played: 
 
‘He muttered in his broken sleep yesterday afternoon, after talking to me’ (this was to 
herself) ‘about some one dead, and some great wrong done that could never be forgotten; but 
whether to him or to another person, I don’t know. Not by him, I am sure.’ (141) 
 
Had he ‘muttered in his broken sleep’ about it or had he ‘talk[ed] to [her]’ about it? The 
placement of the quotation marks renders this question interestingly moot. The difference is 
significant. If the parenthesis in her remarks ends after ‘me’ and does not extend to include 
‘about some one dead’ right through to the semi-colon, the complexion of the clause ‘after 
talking to me’, and indeed of the whole sentence, changes. Although ‘(this was to herself)’ 
suggests, if anything, the other parsing, her confusion over what he meant (‘whether to him or 
to another person, I don’t know’) counters it. And besides, if the other parsing were accurate 
then why mention the ‘mutter[ing]’ at all, since it would be redundant? Parsed the way I have 
described, the clause becomes very curious. Milly appears to be stressing the fact that he 
muttered about those things ‘after talking to [her]’ – ‘after’ now taking on tacit quotation 
marks – as if there were a causal link between the two acts. That is, Milly is saying he 
‘muttered in his broken sleep’ because of ‘talking to [her]’, which implies that she coerced 
him in some doubtless benevolent manner. Note that her ‘voice…[was] like quiet music’, 
making it as enchanted as the Christmas Waits I suggested could have influenced Redlaw. 
 
The question of how Milly and Redlaw might ‘diffuse’ their mesmeric gifts is 
answered in the Reverend George Sandby’s 1844 treatise Mesmerism and its Opponents. 
Like Townshend and Macnish, Sandby leans on a sodality of quacks. But he is nevertheless 
clear on the mesmeric transaction in a way that writers like Townshend and John Elliotson, 
beset by anecdotal desultoriness and casebook obscurantism respectively, are not. Writing 
about ‘this “transfer of thought,” of which we have been speaking’, he says: 
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Dr. Collyer has written an able work on this subject; he supposes that a vital electricity is the 
medium of communication from mind to mind; that there is an ‘embodiment of thought’; in 
other words, an impression of the thoughts of one mind, through a Mesmeric agent, on the 
brain or mind of another. (126) 
 
There is more than a little of the flavour of galvanism, mesmerism’s immediate forebear as 
voguish pseudoscience, to this theory; and, as Winters notes, the mesmerist F.S. 
Merryweather did indeed figure the brain as a ‘galvanic battery’ (120). But this also sounds 
almost viral, and the ‘Mesmeric agent’ a kind of vector, so it is not surprising that Sandby 
proceeds to use the word ‘contagious’ (127). Redlaw, spreading his gift against his will, is 
also a vector, also ‘contagious’. He is practising a version of what Michael T. Taussig calls 
‘“contagious magic”’, involving what appears to be a physical connection in order to effect, 
through rite, the substance connected’ (x). I shall return to Taussig’s remarks below, because 
‘contagious’ recurs in this essay and seems to illuminate what I take to be hypotyposis. 
 
There is an interesting tension between the pathological constructions of the 
somnambulistic trance. I have already noted Macnish’s perorations on the disorder of the 
unmediated trance; but the mediated type described here is professedly therapeutic. Elliotson 
staked his career on its being so, breaking with the medical establishment and publishing his 
treatises and periodical The Zoist to expound his view. The therapeutic and anaesthetic 
benefits were what the frontispiece of Elliotson’s Numerous Cases of Surgical Operations 
Without Pain in the Mesmeric State refers to as ‘the inestimable blessings of mesmerism’. 
Elliotson begins that book by recording the tale of the labourer James Wombell, who needed 
his leg amputated, and the extraordinary influence on him of a mesmerist, Mr W. Topham (a 
barrister, of all things). According to Elliotson’s testimony, Topham was, through an intense 
program of mesmeric subjugation, able to palliate Wombell’s agony to the extent that the 
169 
surgeon began to doubt ‘the propriety of immediately amputating the limb’ (6). In the very 
next line, however, it seems these doubts have vanished like the pain and the patient is told of 
his imminent amputation. Understandably, he takes rather a bad turn upon hearing this; but, 
as Elliotson makes clear, he is returned to mesmerised docility within ‘four minutes and a 
half’. Elliotson goes on to observe that, by dint of those mesmeric passes, Wombell enters a 
state of extreme analgesia: ‘the sensibility to mechanical causes of pain was so far lessened 
that violent pinching, and sudden pricking, and of even the diseased limb, produced no 
evidence of sensation’ (6). The rest of the narrative is as gruesome as can be imagined, the 
sort of experimental ordeal that, for all its ostensibly benign intent, one infers is good enough 
for a common labourer but never for a barrister or a surgeon, although Winter makes a 
cogent, passionate defence of its efficacy (163-187). Wombell is prostrate and utterly still, 
utterly silent except for ‘“a low moaning”…at intervals’ which Elliotson, in an audacious 
coup, imputes not to the surgery but to ‘troubled dreaming’ (9). To Elliotson, this is a familiar 
manifestation: ‘this patient was very likely, and from my experience I should say, was almost 
certain, to be [dreaming of the operation he was afraid of]’. It is as if Elliotson is not merely 
vouching for the utility of mesmeric treatment, he is anticipating future charges of 
malpractice. 
 
Fred Kaplan, apparently paraphrasing the view of Dickens and other subscribers to 
mesmerism, affirms that ‘For the central mesmeric experience is that of sleepwalking, in 
which we awaken from the dreams of illusion and see the truth of reality’ (217). Here a nice 
scrambling of Kaplan’s division between ‘the dreams of illusion’ and ‘the truth of reality’ is 
occurring. There is the truth of the illusion and the dream of the reality, and here they are 
potently commingled. This low moaning aside, though, poor old Wombell is become an 
effigy of himself; as Elliotson puts it, ‘he lay like a statue’. Such a figure, who is capable of 
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nothing except vocalisation, anticipates the titular character in Poe’s ‘The Facts in the Case of 
M. Valdemar’, a story that was in fact inspired by the report of Townshend, who contended 
that ‘under God, the life of my friend, R.T. was prolonged, at least, two months by the action 
of Mesmerism’ (Enns 73). Likewise Valdemar is kept alive by mesmerism in a state of 
trance, but it is, as it were, posthumous life – ‘I am dead’, he says to his former companions, 
who had probably already picked up on this – consisting of nothing more than a ‘“strong 
vibratory motion” emanating from the tongue’, the auditors of which apprehend as palpable 
(Poe 662, 661). 
 
This ‘awaken[ing]’ in sleep, comprising what Kaplan then calls ‘moments of insight’, 
is not merely figurative either. Contemporary writings on mesmerism and somnambulism 
posited a mode of sight that existed outside our eyes, which is to say inside our heads. This 
sight was supra-optic, permitting the ‘truth of reality’, the tangible, to be observed as well as 
the ‘dreams of illusion’, those transcendental visions permitted to Madame de la Rue while 
she was under Dickens’ care during his time in Genoa in 1842 and again in 1845. The treatise 
Animal Magnetism and Magnetic Lucid Somnambulism by Edwin Lee sets forth the 
principles of this trenchant sight, this ‘second sight’ or mind’s eye, in the course of its 
eccentric treatments of studies ranging from ophthalmology to physics. He asks the question 
about sleepwalkers, ‘how can they see in obscurity, or with closed eyes?’, and tries to answer 
it by invoking, as writers such as Macnish, Townshend and William Stone did before him, a 
tissue of quotations from sources which, despite their obscurity, can often be seen through by 
sleepwalker and non-sleepwalker alike. He quotes ‘a recent writer’ on the topic: 
 
It would appear, as a general rule, that rays of light, though invisible to the eye, are passing 
from all objects continually, and can penetrate readily certain substances, if not all, which are 
opaque to ordinary light. Those rays seem to be able to pass at once to the brain of sensitive 
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persons, and give the sensation of vision, without the intervention of the eye as an organ. 
Ordinary light is too coarse for such a refined instrument as the brain to receive without the 
intervention of an organ; but for this refined light the brain needs no such go-between, but 
passes at once through the portals and is admitted into the inner chamber of the soul. (97) 
 
If the brain did not look down, as it were, on that vulgar ‘ordinary’ light, we would have no 
need of eyes at all. This notion of ‘internal vision’ was a pervasive and important one in the 
various theories of mesmerism. It is noteworthy that Browning makes so much of it in his 
poem ‘Mesmerism’, published in Men and Women in 1855, well after the onset of 
mesmerism’s eclipse. The speaker’s enthralled subject – a ‘helpless, somnambulistic 
automaton’, as Steven Connor calls her – he has summoned remotely, much as Dickens 
mesmerised Madame de la Rue from London (Connor 5). She is coming to him, and despite 
her trance she is unhindered, apprehending the way by alternative means: ‘Not turning to left 
nor right / From the pathway, blind with sight’ (Browning 87). But ‘internal vision’ is not just 
available to mesmeric subjects. The efficacy of the mesmerist’s art depended on vision, both 
internal and plain old external. As Alison Winter writes: 
 
Mesmerism was an ocular practice in a more dynamic sense than phrenology and physiology. 
It provided both a display and an account of the way displays affected audiences. An account 
of the power of looking as well as powerful sight for Victorians to see. It often achieved its 
displays through the use of the eye, since one of the primary means of establishing the trance 
was through sustained eye contact. The power of looking and the relations of influence 
operating between the person looking and the thing being looked at were at the heart of 
experiments. (30-31) 
 
In ‘Mesmerism’, the speaker remarks that the subject is ‘In the grasp of my steady stare’ (86). 
Dickens himself ‘referred to the power of his eyes and his magnetism as his “visual ray”, to 
de la Rue’s eyes as his “optic ray” or nerve’ (Kaplan 98). The ‘internal vision’ of the 
mesmerist is less clear from the sources but it is explicit in ‘Mesmerism’, and, in fact, it is 
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what makes the poem so interesting, which is to say unusual. Its narrative is not that of a 
mesmerist exerting his will over a subject, ‘held in the clutch of steady ken’; instead, we see 
what begins as the theft of a soul, verily spirited away, turning into a kind of uncanny 
Pygmalion-esque, even necromantic, vivification (86). As Daniel Karlin writes, the speaker 
‘first hallucinat[es] her image and then compel[s] her by occult power to “inform the shape” 
he has imagined with her living presence’ (in Winters 240). The poem’s first line, ‘All I 
believed is true!’, has a slightly different meaning from the one inferred by Connor (16-17). It 
is not an exclamation of empirical scientific success, a ‘Eureka!’ moment, but an assertion of 
the speaker’s ability to create, in the words of Kaplan again, the ‘truth of reality’ out of the 
‘dreams of illusion’. It is worth quoting the most relevant sections of the poem: 
 
I have sat and brought 
(So to speak) my thought   
To bear on the woman away, 
Till I felt my hair turn grey — 
 
VI 
Till I seemed to have and hold, 
In the vacancy   
‘Twixt the wall and me,   
From the hair-plait’s chestnut gold 
To the foot in its muslin fold — 
 
VII 
Have and hold, then and there, 
Her, from head to foot   
Breathing and mute,   
Passive and yet aware, 
In the grasp of my steady stare… 
 
IX 
Having and holding, till 
I imprint her fast   
On the void at last   
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As the sun does whom he will 
By the calotypist’s skill… 
 
…As I see my belief come true. 
 
XXI 
For, there! have I drawn or no 
Life to that lip?   
Do my fingers dip   
In a flame which again they throw 
On the cheek that breaks a-glow? 
 
XXII 
Ha! was the hair so first? 
What, unfilleted,   
Made alive, and spread   
Through the void with a rich outburst, 
Chestnut gold-interspersed? (86, 88) 
 
The speaker’s arch suggestion in those last two stanzas that he has instilled ‘the woman’ with 
life (‘made alive’) is trussed by the allusion of those last two lines back to stanza VI. The 
suggestion is that she exists there in person not because she has travelled but because he 
‘seemed to have and hold, / In the vacancy’ her image – he later figures it as a calotype – ‘In 
the grasp of [his] steady stare’, the latter actually being not the mesmerist’s usual deployment 
of his eyes but an act of ‘internal vision’. If we revisit Dickens’ talk of his ‘visual ray’ we 
notice the distinction he makes between ‘visual’ and ‘optic’. By implication, it is the 
mesmerist and not the subject who has ‘internal vision’, ‘can see in obscurity’;31 the subject is 
a medium, but like the eye she is not a ‘refined instrument’. Dickens makes this implication 
clearer at other times. He does in talking about his own mesmeric experiences, and in so 
doing tacitly draws the connection between his mesmeric practice and his fictional one. ‘He 
                                                 
31 There is a moment in THM when, as ‘the shadows went and came’ and Redlaw stares into the fire, we find 
that ‘he took no heed of them, with his bodily eyes’ (130). ‘Bodily eyes’, that odd usage, has come up before in 
this thesis and comes up more often in Dickens than one might expect. 
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implied,’ Kaplan writes, ‘that Madame de la Rue and her Phantom were extensions of him, 
“part of me”, the result partially of Madame’s creation’s and his own suggestions’ (Kaplan 
90). 
 
* 
 
The other, related issue Browning’s poem touches on is that of doubles. Since the speaker has 
conjured his adored’s ‘fancied shape’ and thus wrested her soul, the poem’s consummation – 
to be followed, one imagines, by their union’s, at least in the speaker’s ‘dream’ – must be the 
restoration of soul to ‘shape’: ‘and now the dream is done / And the shadow and she are one’ 
(89). The poem is a descendent of the Schaeurroman, the genre of Hoffmann and Chamisso, 
though in the poem the speaker is a literal shadow-romancer (K. Miller 124). THM romances 
many shadows, but not all of them are the obvious kind, which is what makes Browning’s 
metaphor of the calotype so pertinent. In THM, we find that the Phantom is ‘the animated 
image of himself dead’ and ‘this fearful shadow’ (144, 148). The Phantom presents Milly’s 
‘shade and picture’, her ‘image’ (202). All of these sound like stock Gothic ghoulishness, but 
they also have a relationship with contemporary developments in photography. When 
reflecting on the daguerrotype in a letter to her friend Mary Russell Mitford, Elizabeth Barrett 
adjures her to ‘think of a man sitting down in the sun & leaving his facsimile in all its full 
completion of outline & shadow’, is effusive about the ‘the fact of the very shadow of the 
person lying there fixed for ever!’, comparing it to ‘the Mesmeric disembodiment of spirits’ 
and finding it much the better of the two (Victorian Photography 135). William Henry Fox 
Talbot, inventor of the rival calotype that Browning refers to in ‘Mesmerism’, describes its 
manufacture of an image as the ‘Art of fixing a Shadow’, extolling as Barrett does its 
capacity to make ‘all that is fleeting and momentary…fettered by the spells of our “natural 
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magic, and…fixed forever in the position which it seemed only destined for a single instant to 
occupy”’ (Victorian Photography 136). 
 
Photography and mesmerism alike were reagents capable of relieving the ‘shadow’ of 
its body. Indeed, the chemistry metaphor is apt in the case of THM: 
 
Some of these phantoms (the reflection of glass vessels that held liquids), trembl[ed] at heart 
like things that knew his power to uncombine them, and to give back their component parts to 
fire and vapour. (126) 
 
In the rather less scientific parlance of Dickens, his Chemist has the ‘power to uncombine’ 
his chemicals, but that power on its own is irrelevant; the dramatic purpose it serves is to act 
as a literary omen of his power to uncombine people’s souls. The choice of ‘phantoms’ 
reinforces this, suggesting as it does the murk of the self with which Redlaw will tamper, and 
Dickens presumed to tamper in real life. Furthermore, I submit that chemistry furnishes the 
story with another metaphor. Redlaw in his bleak Gothic isolation, with his recondite 
knowledge and his extensive apparatus of ‘glass vessels’ carrying mysterious substances, 
cannot help seeming like one who has searched for the philosopher’s stone. And indeed he 
has, after a fashion. He yearns to efface bad memories, and he appears to succeed. It is worth 
noting the glints of alchemy in Redlaw’s precursors. The hapless Peter Schlemihl transmutes 
his shadow by way of exchange into an inestimable wealth of gold pieces that at times take 
his shadow’s place: ‘I shook out gold, and gold, and gold, and still more gold;—strewed it 
over the floor, trampled on it’ (19). Where his shadow was is now gold. In THM, though, the 
yield of gold manifests itself in a different way, and with altogether happier results. The 
‘leaden face and hands’ of the Phantom bespeak the terrible pall over Redlaw and the weight 
of despond that lades him (142). When that ‘leaden pall’ lifts, ‘the chimney stacks and gables 
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of the ancient building gleamed in the clear air, which turned the smoke and vapour of the 
city into a cloud of gold’ (205). London’s own shadow is turned into the gold of a new dawn. 
 
Paganoni writes in her study The Magic Lantern: Representation of the Double in 
Dickens that ‘strictly speaking, Dickensian doubles cannot be compared to those that we find 
in some famous nineteenth-century texts belonging to the canonical literature of the double’ 
(55). She notes that Dickensian doubles are not autonomous like those in the Schauerroman 
genre, but are instead ‘psychological[ly] imbalance[d]’ or else are separate characters (55). 
But as the tenor of remarks suggests, she would perhaps concede that this does not refute the 
link above. Moreover, her injunction is gainsaid in another way. Karl Miller makes this clear, 
delineating the connection between narratives of doubles and the rise of mesmerism: 
 
The story of the modern double starts with the magical science of the eighteenth century in 
Europe, when Mesmerists or Animal Magnetists went in for an experimental separation of the 
second self, and romantic writers went in for its cultural exploitation… [T]his was the heyday 
of the Rosicrucian doctor, of Romanticism’s scientific virtuoso or dilettante… A craze for 
duality spread from Germany to the rest of Europe. The Gothic strain in the literature of 
nineteenth-century Scotland and England was to accommodate the lore and idiom of magic, 
and of the new pseudo-sciences, Magnetism and Phrenology. In relation to most 
manifestations of the dualistic epoch of the nineteenth century Magnetism and its successor, 
hypnotism, were to prove an enduring stimulus. Duality was, among other things, an 
abracadabra. It was a taste for spells, powders, draughts, elixirs, wizard’s wands and 
doppelgänger-sticks. (49) 
 
The denotation ‘Romanticism’s scientific virtuoso’ certainly applies to Redlaw. And indeed, 
as I have indicated, one may consider him just as close to the figure of the ‘Rosicrucian 
doctor’ too, dabbling alchemically in potions. It is surprising, then, that Dickens affected to 
disparage doppelgängers and the Schauerroman, the ‘craze for duality [that] spread from 
Germany to the rest of Europe’ I quoted above. In his review of Catherine Crowe’s book, 
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Dickens fleered at ‘the Doppelgänger, or Double, or Fetch, of Germany’, facetiously 
remarking that ‘immoderately hot stoves, which often have an uneasy influence upon the 
head…may have something to do with the abundance of phantoms perceived in Germany’ 
(Amusements 85). Given the vehemence of this, it is not really surprising that he wrote a story 
about a character and his ostensible ‘Double’ later that year. It is as if he wanted to protect his 
creation from any imputations that he had been influenced by all that Teutonic silliness, from 
those funny old ‘learned professors and studious men in Germany’ with their German 
Metaphysics and all that (Amusements 85). Dickens is certainly not leery of invoking doubles 
in THM, where he is inordinately fond of dualities. But the doubles are not always the 
minatory replacements of the typical Schauerroman. Milly’s pathetic candour about her 
stillborn child, for example, complements the voices that resound in Redlaw’s head: 
 
‘All through life, it seems by me,’ she continued, ‘to tell me something. For poor neglected 
children, my little child pleads as if it were alive, and had a voice I knew, with which to speak 
to me.’ (226) 
 
Indeed, the child may be doubly a double, as critics such as Wendy K. Carse have linked it 
with the Phantom (172-3). As with Redlaw’s double, the grief-wrought voice, anguished and 
doleful (one fancies the syntax itself, the commas like locks on a canal, reflecting this), is 
actually a source of edification. Contrast this with Mr Tetterby’s own double. At first it seems 
a much lighter case, as light as the doubling of Redlaw’s mesmerism: the Tetterby spawn 
feigning ‘mesmeric influence’ on him, for example, or ‘Mr. William…direct[ing] persuasive 
glances at Mrs. William, and secret jerks of his head and thumb at Mr. Redlaw, as alluring 
her towards him’ (158, 139). Tetterby operates a small concern called ‘A. TETTERBY &. 
CO., NEWSMEN’, in which ‘Co.’ stands for nothing, is ‘a mere poetical abstraction, baseless 
178 
and impersonal’ (155). ‘Co.’, having never existed, is not even a vestige like Marley. Yet, in 
the comic fantasy Dickens indulges in, Tetterby is usurped by ‘Co.’: 
 
The best position in the firm was too evidently Co.’s; Co., as a bodiless creation, being 
untroubled with the vulgar inconveniencies of hunger and thirst, being chargeable neither to 
the poor’s-rates nor to the assessed taxes, and having no young family to provide for. (156) 
 
What starts out as the sort of wry thoughts Tetterby himself might entertain quickly drifts into 
an area of ontological ambiguity, even crisis. ‘Co.’ is prospering at Tetterby’s expense as the 
doubles in Poe’s ‘William Wilson’ and Hans Christian Andersen’s tale ‘The Shadow’ do at 
their originals’. ‘“Better to be called ever so far out of your name,”’ Mr William avers. 
‘What’s a name for? To know a person by”’ (133). That is mocked here. We see it mocked 
further in the case of the base guttersnipe, ‘the child who had no name or lineage’, who was 
‘more strange to the ways of childhood than a rough dog’ (228). This child is less a child than 
Milly’s dead, unborn babe. 
 
The text’s dualities tend to play on subjectivity: on losses of it and, in this case, on its 
redistribution. When the Phantom grants his ‘gift’, he bestows an imprecation on Redlaw: 
‘man whom I here renounce!’ (149) – a fate to which, it must be said, Redlaw rather seems to 
acquiesce. Likewise, little Johnny Tetterby, laden with his newborn sister and entrusted with 
her care, is threatened with a ‘conditional renunciation of him’ if any harm should come to 
her (160). His fate is truly contingent on hers, for the threats seem to transcend bluster, seem 
almost to be metaphysical. Even the Tetterby baby, which has not yet been named, seems to 
suffer from a subjective crisis. We find that ‘Mrs Tetterby always said’ of the baby Moloch’s 
first tooth that ‘“it was coming through, and then the child would be itself”; and still it never 
did come through, and the child continued to be somebody else’ (206). Elsewhere we read of 
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‘the wondering child, half-scared and half-amused, a stranger to itself’, and the wretch who 
wronged Redlaw plaintively muses ‘“I might have been another man, my life might have 
been another life…”’ (128, 224-25). On and on one could go. The abundance of examples in 
a purportedly warm, if sententious, Christmas diversion is startling. The text seems to be 
haunted not so much by ghosts but by the loss of subjectivity. That is to say, the abiding fear 
is not of incorporeal externalities but of incorporeal internalities. And yet that does not 
diminish the importance of the corporal; indeed, as in all good examples of Schauerroman, 
this only enhances its importance. In his deepest trough of, if you will permit the 
anachronism, existential despair, Redlaw 
 
looked confusedly upon his hands and limbs, as if to be assured of his identity, and then 
shouted in reply, loudly and wildly; for there was a strangeness and terror upon him, as if he 
too were lost. (149) 
 
It is as if Redlaw is suffering what those in attendance upon Monseigneur in A Tale of Two 
Cities, among them ‘unbelieving Chemists who had an eye on the transmutation of metals’, 
would later suffer: ‘the leprosy of unreality’ (126). One might well ask how looking upon his 
‘hands and limbs’ would avail him in his attempt ‘to be assured of his identity’. The answer, 
it seems to me, is that he fears what all those visited by doppelgängers fear. ‘I have got so 
much body. I have even got flesh,’ Andersen’s ‘shadow’ says, almost tauntingly, to ‘the 
learned man’, whose corporal presence thereafter evanesces as the Shadow gradually 
supplants him (The Fairy World 59). As Emily Walker Heady notes, ‘concrete objects 
continually stand in for and comment on private thought’ in THM; so, then, might objects that 
are no longer concrete (13). The dissolution of the body betokens the dissolution of the soul, 
although one cannot help thinking that, as with ‘Co.’, this need not be such a bad thing. 
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I am not sure I agree with Groth’s assessment that the text affirms ‘the civilising 
power of memory, its ability to suppress the chaos of individual desire and to foster social 
responsibility’ (‘Reading Victorian Illusions’ 43). There is a mutinousness in it, as there is in 
Redlaw himself; an insurgency of weirdness wells up in it. This is all the more peculiar given 
that, as Ruth Glancy notes, Dickens was scrupulously careful in writing and rewriting the 
text, not at all like an author knocking off a nice little earner in the quick turnaround before 
Christmas (76-77). Consider that Redlaw, for all that ‘he is come back to himself!’ at the end, 
is portrayed as an apparition, one invisible to the people around him, as if his fears for his 
‘hands and limbs’ were not misplaced: 
 
While she was speaking, Redlaw had come in, and, after pausing for a moment to observe the 
group of which she was the centre, had silently ascended the stairs. Upon those stairs he now 
appeared again; remaining there, while the young student passed him, and came running 
down. (216) 
 
He ‘appeared again’, as if at some point during his ascension he had disappeared, and the 
student passes him without appearing to notice that he is there. Bear in mind that the Tetterby 
household is scarcely more than a tenement; at a guess, it would be difficult to pass someone 
on those stairs at all. Refer to Tenniel’s illustration of him holding a lantern on the staircase; 
as in the Leech illustrations elsewhere, Redlaw is an enormous figure and appears to take up 
the entire landing. Yet the student is oblivious, and it is only belatedly that ‘the old 
man...espied the Chemist, whom until now he had not seen’ (220). How could anyone fail to 
see such a figure? It is as if he has degraded to the same level of attenuation as The Learned 
Man in Andersen’s tale. This aporia makes the twee ending – the principals gathering to 
feast, flush with the ideal of the ‘Swidgers’ like Mr William and Milly holding hands around 
the circumference of the world – appear meretricious, a desperate bulwark against the ‘dark 
swallowing one up’ that Mr William refers to in his first conversation with Mr William. 
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There is still that lacuna in the text: namely, that while Redlaw’s victims were under his 
‘charmed influence’, their behaviour was actually inherent. There seems nothing to stop such 
behaviour irrupting again; ‘the chaos of individual desire’ is not suppressed, much as the 
ending, an occlusion rather than a conclusion, tries to suppress it. 
 
* 
 
Kaplan’s reversed formulation, ‘the truth of the illusion and the dream of reality’, is a neat 
summary of a longstanding, cogent line in Dickens criticism. Take Lewes’s striking remarks 
on Dickens as a ‘seer of visions’ whose ‘vividness of mind approach[ed] so closely to 
hallucination’: 
 
What seems preposterous, impossible to us, seemed to him simple fact of observation. When 
he imagined a street, a house, a room, a figure, he saw it not in the vague schematic way of 
ordinary imagination, but in the sharp definition of actual perception, all the salient details 
obtruding themselves on his attention. He, seeing it thus vividly, made us also see it; and 
believing in its reality however fantastic, he communicated something of his belief to us. He 
presented it in such relief that we ceased to think of it as a picture. So definite and insistent 
was the image, that even while knowing it was false we could not help, for a moment, being 
affected, as it were, by his hallucination. (Critical Assessments v.I 457, 458) 
 
Insofar as any subjective judgement can be, this seems to me just about right as an 
assessment of what made Dickens a successful novelist. And in its capacious rightness there 
seem to me many points that animate ones I have made about hypotyposis, or not even so 
much ‘points’ as ‘tendencies’, perhaps, tacks whose destination is between Lewes’s points, 
stewarded by the lighthouse of their illumination. Its rightness can be extrapolated from the 
similarity of so much criticism that followed it. Henry James, for example, almost seems to 
be plagiarising Lewes when he writes about the ‘the [imaginative] power of evoking visible 
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objects and figures, seeing them themselves with the force of hallucination and making others 
see them all but just as vividly’ that he believed Dickens and Balzac to share with 
Shakespeare (Fanger 75). My first thought upon seeing the passage from Lewes was how 
much the idea of ‘believing in its reality however fantastic’ recalled Townshend, who 
expends reams of prose on relating the revelation of the first act of mesmerism he witnessed, 
the epiphany he felt: 
 
That which I had heard mocked at as foolishness — that which I myself had doubted as a 
dream, was perhaps about to be brought home to my conviction, and established for ever in 
my mind as a reality. Should the present trial prove successful, how much of my past 
experience must be remodelled and reversed! (59) 
 
All I believed is true! Notice once again the subversion of Kaplan’s division between ‘the 
dreams of illusion’ and ‘the truth of reality’: what Townshend ‘had doubted as a dream’ is 
‘established for ever in my mind as a reality’. But from Lewes’s passage we can also see the 
conspicuous relation between the ‘seer of visions’ it describes and the tranced vision of 
mesmerised patients. As I noted earlier, under his observation Dickens’ mesmeric patient 
Madame de la Rue ‘spoke earnestly [about a scene], as if the scene had been actually visible 
to her…something that she can see and fears to miss any sight’. But, as Lewes says here, this 
could just as soon be about Dickens himself. One recalls that famous comment by Dickens 
that I quoted in the introduction: ‘I don’t invent it – I really do not – but see it, and write it 
down’. This is an extraordinary assertion. Implicit in this model, and close to explicit in the 
Dickens quote, is the idea of the author being tranced, a broadcaster of his literary delirium. 
Here we might concur with Lee’s tentative hypothesis that ‘the oracles of old, those for 
instance of Delphi, [might] be explained by the responses of a magnetic somnambulist in the 
highest state of lucidity’ (127). Returning to a passage from Macnish I quoted earlier, in 
which ‘the sorrowful man’ who is ‘stimulated by over-excessive study’ is unable to sleep, we 
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find that coupled with this Redlaw-like figure described first, there is a very Dickens-like one 
described just below it: 
 
It is the same with the man of vivid imagination. His fancy, instead of being subdued by the 
spell of sleep, becomes more active than ever. Thoughts in a thousand fantastic forms—
myriads of waking dreams—pass through his mind, whose excessive activity spurns at repose, 
and mocks all his endeavors to reduce it to quiescence. (199) 
 
To quote a description from later in the treatise that can be Redlaw with equal justice, ‘It is 
the series of false images or sounds, which are so vivid as to be mistaken for realities’ that 
Dickens perceives (216). 
 
To return again to Madame de la Rue and Dickens’ mesmeric relaionship with her, 
Dickens records that she was ‘shedding tears…and shewing the greatest sympathy’ as she 
saw with her internal vision her brother ‘Charles’, even though no such brother existed 
(Letters v.4 248). In a further comical development during this highly comical episode32, de 
la Rue began to speak of ‘a man’ she saw in her trances; only it was not clear she did see him, 
and he was not clear to her if she did. In Dickens’ account, the man is ‘dimly seen’ but she 
‘“dare not” look at’ him. When the ‘man’ is next spoken of, however, he is a ‘phantom’, as if 
he were both physically evanescing before our eyes – though not Dickens’ and certainly not 
de la Rue’s, except perhaps de la Rue’s after all – yet also gaining in malevolent influence. It 
is at this point that we get the most peculiar sentence, a sentence not easy to parse in its 
entirety, and even harder to understand: 
                                                 
32 Michael Slater relates that in Rome in late 1844 Dickens and Madame de la Rue 
 
resumed face-to-face treatment – though this hardly seems the right phrase when we think of the 
occasion when he was summoned to the de la Rues’ bedroom one night to find Madame ‘rolled into an 
apparently impossible ball, by tic in the brain’ and was only able to find where her head was ‘by 
following her long hair to its source’. (Charles Dickens 233) 
 
With delicacy Slater goes on to note that ‘the situation made Catherine…understandably very uneasy’. 
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I connect [the phantom] with the figure she calls her bad spirit; in consequence of her trembling very 
much, when I once asked her, lying on this imaginary hill, if that phantom were to be seen: when she 
implored me not to speak of him. (248)  
 
Suddenly Dickens’ faulty modifier has vaulted him into the dream, which is apt since he 
appears to be both progenitor and double of the figure (248). The scene is a reprise of the 
scene from BR I referred to earlier, where the mesmerised Barnaby dreams of being pursued 
by a monster ‘in the shape of a man’. The willingness earnestly to pursue a chimera until it 
becomes lodged as truth, whereupon its status as truth is hastily taken for granted to the point 
of complacency and it is then distorted further, is a staple of Dickens’ writing. It goes all the 
way back to Boz and its rickety, fabulous extemporisations. Dickens knows the ‘phantom’ 
who ‘has persecuted her’ is a ‘Fancy’, yet he allows it to persecute him as well. As Connor 
notes, ‘Dickens became obsessed with this figure of the phantom, who seems to be both his 
double and his rival’, convinced of existence, whatsoever that existence may have been (19). 
Like his tranced subject, he behaves ‘with as much earnestness as if the scene had actually 
been present to [his] view’ (Letters v.4 248). 
 
Glancy records that when Dickens wrote the scene in which Milly reveals that she had 
once had a stillborn child, he wept: ‘the manuscript is heavily blotted with tears at this point,’ 
Glancy writes, noting that Dickens had told William Bradbury the day after finishing it that 
he was ‘crying my eyes out over it – not painfully but pleasantly as I hope the readers will – 
these last three days’ ( 73). Three days’ mourning, irrigated with those incomparably 
Victorian ‘pleasant’ tears. He was, in other words, pitched into transports of grief over a 
fictional character he invented discussing a baby that she had, with the aid of Dickens, 
invented herself – ‘made alive’ in the words of Browning’s mesmerist – by projecting the 
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fancied life its stillbirth precluded it from enjoying. There is nothing unusual in weeping over 
a piece of writing, I should add. Moreover, one infers from Dickens’ report to Bradbury that 
his ‘pleasant’ tears are not a little self-congratulatory as he surveys the vista of acclaim 
beyond publication. ‘If you had seen Macready last night,’ he tells a correspondent after 
performing a private reading of The Chimes, ‘undisguisedly sobbing, and crying on the sofa 
as I read, you would have felt , as I did, what a thing it is to have power’ (A. Wilson 187). 
Still, self-congratulation aside, the scene with Milly he is ‘seeing…thus vividly’, and seeing 
too how he will ‘ma[k]e us also see it’. It is interesting that the virtually identical conditions 
Macnish describes in those quotes about ‘myriads of waking dreams’ and ‘false images or 
sounds…so vivid’ and the art Lewes describes, which it seems to me are not merely similar 
but analogous, have something else in common. Macnish ascribes the conditions to 
‘inflammation of the brain’; this comports with Lewes’s insinuation of a pathology, where he 
has Dickens spreading his ‘hallucination’, a kind of derangement, as if it were a malady, the 
‘gift’ of THM (216). Dickens is like the ‘Mesmeric agent’ in Sandby, a vector. 
 
* 
 
On the opening page of The Mystery of Edwin Drood there is a famous passage detailing the 
dream of the intoxicated, entranced Jasper as he slowly rouses from his stupor in an opium 
den. If this is the Dickens book without an ending, it is also a book rather without a 
beginning. A.D. Nuttall suggests in his brilliant study Openings that other Dickens books 
such as Barnaby Rudge have in media res beginnings, but this seems to me incorrect since in 
BR and other of the third-person books we are in media well before we get to the res (174). 
Here there are no well-fed preliminaries. What we get is lean, without context, without even 
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orientation. The perceiving consciousness has just been startled by the irruption of a town, his 
home town, and its landmark the Cathedral: 
 
An ancient English Cathedral Tower? How can the ancient English Cathedral tower be here! 
The well-known massive gray square tower of its old Cathedral? How can that be here! There 
is no spike of rusty iron in the air, between the eye and it, from any point of the real 
prospect. What is the spike that intervenes, and who has set it up? Maybe it is set up by the 
Sultan’s orders for the impaling of a horde of Turkish robbers, one by one. It is so, for 
cymbals clash, and the Sultan goes by to his palace in long procession. Ten thousand scimitars 
flash in the sunlight, and thrice ten thousand dancing-girls strew flowers. Then, follow white 
elephants caparisoned in countless gorgeous colours, and infinite in number and attendants. 
Still the Cathedral Tower rises in the background, where it cannot be, and still no writhing 
figure is on the grim spike. Stay! Is the spike so low a thing as the rusty spike on the top of a 
post of an old bedstead that has tumbled all awry? Some vague period of drowsy laughter 
must be devoted to the consideration of this possibility. 
Shaking from head to foot, the man whose scattered consciousness has thus 
fantastically pieced itself together, at length rises, supports his trembling frame upon his arms, 
and looks around. (37) 
 
What is ‘fantastically pieced’ together here is a fictional portrait of an hallucination that is 
nevertheless capable of discerning an intra-textual ‘real’ within its own fiction (intra poema, 
to quote from Nuttall again: ‘within the fiction’ [Openings 184]). That is, we are at two 
removes from the sense-impressions percolating back to us. We may add a third layer of 
mediation in the form of a dispute over whether this is indeed ‘a real prospect’ of an opium 
trance. Hayter suggests Dickens’ descriptions of Jasper’s dream ‘sound factitious’; Stanley 
and Tracey, however, both appear to rebut this, contending that it follows from De Quincey 
directly and also indirectly through, among others, Macnish and Elliotson (Hayter 295). For 
the reader, it is not even clear what a ‘real prospect’ would be with regard to such a vision. 
Leave aside the two incongruous elements and the vision is still a simulacrum of lurid 
exotica. Stanley wonders whether Jasper is truly as much under the influence as we assume: 
‘Jasper's dismissal of the Cathedral vision as something unrealistic,’ he writes, is in keeping 
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with how a clear, unintoxicated mind ‘would reject incongruous perceptual phenomena. 
Questions [remain] as to what extent the opium trance has displaced Jasper's grasp on reality’ 
(16). As Stanley would have it, Jasper is in effect cultivating and tending his own 
hallucination: this is ‘the anomaly of a hallucinogenic trance that can define and maintain its 
own inner reality by reference to the visions it produces,’ unseen in literature hitherto (15). 
But surely the point here is that the ‘curious depersonalization of [Jasper’s] account’ arises 
from the waning of the opium. It was never Jasper’s trance, in the sense of him being its 
arbiter, much less Jasper’s account, since we are seeing instead a focalised paraphrase (16). 
Nor is ‘the inner reality’ ever ‘maintained’ in our scant glimpses of the dream. The 
Cathedral’s unwelcome debut presages the dissolution of the trance, both internally (the 
dream it produces) and externally (Jasper awakes), insofar as it was ever more than an 
association of ‘incongruous perceptual phenomena’. Jasper cannot arrange for his ‘horde of 
Turkish robbers’ to be skewered on the spike for his delectation, though clearly he is eager to 
see it (there is a sadistic smack of the lips in ‘writhing figure’ and an impatience with the lack 
of one). He does not even know who is responsible for the erection of the spike. 
 
Indeed, the expressed bewilderment near the beginning of the passage comes to seem 
slightly absurd. ‘How can that be here!’ is not censorious when one looks at the marvellous 
figments taken for granted. What would ‘ten thousand scimitars’ look like? Are the ‘thrice 
ten thousand dancing girls’ precisely quantified, or is the figure arrived at merely the 
retention of the preceding clause’s exaggerated unit? In exhibiting a stonerish fascination 
with irrelevant minutiae, to which ‘a vague period of drowsy laughter is devoted’ at the end, 
Jasper is not seeing the forest for the trees. There is no perspective in this ‘phantasmagoria’, 
as Stanley calls it, but Jasper tries to impose one anyway, a doomed attempt (14). ‘Between 
the eye and it, from any point of the real prospect’ suggests a standard of verisimilitude that 
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the dream elsewhere refutes. Nothing can be ‘real’ here because it is all incongruous. None of 
the other envisioned things is in Cloisterham either. The spike as incongruous in the context 
of the dream is less interesting than the spike as incongruous in the context of itself. Jasper 
laughs because it is veritable child’s play: the transmutation of some furnishing’s rundown 
extremity into the instrument of the wicked Turkish robbers’ comeuppance, a patently 
ridiculous fancy. For a moment the ordinary has been rendered extraordinary. It gives the 
subsequent observation of ‘the large unseemly bed’ another shade of meaning, nudging a 
latent pun from ‘unseemly’. The bed has ceased seeming and returned to its habitual prosaic 
state, utterly disenchanted. The room is all the more slovenly for the contrast, hence Jasper 
and the narrator’s shared revulsion. 
 
The ‘incongruity’, far from being an impediment to the fantasy, is its impetus. Nor 
does the weaning from vision to reality, albeit a reality as tainted and therefore as unreliable 
as this, impede the play of seeming. How much more accurate are the images Jasper sees in 
the room when awake than those he sees in his trances? Jasper and the reader come upon the 
image of the pipe’s ‘red spark of light’ that ‘serves in the dim morning as a lamp to show him 
what he sees of her [the old opium-dealer]’. That odd phrasing, the biblical pleonasm of 
‘show him what he sees of her’, is noteworthy. Construed literally, it implies that without the 
spark he would not see anything when he sees her – a self-annulling nonsense – almost as if 
she were no more than a screen on which to project the lamp. There is, however, further 
evidence for this in the twisted distortion on the next page: ‘He notices that the woman has 
opium-smoked herself into a strange likeness of the Chinaman’ (38). Jasper believes in this 
contagion and panics at the corporal threat it appears to pose, like Redlaw before him. 
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The dream cathedral is actually a species of hypotyposis, hypotyposis at its purest. Or, 
at any rate, it is an inversion of hypotyposis at its purest. If an exemplar of hypotyposis is 
‘putting lions or olive trees in a northern country’, as Barthes puts it, then the imposition of a 
foreboding, deathly English cathedral on a grandiloquent vision of ‘white elephants 
caparisoned in countless gorgeous colours’, among other Oriental splendours, is the same 
thing in reverse (144). We may note further that the incongruity is not quite what it purports 
to be. To put it another way, the impossible juxtaposition within Jasper’s sense-impressions is 
not so much an ‘incongruity’ as an unapprehended congruity, to be perceived by both reader 
and protagonist during the course of the novel. The link between Cloisterham and Jasper’s 
furtive secret life in the opium world, with its seedy den and transcendent visions, is present 
and strong, if mostly unseen at this point. Yet the ‘spasmodic shoots and darts that break out 
of her face and limbs, like fitful lightning out of a dark sky’ as Jasper watches the old lady 
‘Princess Puffer’ smoking her opium pipe are answered back in Cloisterham when ‘the 
intoned words’ of the church service’s opening prayer ‘rise among groins of arches and 
beams of roof, awakening muttered thunder’ (39, 40). The link is not idle, since this 
metaphorical consonance foretells both the scene of Drood’s presumed entombment and the 
book’s broader thematic play. Opium, secreted in this London den, will nevertheless impinge 
on Cloisterham, as will the Orient in its repeated guises, of which opium is but one. 
 
The passage featuring Jasper’s dream recalls John Carlos Rowe’s comment on the 
etymology of hypotyposis that I quoted in the introduction. He notes that ‘the impression is 
always an act of physical violence, ‘“a pressing into or upon”’. It is, among other things, the 
rhetorical device of putting something ‘where it cannot be’. We find an even better example, 
better for being less ostentatious, in Drood’s ‘little nook composed of two irregular 
quadrangles, called Staple Inn’, where Rosa’s attorney Mr Grewgious has his chambers: 
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It is one of those nooks where a few smoky sparrows twitter in smoky trees, as though they 
called to one another, ‘Let us play at country,’ and where a few feet of garden mould and a 
few yards of gravel enable them to do that refreshing violence to their tiny understandings. 
(133-34) 
 
They might almost laugh at this play as Jasper laughs at the bed spike. ‘Refreshing violence’ 
is, as Fanger wrote, contrary to ‘realism’, which must consist of ‘a language that does not do 
violence to its objects’. Yet the birds’ incongruous fiction, ‘refreshing’ as defamiliarisation is 
refreshing, is nevertheless persuasive; the birds enjoy the ‘truth of illusion’. So does Jasper’s 
dream. Fancy courts a giddy, vertiginous apprehension of the world, by turns delightful and 
horrific, similar to what Dorothy Van Ghent wrote about in her seminal essay ‘The Dickens 
World: A View from Todgers’, where she calls ‘Dickens’s method…a scrupulous rendering 
of nature gone wrong in all its parts’ (Critical Assessments v.IV 58). This is the passage she 
writes about, with the addition of the paragraph before it: 
 
The top of the house was worthy of notice. There was a sort of terrace on the roof, with posts 
and fragments of rotten lines, once intended to dry clothes upon; and there were two or three 
tea-chests out there, full of earth, with forgotten plants in them, like old walking-sticks. 
Whoever climbed to this observatory, was stunned at first from having knocked his head 
against the little door in coming out; and after that, was for the moment choked from having 
looked perforce, straight down the kitchen chimney; but these two stages over, there were 
things to gaze at from the top of Todgers’s, well worth your seeing too. For first and foremost, 
if the day were bright, you observed upon the house-tops, stretching far away, a long dark 
path; the shadow of the Monument; and turning round, the tall original was close beside you, 
with every hair erect upon his golden head, as if the doings of the city frightened him. Then 
there were steeples, towers, belfries, shining vanes, and masts of ships; a very forest. Gables, 
housetops, garret-windows, wilderness upon wilderness. Smoke and noise enough for all the 
world at once. 
 
After the first glance, there were slight features in the midst of this crowd of objects, which 
sprung out from the mass without any reason, as it were, and took hold of the attention whether the 
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spectator would or no. Thus, the revolving chimney-pots on one great stack of buildings seemed to be 
turning gravely to each other every now and then, and whispering the result of their separate 
observation of what was going on below. Others, of a crook-backed shape, appeared to be maliciously 
holding themselves askew, that they might shut the prospect out and baffle Todgers’s. The man who 
was mending a pen at an upper window over the way, became of paramount importance in the scene, 
and made a blank in it, ridiculously disproportionate in its extent, when he retired. The gambols of a 
piece of cloth upon the dyer’s pole had far more interest for the moment than all the changing motion 
of the crowd. Yet even while the looker-on felt angry with himself for this, and wondered how it was, 
the tumult swelled into a roar; the hosts of objects seemed to thicken and expand a hundredfold, and 
after gazing round him, quite scared, he turned into Todgers’s again, much more rapidly than he came 
out; and ten to one he told M. Todgers afterwards that if he hadn’t done so, he would certainly have 
come into the street by the shortest cut; that is to say, head-foremost. (MC 133-34) 
 
Indeed, Jasper’s opium dream is very similar to the titular view from Todgers’ boarding 
house. In MC, what appears to be a panorama is something far more discomfiting, since it is 
not the viewer’s eye whose gradual movement pans across or tracks the diverse phenomena, 
nor is it the phenomena themselves that gradually but uniformly move. Indeed, the ‘revolving 
chimney-pots’ are a strange parody of the panorama, ‘whispering their separate observation 
of what was going on below’ (58). ‘What was going on below’ is quite unruly, nay riotous, 
each phenomenon changing of its own accord, coalescing or emerging or withdrawing. As 
Francesca Orestano, writing about Dickens’ eschewing of conventional ‘picturesque’ 
perspective for the fluidity of the magic lantern’s dissolve, puts it: ‘Dickens’s experiments 
with description’ result in ‘paradigmatic cogency of visual forms in their mutually creative 
relationship’ (264). The scene is in flux, though not the ordered flux of afternoon turning to 
sunset and then on to dusk that I quoted near the beginning of this chapter in my summary of 
Drood. ‘A scrap of cloth’ is seen to ‘gambol’. Some trivial activity’s cessation causes a 
‘ridiculously disproportionate’ rend in the view, much as the spike on the bedstead was 
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ridiculously disproportionate in Jasper’s dream. As Garrett Stewart writes, ‘things do not 
simply exist, they happen, they swarm and start to life, and before long they have startled and 
harried the observer’ (Trials 175). Finally, what perspective there ever was is lost and ‘the 
hosts of objects seemed to thicken and expand a hundredfold’, the numerary exaggeration 
dialled down only a little from ‘ten thousand’, ‘thrice ten thousand’ and ‘infinite’. 
 
There is a description in Great Expectations that brings together many of these 
themes: ghosts, disorientation and its aesthetic, and even the ‘refreshing violence’ to the 
sparrows’ ‘tiny understandings’, though admittedly its single instance of counting is exact 
(‘in number half a dozen or so’): 
 
…[W]e were at Barnard’s Inn. My depression was not alleviated by the announcement, for, I 
had supposed that establishment to be an hotel kept by Mr. Barnard, to which the Blue Boar in 
our town was a mere public-house. Whereas I now found Barnard to be a disembodied spirit, 
or a fiction, and his inn the dingiest collection of shabby buildings ever squeezed together in a 
rank corner as a club for Tom-cats. 
We entered this haven through a wicket-gate, and were disgorged by an introductory 
passage into a melancholy little square that looked to me like a flat burying-ground. I thought 
it had the most dismal trees in it, and the most dismal sparrows, and the most dismal cats, and 
the most dismal houses (in number half a dozen or so), that I had ever seen. I thought the 
windows of the sets of chambers into which those houses were divided were in every stage of 
dilapidated blind and curtain, crippled flower-pot, cracked glass, dusty decay, and miserable 
makeshift; while To Let, To Let, To Let, glared at me from empty rooms, as if no new 
wretches ever came there, and the vengeance of the soul of Barnard were being slowly 
appeased by the gradual suicide of the present occupants and their unholy interment under the 
gravel. A frowzy mourning of soot and smoke attired this forlorn creation of Barnard, and it 
had strewn ashes on its head, and was undergoing penance and humiliation as a mere dust-
hole. Thus far my sense of sight; while dry rot and wet rot and all the silent rots that rot in 
neglected roof and cellar,—rot of rat and mouse and bug and coaching-stables near at hand 
besides—addressed themselves faintly to my sense of smell, and moaned, ‘Try Barnard’s 
Mixture.’ 
So imperfect was this realization of the first of my great expectations, that I looked in 
dismay at Mr. Wemmick. ‘Ah!’ said he, mistaking me; ‘the retirement reminds you of the 
country. So it does me.’ 
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He led me into a corner and conducted me up a flight of stairs,—which appeared to 
me to be slowly collapsing into sawdust, so that one of those days the upper lodgers would 
look out at their doors and find themselves without the means of coming down,—to a set of 
chambers on the top floor. (173) 
 
As with ‘Co.’, ‘Barnard’ yields a complex of fancies that, as it develops, corroborates and 
extends its own veracity through a mixture of legerdemain and anaphora. ‘Barnard’s’ is 
veritably a name to conjure with. He has been ‘called out of [his] name’, though there is no 
evidence beyond the possessive that a man ever existed to be called out of anything. Pip 
acknowledges that he ‘now found Barnard to be a disembodied spirit, or a fiction’, in other 
words nothing. Much like the man in Madame de la Rue’s dream, he has waned from 
corporeality, if only an illusory corporeality in Pip head, to a menancing ‘disembodied spirit’ 
or ‘soul’ who takes ‘vengeance’ against his tenants for some undisclosed wrong with this 
manslaughter apparatus posing as a dwelling. He superintends their ‘unholy interment’ in the 
mass grave underneath his unholy grounds. As it happens, Pip is already explaining why 
future ‘wretches’ might be compelled to ‘suicide’ by observing the apparently rotten flight of 
stairs. It all arises out of revulsion, a distate made literal by the advertisment for the 
homicidal tonic ‘Barnard’s Mixture’, itself having unwittingly assimilated the earlier, seminal 
fiction that Barnard might be some kind of grand publican in the great metropolis. The tattoo 
of ‘Dismal’ – a word that in fact frequently recurs in the novel – is answered by the tattoo of 
‘To Let’, both of them uttered as if imprecations against this hateful place. As with Jasper’s 
dream and Todgers’ aspect, such a view can only occur without any measure of perspective; 
it subsists on enclosure, with even its vocabulary confined to stinting anaphora, an anaphora 
that imposes Stoehr’s ‘order without direction or classification’ on froward reality but is also 
captive and impoverished, as if Pip could not conceive of other worlds, let alone ways of 
describing this one without the manacles of ‘dismal’ and ‘rot’. This is akin to the ‘devious 
mazes’ on the way to the other inn, Todgers’, a world as oppressive as Redlaw’s or Jasper’s 
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(MC 131). And yet while this deadly place is made to live on the page, we are made aware of 
just how distorted is Pip’s view, quite the opposite of ‘realization’ in the other sense, by the 
glorious bathos of Wemmick’s comment ‘“the retirement reminds you of the country. So it 
does me.”’ One would not be surprised if the ‘dismal sparrows’, like their counterparts in 
Drood, felt the same way. 
 
‘His visions were of objects at once familiar and potent,’ Lewes writes, repeating 
Dickens’ view, expressed in his preface to BH, that he saw ‘the romantic side of familiar 
things’ in his fiction. Juliet McMaster, writing about BR, observes that in that novel ‘illusions 
recurrently turn real: dreams are prophetic, ghosts are substantiated into flesh and blood, and 
the wild fantasies of madmen are actually enacted’ (Critical Assessments v.II 444-45). She 
demonstrates this with wonderful perceptiveness, and concludes with the further observation 
that ‘by showing how visions turn real, he is announcing his faith in the faculty of the mind to 
figure forth that which is not, and recognize its validity’ (456). Quite so, but this is true of 
other works too. Illusions turn real in the novels I have discussed, and, as Petroski put it, the 
reader temporarily allows himself to be persuaded of their truth. Donald Fanger, quoting the 
remark in ‘Meditations in Monmouth-Street’ that ‘we saw, or fancied we did – it makes no 
difference which’, notes that in Dickens’ work sight and vision, seeing things and ‘seeing 
things’, are conflated (78). Observing that the ‘fancy’ of its ‘fanciful observer[s]’ is always in 
surplus, he writes that ‘it enters as well into the very fabric of the narration and constitutes 
one of the indices of the quality of hallucination…’ (86). There is something unlawful, 
intractable about such fancy, as we have seen. It seems quite plausible to me that a further, 
different example of what Fanger means and of what I have been discussing is visible in the 
Tetterby household. Poor Johnny, laden with the baby in that diabolical reprise of pregnancy, 
must be mindful of spilling any food on it: ‘He was required…to keep his pudding, when not 
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on active service, in his pocket’. This follows from the description of children ‘utterly 
routing’ each other. Further down the page, that whimsical little intrusion of the martial 
appears to bloom: 
 
a party of light skirmishers in night-gowns were careering about the parlour all through 
supper, which harassed Mr Tetterby exceedingly, and once or twice imposed upon him the 
necessity of a charge, before which these guerrilla troops retired in all directions and in great 
confusion. (216) 
 
It is as if Dickens’ ‘fancy’ more than the Tetterby brood is what is careering about, excited by 
the glimpse of one brief metaphor into an insurrection, a wild, ungovernable conceit. Another 
example might be that from BH noted by Garrett Stewart: ‘“deposits” of mud in the opening 
paragraph, whose seemingly neutral choice of diction triggers the caustic metaphor (and 
fiscal send-up), “accumulating at compound interest”’ (‘Dickens and language’ 140). There is 
a temporality, a contingency, occurring here, notably different from other types of description 
in Dickens’ writing. What we find is not so much a conceit or extended metaphor but a 
distended metaphor: swollen, distorted and contaminating. To complete the Michael T. 
Taussig quote I cited when discussing Redlaw’s ‘contagion’, we find in such prose: 
 
‘contagious magic’, involving what appears to be a physical connection in order to effect, 
through rite, the substance connected… Words can do this, too, writing no less than reading 
being a ritualistic practice, and thus words can be links to viscerality, into the thingness of 
things connected in chains of being, not chains of meaning. (x) 
 
‘[V]iscerality’ and ‘the thingness of things connected in chains of being, not chains of 
meaning’ is perfect as a description of Dickens’ descriptive prose at representative moments 
like those I quoted above. Fanger, anticipating Rosemary Jackson’s ‘fantastic realism’, refers 
to this sort of trope as ‘fantastic fidelity’, a nicely motley phrase (91). Illustrating his 
196 
argument, he adduces a comment by Dickens from his preface to Oliver Twist: ‘It is useless 
to discuss whether…the girl seems natural or unnatural, probable or improbable, right or 
wrong. IT IS TRUE’ (6). It is true, Dickens writes, regardless of whether it is ‘a 
contradiction, an anomaly, an apparent impossibility’ (7). The scrambling, perhaps even the 
abrogation, of Kaplan’s division between the ‘dreams of illusion’ and the ‘truth of reality’ is 
complete here, for Dickens aspires to transcend them. Looking again at Lewes’s comment, 
we see that the comment about ‘visions…of objects at once familiar and potent’ is the 
reverse, the other side, of ‘the romantic side of familiar things’, for it holds that Dickens sees 
illusory things as if they were familiar objects. There is a scrambling here too, and in THM, 
that scrambled text, it is bodied forth: a reality of dreams, the truth of illusion as perceived 
through his ‘internal vision’. Just as, in Redlaw’s words, ‘a dream, like her’s has stolen over 
my life’, one has stolen over the text too (145). 
 
We see some of this temporality, a completely different version from that example of 
sunset and then dusk I quoted earlier, in the following Chinese whispers, to use an aptly 
Oriental term. It is useful to look at how easily this rhetorical technique I have dilated on 
corresponds to sheer malicious gossip. Drood and his antagonist Neville Landless, both 
drugged by Jasper and unaware of it, have some kind of brawl; word of this, presumably via 
Jasper, gets out and its contagion quickly spreads and mutates. The narrator is arch about its 
transmission, entertaining several fanciful notions of how it breached The Nuns’ House 
where Drood’s fiancee Rosa and Neville’s sister Helena reside. Eventually he alights on the 
formulation ‘certain it is that the news permeated every gable of the old building before Miss 
Twinkleton was down’. Particulars of the transmission thereafter are given in this passage: 
 
Miss Landless’s brother had thrown a bottle at Mr Edwin Drood. 
Miss Landless’s brother had thrown a knife at Mr Edwin Drood. 
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A knife became suggestive of a fork, and Miss Landless’s brother had thrown a fork 
at Mr Edwin Drood. 
As in the governing precedence of Peter Piper, alleged to have picked the peck of 
pickled pepper, it was held physically desirable to have evidence of the existence of the peck 
of pickled pepper which Peter Piper was alleged to have picked; so, in this case, it was held 
psychologically important to know why Miss Landless’s brother threw a bottle, knife, or fork-
or bottle, knife, and fork—for the cook had been given to understand it was all three—at Mr. 
Edwin Drood? 
Well, then. Miss Landless’s brother had said he admired Miss Bud. Mr. Edwin Drood 
had said to Miss Landless’s brother that he had no business to admire Miss Bud. Miss 
Landless’s brother had then ‘up’d’ (this was the cook’s exact information) with the bottle, 
knife, fork, and decanter (the decanter now coolly flying at everybody’s head, without the 
least introduction), and thrown them all at Mr. Edwin Drood. (107) 
 
We begin with the suggestion of a charge sheet in the line-length paragraphs and the legal 
formality of Drood’s title in ‘Mr Edwin Drood’, rather piously repeated in a way that speaks 
to the comic solemnity of the gossip. Couching low demotic exchanges in lofty registers was 
a favourite device of Dickens’. It is formality in inverse proportion to the frivolity or 
colloquialness of the scene as a means to maximum bathos. He proceeds with the device right 
the way through the passage. It is easy not to notice that we are being presented with a 
shadow investigation, even a shadow criminological study (‘it was held psychologically 
important’), that ends in parody: the narrator before an invisible – or doubly invisible, since 
imagined by the imaginary – drawing room of potential suspects, recapitulating the facts of 
the case as well as demonstrating his power of deduction. This shadow detection seems 
complacent about the enormous imaginative leap needed to surmount the chasm between the 
first two facts of the case and the last, such as it is. The irony of appearing to pronounce upon 
a crime is that the spurious logic is actually being used in the service of a real, far more 
sinister crime. How easily in the minds of those who accept the rumours’ veracity might a 
fight become suggestive of a murder, or indeed anything of anything else. So it proves: 
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‘Neville was detained, and the wildest frenzy and fatuity of evil report arose against him’ 
(198). 
 
Each scurrilous intelligence is a shy at the truth like the stones shied at Durdles, a 
false representation that begets further false representations. The lineage of more and more 
outrageous accounts expands until it reaches that triad of projectiles, ‘bottle, knife, or fork – 
or bottle, knife, and fork – for the cook had been given to understand it was all three,’ 
whereupon the cook confects the addition of a ‘decanter (the decanter now coolly flying at 
everybody’s head, without the least introduction)’ (107). In this droll sketch, people 
continually embellishing the altercation, an altercation they relish as they disapprove of it, we 
see the old style become noxious. Does it matter what happened? But this is no more than an 
exercise of fancy, is it not? As I have implied throughout this chapter, however, fancy is not 
always salutary. The ‘over-thinking sage’ possesses a ‘large development of the organ of 
Wonder’. It yields Madame de la Rue’s imagined figure, ‘that Fancy [who] has persecuted 
her’. 
 
* 
 
This purpose of this chapter has been not to look at the fictional real as fantasmatic, which the 
second chapter did, nor to look at conceiving the fantasmatic as a means of expanding one’s 
knowledge of the real, as the third chapter did in its explorations of ‘facts’. It has been to look 
at the fantasmatic perceived as real, the conception of the fantasmatic in lieu of the real. Or, 
to put it another way, I have argued that with BH we and the fictional entities within the text 
are ‘seeing things’ even when we and they are seeing things, discounting any kind of ‘world-
reflecting’ Realism. In nineteenth-century science, where this positivist Realism obtruded, we 
199 
should be ‘seeing things’ when seeing things is preferred; that is what Dickens in both his 
Examiner review and HT tries to impart. Finally, in THM and Drood we are ‘seeing things’ 
either way. I have proceeded in this manner because the thesis has been arguing a few 
different things at once in response to that simple question I adapted from Grahame Smith 
about Dickens’ writing being ‘more real than reality itself’. In this chapter I have tried to give 
my fullest answer to this question from an aesthetic perspective – if ‘perspective’ is not inapt 
for the disoriented aspects I have just criticised. This is the aesthetic perspective I 
foreshadowed in the introduction when invoking Lewes, Petroski and J. Hillis Miller. As 
Lewes first argued, the reader of Dickens ‘believ[es] in [the novels’] reality however 
fantastic’; ‘even while knowing it was false’, this reader ‘could not help, for a moment, being 
affected’. So it proves in the examples above. The aesthetic procession of a Dickens passage 
is akin to that of a trance, the contingent ‘self-generating reverie’ of Miller as contagious as 
Redlaw’s ‘gift’.
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has sought to trace the way in which ‘distortion’, ‘Falsism’, yields a 
cogent sense of realism in Dickens, indeed a devout conviction of it. There have been 
many ancillary arguments needed to dilate on and explicate this simple contention. 
First, I have attempted to show the grounds on which this distortion is admissible as 
‘realism’. The reasons for this attempt were to confirm the impression of realism that 
other readers and I have demonstrably felt and to explain why a new term was not 
needed – Lewes’s ‘Falsism’ not really counting as a credible term, merely an 
inversion for rhetorical effect. I have tried to show how the classical trope hypotyposis 
can illuminate what about Dickensian description, which as I indicated at the very 
beginning of this thesis is its main focus, creates the impression of realism. Clearly I 
am not suggesting Dickens wrote under any apprehension of this term, a risible idea. 
Instead I am proposing it to show how such a term – though I believe it to be the most 
precise of those terms in its ken – is a fruitful one for understanding the descriptive 
style. It expresses what Petroski finds in Dickens from his American tour onward, a 
style in which things ‘become more meaningful to Dickens when he perceives them to 
be something that they are not’, which makes the reader akin to the spectator of the 
panorama who could not quite concede what he had seen and knew to be an illusion 
was not real. This is the reader of Dickens. To adapt Aristotle’s description of 
hypotyposis’s effect again, this reader is made to ‘see things’. 
 
 In the introduction and four chapters this has extended from discussing the 
breaches of ‘distortion’ in Dickens’ non-fiction to discussing the nature of realism. In 
particular, the thesis discussed the way falsity is not incompatible with constructions 
of realism and then discussed defamiliarisation as one means of transmitting the 
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‘real’, which is where hypotyposis came in. In the chapters that followed I sought to 
show these findings across different Dickens novels. In the second chapter I tried to 
identify the falsity within the ‘real’, though not in that tiresome way critics who are 
surprised by novels’ fictionality try to identify it. My suggestion was that if the 
fictional ‘real’ is false anyway, might not falsity be an index of realism in a way 
totally different from that imagined? This would explain why so many readers find 
Dickens’ outlandish productions realistic. The third chapter complemented this by 
showing how falsity – defamiliarisation, Impossibilia – could facilitate scientific 
discovery. I wanted to stress ‘discovery’ because at its best Dickensian descriptive 
prose actually seems a discovery; withal, it seems to discover itself as it proceeds. 
This is the ‘continued process of Dickens’s language’ Smith talks about. The fourth 
chapter was about reading this ‘process’ in several examples. It was also about 
demonstrating how Lewes’s metaphor of the ‘hallucination’ was applicable to that 
‘process’ after all. The chapters were about other things besides, but those were the 
central themes. 
 
In this thesis I have tried to convey my own pleasure in Dickensian 
description, a pleasure that, for better or worse, led to this thesis. As I have tried to 
show, what I find so exciting about Dickensian description is its vivifying thrust, but 
‘energy’ is perhaps not quite what I mean. ‘Energy’ accounts for that bustle of onward 
progress, the descriptions tilting at their scenes and people and objects, almost 
belabouring them at times. It tilts at them as the Tetterby children tilt at each other. 
But ‘energy’ alone would not suffice for the manifest greatness of the prose, even 
greatness sustained over such expanses – though not, it should be said, without 
interludes of wilfulness or badness. What makes the wild career of the descriptions 
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unique is that revisionism and permutation, the contingencies that make the writing 
live, and thus alive, not just lively. Metaphors are riffled and adjectives, usually 
pejorative, toll and then disappear only to return, subtly altered, a few sentences on. 
Garrett Stewart expresses this stylistic tendency very well, discussing a passage from 
LD in which Amy Dorrit is travelling to Venice: 
 
[T]he kaleidoscopic barrage of the Dickens passage is more unreflective and nightmarish, a 
dizzy unfurling of contradictory impressions without any of the perspective tacitly achieved 
by rhetorical balance in [George] Eliot. The whole headlong tourist trek seems, from Amy 
Dorrit’s assaulted perspective, like a delirious dream in its senseless, expensive repetitions… 
(‘Dickens and language’ 139) 
 
He is referring to ‘the whole day’s dream’ (LD 517). It culminates in ‘the crowning 
unreality’ of Venice itself, where Dickens reprises the rhetorical poses in the 
descriptions of Venice I quoted in the introduction. Venice is a ‘collection of wild 
fancies’, and all Dickens’ descriptions of it, like the ‘massive stone darkened by ages’,  
are ‘built in a wild fancy’ (520). Again it is all rapid, as is the scene Stewart describes 
before it, a ‘family procession’ that pauses only when Little Dorrit ‘sat down to muse’ 
(519). But what one notes about the passage is not, for a change, the description, 
which adds little to the decade-old descriptions it paraphrases. It is the ‘other places 
and…other scenes associated with those different times’, namely Marshalsea and its 
‘old gate’ and the disgrace in which she was reared (520). We have already seen 
evidence of Marshalsea disturbing Little Dorrit’s thoughts in the free indirect line 
‘[the family] were to live in Venice some few months in a palace (itself six times as 
big as the whole Marshalsea)’ (519). Now Marshalesea and ‘other scenes’ are as if 
before Little Dorrit: she would ‘look over at the water, as though they all lay 
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underneath it’ (520). The fear is that the water ‘might run dry, and show her the prison 
again, and the old inmates, and the old visitors: all lasting realities that had never 
changed’ (520). She cannot escape it, as incongruous as it is there in Venice, where it 
is another ‘wild fancy’. 
 
This is something I wish to discuss before leaving off, because I think it 
clinches my argument as well as anything could. Throughout this thesis I have been 
trying to grasp and put into words exactly what Dickensian style is like. Not what it is, 
since doing that is as easy as reading the wonderful high-builded edifices of prose I 
am fond of importing. As I have shown, trying to put into words what the style is like, 
how it strikes one – and I use ‘strikes’ advisedly, since it can be a buffeting – is a 
common labour for Dickensians. For Lewes the style is like an hallucination; for 
Smith like walking out of a cinema after watching a film, though he also follows 
Lewes in finding an ‘hallucinatory power of observation’ (155). In the previous 
chapter I followed Lewes’s example and tried to explain, with help from his inheritors 
Taylor Stoehr, Donald Fanger, Dorothy Van Ghent, Stewart and Smith, what it meant 
to be hallucinatory (or Smith’s ‘dreamlike’). But at the risk of repeating myself, I feel 
ascribing Dickens’ virtuosity to a form of profitable derangement eventually causes 
problems. The movement of the prose follows the co-ordinates of an hallucination or 
dream but the artificer forming it – and as I have indicated, the ostentation of the 
forming is a big part of the effect – has not taken leave of his senses. On the contrary, 
he is preternaturally sensitive.  
 
This leads me to my own modest suggestion of what the style is ‘like’. It is a 
modest suggestion and may have been made before, though I cannot recall seeing it in 
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my rounds on the Dickens beat. The suggestion is this: it seems as if Dickens is 
constantly describing scenes as if he had just murdered them. Or perhaps, at any rate, 
he is describing scenes as if he were, like Sikes, a new murderer on the loose and 
were wandering through them. Bear with me. Perception has been whetted to the 
point at which everything impresses on it without perspective and discernment, and 
selectiveness is apparently effaced. We see it after that seminal murder, Bill Sikes 
bludgeoning Nancy in OT. Sikes has fled but, as we saw with Jonas in the 
introduction, flight is never wholly possible for a murderer. Indeed, as with scenes of 
hypotyposis, visions of murder scenes can appear in incongruous places. Murder is 
itinerant. This is true even for the wicked John Jasper, whose suppression of guilt 
falters for a moment in Grewgious’s presence when he swoons (Drood 191-92). 
Unlike Jasper’s murder of Drood, however, Sikes’s murder of Nancy is not cold-
blooded, and the shock rends him. Harried and exhausted, he collapses and 
‘undergo[es] a new torture’: 
 
For now, a vision came before him, as constant and more terrible than that from which he had 
escaped. Those widely staring eyes, so lustreless and so glassy, that he had better borne to see 
them than think upon them, appeared in the midst of the darkness: light in themselves, but 
giving light to nothing. There were but two, but they were everywhere. If he shut out the sight, 
there came the room with every well-known object – some, indeed, that he would have 
forgotten, if he had gone over its contents from memory – each in its accustomed place. The 
body was in its place, and its eyes were as he saw them when he stole away. He got up and 
rushed into the field without. The figure was behind him. He re-entered the shed, and shrunk 
down once more. The eyes were there, before he had lain himself along. (322) 
 
We recall that at the time Nancy’s dying body ‘was a ghastly figure to look upon’ and 
Sikes reared from it ‘shutting out the sight with his hand’ (317). Yet what Sikes is 
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really afraid of is its post-mortem pursuit of him, an entirely irrational fear. We are 
told ‘he had never once turned his back upon the corpse; no, not for a moment’ (317). 
This is because, as we are also told, ‘it was worse to fancy the eyes, and imagine them 
moving towards him, than to see them glancing upward’ (317). To ‘fancy’ or 
‘imagine’ something is more potent than to ‘see’ it, as I argued in my second chapter 
especially but also throughout this thesis. Things are most alive when one has just 
killed. This is the greatest possible means of doing ‘violence’ to reality, to revisit 
Fanger’s term and one favoured by Dickens. The description of Sikes’s vision is an 
acute case of what we find in all the great extended ‘fanciful flights’, as Lewes called 
them, in Dickens – with ‘flights’ doing double duty here in Sikes’s case, although the 
epistolary vision of Venice I quoted in my introduction is not so different, as I shall 
explain below. Jasper himself has just killed Drood in his dream, but Pip’s vision of 
Barnard’s Inn, say, is no less intense. You find a wonderfully paradoxical distillation 
of Stewart’s ‘expensive repetitions’ or Reed’s ‘riches of redundancy’ in the oxymoron 
‘These were but two, but they were everywhere’, which is amplified by the hideously 
quasi-comic procedure of its repetition in ‘The eyes were there’ (Reed 85). The 
repetition is redundant because we have already been told the eyes were 
‘everywhere’, so naturally they ‘were there’; but it is also redundant because they just 
were there – we were just told they were there. Delusion has acquired its own logic. 
Indeed, it is almost as if ‘there’ was by this point ‘the accustomed place’ for the eyes. 
In this way, repetition, contrary to Taylor Stoehr’s suggestion in the last chapter that it 
was an expression of ‘simple scanning, from point to contiguous point’, marks 
change. It is only ever ostensibly redundant. 
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The problem for Sikes is that nothing is really ‘in its accustomed place’ – the 
body is there in his mind’s eye, and though dead it is pursuing him like Madame de la 
Rue’s  ‘Phantom’ – which is why the ‘vision’ is ‘torture’. But for Dickens, this is the 
opposite of a problem. Scenes and their things and people not being in their 
‘accustomed place[s]’ is the essence of aesthetic success. In those two examples I just 
alluded to, Jasper wants them that way – his ‘accustomed place’ is the awful bondage 
of Cloisterham – while Barnard’s Inn not being Pip’s ‘accustomed place’ is why it is 
so objectionable. We see it in the example of BH’s opening page, which I discussed in 
chapter one. The description turns something entirely natural, the ambience of fog in 
London, into something dread and portentous. It makes it, indeed, no different from 
the vision of Nancy’s corpse that ‘torture[s]’ Sikes’. Dickens writes as if the narrator 
was responsible for ‘the death of the sun’ and is suffering never to escape it, as if 
stuck in Todgers’ ‘devious mazes’. In her great essay on ‘The View from Todgers’s’ I 
cited in the last chapter, Van Ghent finds ‘naked and aggressive existence’ both in the 
view and in the Dickensian world broadly. The view is alienating, its constituents in 
rebellion against the pleasing yoke of literary coercion. Yet ‘naked and aggressive’ 
existence is also in opposition to a force that would efface their ‘existence’. This force 
finds expression in words like ‘mud’, ‘fog’, ‘shadow’, dark’, in the traumatic rote of 
their repetition. I think Dickensian description, with its mixture of the metaphors that 
resist coercion and the anaphoric consolidation that asserts it, gains much of its energy 
from these two opposing forces. 
 
If I may quote at length one last time in this thesis, this description of the Six 
Jolly Fellowship Porters from OMF is a perfect example of what I have been arguing. 
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We know how fastidiously Dickens planned his later novels, but this seems utterly 
extemporaneous, as apparently misshapen and liable to collapse as the tavern itself: 
 
The Six Jolly Fellowship Porters, already mentioned as a tavern of a dropsical 
appearance, had long settled down into a state of hale infirmity. In its whole constitution it had 
not a straight floor, and hardly a straight line; but it had outlasted, and clearly would yet 
outlast, many a better-trimmed building, many a sprucer public-house. Externally, it was a 
narrow lopsided wooden jumble of corpulent windows heaped one upon another as you might 
heap as many toppling oranges, with a crazy wooden verandah impending over the water; 
indeed the whole house, inclusive of the complaining flag-staff on the roof, impended over the 
water, but seemed to have got into the condition of a faint-hearted diver who has paused so 
long on the brink that he will never go in at all.  
This description applies to the river-frontage of the Six Jolly Fellowship Porters. The 
back of the establishment, though the chief entrance was there, so contracted that it merely 
represented in its connexion with the front, the handle of a flat iron set upright on its broadest 
end. This handle stood at the bottom of a wilderness of court and alley: which wilderness 
pressed so hard and close upon the Six Jolly Fellowship Porters as to leave the hostelry not an 
inch of ground beyond its door. For this reason, in combination with the fact that the house 
was all but afloat at high water, when the Porters had a family wash the linen subjected to that 
operation might usually be seen drying on lines stretched across the reception-rooms and bed-
chambers.  
The wood forming the chimney-pieces, beams, partitions, floors and doors, of the Six 
Jolly Fellowship Porters, seemed in its old age fraught with confused memories of its youth. 
In many places it had become gnarled and riven, according to the manner of old trees; knots 
started out of it; and here and there it seemed to twist itself into some likeness of boughs. In 
this state of second childhood, it had an air of being in its own way garrulous about its early 
life. Not without reason was it often asserted by the regular frequenters of the Porters, that 
when the light shone full upon the grain of certain panels, and particularly upon an old corner 
cupboard of walnut-wood in the bar, you might trace little forests there, and tiny trees like the 
parent tree, in full umbrageous leaf.  
208 
The bar of the Six Jolly Fellowship Porters was a bar to soften the human breast. The 
available space in it was not much larger than a hackney-coach; but no one could have wished 
the bar bigger, that space was so girt in by corpulent little casks, and by cordial-bottles radiant 
with fictitious grapes in bunches, and by lemons in nets, and by biscuits in baskets, and by the 
polite beer-pulls that made low bows when customers were served with beer, and by the 
cheese in a snug corner, and by the landlady’s own small table in a snugger corner near the 
fire, with the cloth everlastingly laid. This haven was divided from the rough world by a glass 
partition and a half-door, with a leaden sill upon it for the convenience of resting your liquor; 
but, over this half-door the bar’s snugness so gushed forth that, albeit customers drank there 
standing, in a dark and draughty passage where they were shouldered by other customers 
passing in and out, they always appeared to drink under an enchanting delusion that they were 
in the bar itself. (67-68) 
 
It would seem as if Dickens wants us to be under that same ‘enchanting delusion’. 
And we are, apparently in spite of the passage’s ‘distortion’, its absolute contrivance, 
but actually because of it. To quote Shklovsky one more time, the scene is ‘perceived 
not spatially but, as it were, in its temporal continuity. That is…the object is brought 
into view’ – which is to say, brought before the hearer’s eyes: we and Dickens are 
‘seeing things’ (Theory 12). The contrivance is what I am interested in, the way the 
passage seems ‘stamp[ed] and form[ed]’, to use John Carlos Rowe’s definition of 
hypotyposis. The contrivance emerges most fully in what appear to be a series of 
connotations extrapolated from idle puns by Dickens’ quick fancy. ‘Dropsical’ earlier 
on – ‘a red-curtained tavern, that stood dropsically bulging over the causeway’ – 
seems to yield the fancy of a house with ‘toppling oranges’ for windows that is 
slumping into the water it is ‘all but afloat’ in yet somehow resisting that final drop it 
is ‘impending over’ like ‘a faint-hearted diver’ (36).  Even the water itself seems in 
part to arise from ‘Porters’, which as with ‘dropsical’ (‘drop’) includes a word with a 
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different meaning, ‘port’. Likewise the word ‘sprucer’, through its other meaning, a 
tree, seems to yield the ‘wilderness’, or any rate the ‘little forests’. Or perhaps it is the 
‘wilderness’ that yields the ‘little forests’. The idea of wood in general has emerged 
from the previous chapter, in which Dickens introduced us to the wooden-legged Silas 
Wegg, a ‘knotty man, and a close-grained’, words that recur in slightly altered 
versions here. Wegg’s personal woodeness means he ‘seemed to have taken his 
wooden leg naturally, and rather suggested to the fanciful observer’ that he would be 
‘completely set up with a pair of wooden legs in about six months’.  
 
This passage works as the mind of that ‘fanciful observer’, who is really the 
same observer, works: through wayward contiguities that are nevertheless figurative, 
transmutative, more than metonymic. As with the aforementioned connections, so 
with the ‘toppling oranges’, which also appear to have emerged from the previous 
chapter. They yield the ‘lemons in nets’, almost as if the latter were ‘toppling’ citrus 
fruits for which the precaution of a ‘net’ had happily been taken, the ‘net’ implying 
their potential to ‘drop’. The ‘toppling oranges’ also show us the contrivance of the 
metaphors. Even if we can accept that windows can be ‘corpulent’ as a ‘cask’ – where 
‘corpulent’ recurs – can, how can they be like ‘toppling oranges’? It is all apparently 
wilful. Dickens wittily imputes to the things themselves their own wilful similes, 
writing of ‘the wood’ that ‘here and there…seemed to twist itself into some likeness 
of boughs’ when it is actually Dickens doing the ‘twist[ing]’, Dickens providing the 
‘stamp and form’. Notice too the rapidity of these changes, their provisionality. What 
seems encompassing is the ‘wild fancy’ I referred to earlier. As with Venice in the 
introduction, the point is ‘seeing things’, not seeing things; fancy matters more than 
knowledge. Just as Sikes finds it ‘worse to fancy the eyes, and imagine them…than to 
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see them’ – which is to say, more affecting to do so – so here it is more affecting to 
‘fancy’ and ‘imagine’ the tavern, to wrest these prodigies from it, than to ‘see’ it. 
 
The passage recalls the quote from Peter Carey’s Jack Maggs in my second 
chapter. The composite of Dickens and Inspector Bucket’s physician disguise is 
‘incredible, ridiculous, and yet [it] existed, given life by some violent magic in his 
creator’s heart’. So is this passage, and so it does. It is an enormous distortion, and I 
have not even mentioned the infelicities and circumlocutions. It is ‘bulging’ yet 
‘snug’, but, though impossibly ‘the bar’s snugness so gushed forth that, albeit 
customers drank there standing, in a dark and draughty passage’, as though snugness 
could gush, at which moment it would surely cease to be snug (contradicting not just 
itself but the earlier ‘no one could have wished the bar bigger,’ which is only true if 
you are under the ‘enchanting delusion’). A ‘snugness’ that ‘gushed’ is anyhow a 
mystery, ‘gushed’ having been suggested by the beverages (‘draughty’ is stirring with 
semantic possibilities, though they are limited to an ordinary pun). Yet, of course, the 
snugness would be gushing if the entire tavern were ‘afloat’, as we have been told it 
‘all but’ is at ‘high water’. In this way the whole thing, through what J. Hillis Miller 
calls ‘self-generating reverie’, has developed its own sense, even cogency.  
 
I hope that, after its own at times tortuous procession, this thesis has too. It has 
sought to question, meditate on and finally explain how such a ‘preposterous’ place as 
the Six Jolly Fellowship Porters can seem to be there before us in such a compelling 
guise. Dickens, in Taylor Stoehr’s words from the last chapter, ‘makes the scene 
appear to present itself, so that the total effect is not realistic at all, but magical, even 
supernatural’; yet, as Stoehr also notes, it nevertheless persuades us of its realism. 
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That is hypotyposis, ‘a presentation’ that insists on its own reality however 
‘preposterous’ through its rhetorical persuasiveness. I hope my rhetorical 
persuasiveness in this thesis has sufficed to do justice to Dickens’, and by extension 
my argument. Ultimately, though, the thesis is less an argument for hypotyposis than a 
pretext for an appreciation of this ‘magical’ quality. Happily for us, there is so much 
of it to appreciate.
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